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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Environmental Economics
by
Yanjun Liao
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Mark Jacobsen, Chair
This dissertation contains three essays exploring how economic agents and markets
respond to weather events and natural disasters.
Chapter 1 examines whether short-run weather fluctuations affect the decision to go solar
by residential customers in California. The results show that residential customers whose sign-ups
are followed by less sunny weather are more likely to cancel their contracts. This behavior is
inconsistent with rationality, as a solar PV system is a long-term investment whose return is not
affected by short-run weather fluctuations. I analyze this behavior further using a theoretical
model of projection bias combined with engineering models of solar power production and energy
demand.
xii
Chapter 2 studies housing market responses to hurricanes using detailed data on Florida
housing markets during 2000-2016. We identify the causal effects of hurricanes in a difference-in-
differences framework exploiting the exogeneity of hurricane path and timing. The results show
that the housing market is dominated by a negative supply shock lasting up to three years. While
these effects are transitory, we show that they are associated with the arrival of home buyers
whose income is higher, holding fixed the quality of homes transacted. This implies a lasting shift
in the local economic profile towards higher income, along with potential gentrification.
Chapter 3 investigates whether and how voters’ preferences on environmental policy
are reflected in legislative elections. People’s belief in climate change is known to be affected
by experiencing extreme weather events. We study the electoral responses to these randomly
occurring events in House of Representative elections. To focus on the channel of environmental
preference, we estimate differential responses based on the environmental ideology of the incum-
bent congressperson conditional on party membership. We find evidence that climate-related
extreme weather events motivate political giving to challengers of anti-environment incumbents,
increase the overall competitiveness in these races, and lead to a lower probability of re-election
for these incumbents.
xiii
Chapter 1
Weather and the Decision to Go Solar:
Evidence on Costly Cancellations
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of short-run weather fluctuations on solar panel adoption in
California. This decision appears to respond strongly to weather patterns associated with solar
panel productivity: I find that customers whose sign-up for solar panels is followed by unfavorable
weather are more likely to cancel their contracts. In contrast, non-residential customers are not
subject to the same effect. Together, these results suggest that short-run weather conditions affect
customers’ valuation of solar panels. The most plausible mechanisms are psychological biases
such as projection bias or a salience effect, leading the decision-maker to rely too heavily on
transient conditions when predicting long-run utility. This paper is among the earliest to document
evidence of behavioral anomalies in the solar market.
1
1.1 Introduction
Many important economic decisions require the consumer to estimate future utility. When
purchasing a durable good, the consumer needs to trade off her future utility against the present
cost of purchase. Standard economic theory assumes that these estimates are accurately and
consistently made, but emerging evidence shows that psychological mechanisms can often
interfere.1 For example, people with projection bias tend to exaggerate the degree to which future
state will resemble the current state. People may also be affected by the salience effect, where
current conditions accentuate certain attributes of a good and lead to a change in valuation.2
In this paper, I study whether residential solar customers are affected by short-run weather
in their decision to acquire a solar photovoltaic (PV) system. If the current weather is favorable
for real-time solar power generation, we might see more sign-ups because the benefit of a solar
PV system is more salient, while bad weather would have the opposite effect. Moreover, because
solar panels are not immediately installed after sign-up, weather conditions during the waiting
period may also affect the customer’s valuation of the system and lead to cancellation. These
implications, with a focus on cancellations, are empirically tested in this paper.
Using transaction-level administrative data from the California Solar Initiative (CSI), a
statewide subsidy program, I find that residential customers are more likely to cancel their solar
contracts when they experience worse weather after signing up. Specifically, a one-standard-
deviation decrease in solar radiation is associated with a 7.1-9.8% increase in cancellations,
which, in turn, account for 12.06% of all CSI applications. This effect is identified using variation
within each season while controlling for individual system characteristics and monthly economic
conditions. It is consistent with the aforementioned psychological mechanisms and robust
across a variety of other specifications, including county-quarter-year fixed effects, month fixed
1See DellaVigna (2009) for a review.
2Empirical evidence on projection bias: Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang (2007), Magistris and Gracia
(2016), Busse, Pope, Pope, and Silva-Risso (2015), and Simonsohn (2010). Empirical evidence on salience effects:
Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013), Hastings and Shapiro (2013), and Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2012).
2
effects, nonlinear models, and alternative weather controls.3 Moreover, I find that non-residential
customers are not subject to the same effect. This is likely because their decision-making process
is less susceptible to psychological factors in general.
Solar PV investment has some unique features that make it difficult to reconcile the above
results with rational mechanisms. First, solar panels typically last more than 25 years. Short-run
weather fluctuations prior to installation do not affect the return to such a long-run investment.
Second, solar companies commonly provide estimates of electricity savings based on micro-
climate to potential buyers. Short-run weather fluctuations do not contain useful information in
addition to those estimates. For these reasons, the results also cannot be explained by present bias
unless the discount rate is very large and the weather is very persistent.
As an outcome of interest, the cancellation of a signed contract has a number of advantages.
In terms of interpretation, a cancellation directly reflects that the customer decides ex post that
the contract was a mistake. Projection bias can thus be directly tested using this decision margin,
as discussed in the literature (Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang, 2007; Busse, Pope, Pope,
and Silva-Risso, 2015). Furthermore, the cancellation often entails a penalty which supports the
interpretation of a change in valuation.4 An obvious alternative is purchase: consumers with
projection bias are more likely to purchase solar panels on sunnier days. It is tempting, therefore,
to estimate whether there are more purchases on sunny days.5 However, the implications of such
a pattern of purchase are less clear than cancellation. For instance, a solar purchase might simply
be due to increased awareness of solar power rather than higher valuation by the customer. Also,
a sunny day might “harvest” solar purchases that would have occurred rationally, which implies
minimal welfare impacts. In contrast, cancellations necessarily carry losses in overall welfare in
the form of wasted effort by both the contractor and the customer in coordination, negotiation,
3By controlling for a rich set of fixed effects, I use the remaining random variations in weather to identify the
causal effect on cancellations. This fixed effects framework is first used in Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) and
later adopted in numerous papers in the climate-economy literature. See Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014) for a review.
4Section 1.3 provides more details on the cancellation process and the associated costs.
5A concurrent paper (Lamp, 2018) examines this outcome in Germany. As supplemental evidence, I also look at
solar sign-ups and find results that are similar in direction and scale.
3
site inspection, and other contracting costs. Another key advantage of cancellation over purchase
is data availability. Cancellation can be analyzed at the individual level, whereas purchase can
only be examined at an aggregate level due to lack of information on all potential buyers.
I examine how current weather can impact a customer’s decision by explicitly modeling
her over-dependence on current conditions along two dimensions. The model allows weather to
affect the customer’s valuation by (1) a “solar production” channel that affects her prediction of
future solar generation, and (2) an “increasing rate” channel where solar generation displaces
electricity on different price tiers. Applying engineering models, I transform the weather variables
into two indices that represent the two channels. I then estimate the effects of these indices jointly.
The results show that cancellation responds most strongly to variations in short-run solar panel
productivity. I also show evidence that negative updates in weather conditions relative to the
pre-contract period play an important role, and the responses are particularly strong for customers
who sign up following a period of above-average weather. These results lend further support to
the psychological mechanisms.
Lastly, I explore heterogeneous responses along various dimensions. I first examine
whether customers from neighborhoods with higher solar-market penetration respond differently
to weather. I find that they are less likely to cancel, which is consistent with the peer effects
identified in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). However, they are not less responsive to weather.
There are heterogeneous effects on other margins: the weather effect is larger for customers
whose system is owned by a third party, whose neighborhood of residence is more urban, and
whose sign-up was followed by an imminent decrease in the incentive rate.
This paper makes several contributions. It is closely related to a growing literature in
behavioral economics that presents “smoking gun” evidence of projection bias and salience effects
in the field (Busse, Pope, Pope, and Silva-Risso, 2015; Chang, Huang, and Wang, 2018; Conlin,
O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang, 2007; Hastings and Shapiro, 2013; Lamp, 2018; Simonsohn, 2010).
Rather than studying the effect of weather on the purchase decision as most previous studies do,
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this paper highlights the importance of weather updates, especially negative ones, in changing
the customers’ valuation. Furthermore, because a solar PV system is a big-ticket item with an
instrumental nature, the findings suggest that such biases are more pervasive and economically
important than previously understood.
This paper also adds to the literature that documents the behavioral anomalies in energy
efficiency investments. Consumers are often found to mis-optimize due to inattention, imperfect
information, or myopia (Allcott, 2011; Allcott, 2013; Attari, DeKay, Davidson, and De Bruin,
2010; Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer, 2013; Hausman, 1979; Ito, 2014; Sallee, 2014). The
decision to invest in solar PV is, in many ways, similar to the decision for energy efficiency.
Therefore, the behavioral mechanism identified in this paper is also relevant for any energy
efficiency investment whose real-time productivity depends on transient conditions.
Such behavioral anomalies have profound policy implications. They provide the basis
for paternalistic intervention in energy efficiency (Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky, 2014;
Allcott, 2016). They can also be targeted in new behavioral programs to achieve much higher cost-
effectiveness than traditional economic incentives (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Gillingham,
Keyes, and Palmer, 2018). These lessons also apply to solar policies. In the U.S., there are many
solar subsidies at the federal, state, and local levels. However, prior evaluations show that these
programs often cost more than the environmental and industrial benefits they generate.6 It will
be fruitful for future policy to incorporate insights from the behavioral sciences. As behavioral
research on consumer choice regarding solar is limited, the current study is an early effort in that
direction. The findings reveal opportunities to improve welfare by presenting potential customers
with accurate information and cautioning them against over-dependence on short-run weather
conditions, thereby reducing costly cancellations.
6Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2017) and Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) both find that the cost of carbon
mitigation in subsidy programs is much higher than the social cost of carbon. Bollinger and Gillingham (2014)
find that non-appropriable learning-by-doing in the solar industry similarly do not justify the cost. Furthermore,
Borenstein and Davis (2015) notes the distribution of benefits of such programs are highly regressive. More generally,
see Baker, Fowlie, Lemoine, and Reynolds (2013) for a review on the cost and benefit of solar electricity.
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1.2 Weather in the Decision to Go Solar
This section presents a simple model to illustrate how specific weather patterns might
affect customers’ valuation of solar panels. It is adapted from existing theory on projection
bias, but the implications are applicable to other psychological channels where consumers are
over-influenced by current conditions.
1.2.1 An Illustrative Model on Projection Bias
Projection bias refers to the tendency for people to exaggerate the degree to which the
future state will resemble the current state. As modeled in Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin
(2003), this framework distinguishes between u(G,s1), the actual utility from using good G in
period one (with state s1), and u˜(G,s1|s0), the “projected” utility based on the current period
(with state s0). A simple representation of over-influence by the current state is
u˜(G,s1|s0) = (1−α)u(G,s1)+αu(G,s0), (1.1)
where α is between 0 and 1. When α is nonzero, the projected utility is different from the actual
utility and biased towards the period-zero utility. At the current period, the projected total utility
from purchasing a good that lasts from period 1 through T is given by
U˜(G|s0)≡
T
∑
τ=1
δτu˜(G,sτ|s0)
= (1−α)U(G)+αδ
(1−δT
1−δ
)
u(G,s0),
(1.2)
where U(G) = ∑Tτ=1 δτu(G,sτ) is the discounted sum of the stream of actual utilities. The second
equality follows from substituting in Equation (1.1). Therefore, the current state biases the total
projected utility.
In the context of solar adoption, I consider the relevant states as different weather con-
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ditions. Households decide whether to go solar by weighing the projected total utility against a
fixed cost. Therefore, although current weather does not affect the true utility (U(G)) at all, it
affects the projected utility and hence the decision of the marginal customer. This has two testable
implications:
(I1) Better weather leads to a higher probability of signing up for solar.
(I2) Worse weather after the sign-up leads to a higher probability of canceling the contract.
While we can test both implications, there are conceptual and practical differences between them.
Section 1.3.2 provides a detailed discussion on these issues.
1.2.2 Channels: Solar Production vs. Increasing Rate
The return to a solar PV system in each period depends on the total electricity bill savings
in that period, which depends on the amount of power it generates and the cost of the displaced
electricity.7 I assume that the current period utility equals to the reduction in electricity bill under
net metering, which takes the following form:
u(G,s0) =
∫ D(s0)
D(s0)−E(s0)
P(v)dv. (1.3)
D(s0) is gross electricity demand, E(s0) is solar power production, and D(s0)−E(s0) is the net
demand that eventually enters into the price schedule. P(·) is the marginal price schedule of
electricity and is weakly increasing in electricity usage due to the increasing-block pricing scheme
in California.8 As illustrated in Figure 1.1, Equation (1.3) is essentially measuring the shaded
area for given electricity demand D and solar power production E.
7Some solar customers might have “green” preference. The model accounts for such preference so long as “green”
utility is proportional to solar power generation. Other forms of green preference are ignored for simplicity.
8See Borenstein (2012) for details on electricity pricing in California. This rate structure is a major option for
electricity pricing. It is also adopted in other important solar markets such as China.
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D − E D Demand (kWh)
P ($)
∫ D
D−E
P (v)dv
Figure 1.1: Benefit from Solar PV System
For simplicity, assume the scalar s0 is a sufficient statistic that summarizes the state of the
world in period zero. It is clear that s0 affects the projected total utility through both D(s0) and
E(s0). More formally, we can derive
dU˜(G|s0)
ds0
= αδ
(1−δT
1−δ
)[
P|D(s0)−E(s0) ·E ′(s0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Solar Production Channel
+
(
P|D(s0)−P|D(s0)−E(s0)
) ·D′(s0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Increasing Rate Channel
]
. (1.4)
Equation (1.4) highlights the two channels through which weather might affect the decision to
go solar. The first term represents the solar production channel. When the current weather is
unfavorable for solar power production, customers might underestimate the lifetime productivity
of the solar PV system. The second term represents the increasing rate channel. During periods
of greater energy demand, such as particularly hot or cold days, customers might overestimate
their future energy demand. In turn, they will perceive greater savings from the solar panels under
an increasing rate schedule.
Theoretically, the production channel will shut down when the solar PV system generates
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sufficient power to offset all electricity consumption in a year.9 On the other hand, the increasing
rate channel will shut down when solar generation is not large enough to move the net demand to
a lower price tier. In reality, however, these conditions are rare. It is worth noting that these two
channels do not necessarily go in the same direction. For example, extreme heat reduces solar
panel productivity but increases electricity demand for cooling. Another real-life complication is
that customers have been shown in this context to respond to average rather than marginal price
(Ito, 2014). We can account for this by replacing P(·) with a perceived price schedule that is
constantly increasing. Under the new schedule, the qualitative result in Equation (1.4) remains
valid.
1.3 Policy Background and Data
1.3.1 The California Solar Initiative (CSI)
The CSI is a solar rebate program in California for the customers of the three investor-
owned utilities (IOUs) covering most of California. It funds solar on commercial, agricultural,
government, and non-profit buildings as well as existing homes. Overseen by the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC), the program had a total budget of $2.167 billion between 2007
and 2016 and a goal to install approximately 1,940 MW of new solar generation capacity. Over
the years, California continues to be the leading solar market in the United States, accounting for
about half of the nationwide installed capacity.
An important feature of the program is that the rebate rate is designed to decrease
automatically based on the total volume of solar megawatts (MWs) with confirmed project
reservations (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). The exact timing of each step decrease is uncertain
to solar market participants. This design is intended to encourage learning-by-doing and lower
the cost of solar over time. During the sample period, the average cost has indeed been rapidly
9The billing cycle for California net metering customers is 12 months.
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Figure 1.2: Timeline of a CSI application
decreasing.
The main data source in this paper is the administrative dataset from the CSI. It contains the
universe of CSI applications, regardless of whether they are eventually completed. They represent
about 80% of all solar projects in California before 2012 and much less afterward, as the incentive
weakens. For each application, the dataset provides detailed information on system characteristics
such as the CSI rating (generation capacity), total cost, incentive amount, the sectors for the host
and the owner, and status of third-party ownership.10 More importantly, it contains the zip code
and relevant dates for each application, which can be matched to meteorological data at a fine
geographical scale.
Figure 1.2 shows the typical timeline for a CSI application, where unobserved events are
plotted above the line and observed ones below. The process begins with the household spending
an unknown amount of time to consider going solar. In this process, they might be in contact
with one or more solar contractors. Each contractor provides some relevant information such
as estimated bill savings, design options, and quotes. The consideration period ends when the
household signs a contract. This sign-up date is not observed. However, CSI records the date
when a rebate application is electronically submitted, at which point a signed contract is required
10The sectors include residential, commercial, government or non-profit. The host is usually the customer, or
where the system is physically located. Third-party ownership (TPO) means that the system is not owned by the host
but a third party such as a solar developer or investor.
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by program rules. The application might be submitted by either the homeowner or the contractor,
but the subsidy is mainly captured by the homeowner (Pless and Benthem, forthcoming). Because
a rebate is reserved for the homeowner at the current rate upon submission, the homeowner has
the incentive to submit as soon as possible. This makes the submission date an effective proxy for
the sign-up date.11
The majority of the applicants completed the installation and submitted the proof within
one year. For these projects, I calculate the complete duration as the number of days between the
initial application and the proof submission. On the other hand, 12.06% of the applications ended
up being canceled.12 Likewise, a cancellation duration can be calculated as the period between
the initial application and the recorded cancellation date.
In Figure 1.3, I plot separate distributions for complete duration and cancellation duration.
Because applications are subject to a one-year deadline, observations beyond one year are
excluded. The distribution of complete duration is single-peaked, relatively dispersed and smooth
with a 96.2% valid rate, which is what we would expect if most dates are reported accurately.
On the other hand, the distribution of valid cancellation duration has a highly concentrated peak
around a month, but it accounts for only 36.4% of all cancellations. In other words, the majority
of canceled projects have a recorded cancellation date beyond one year.
When a project is canceled, there is no incentive for either the solar company or the
customer to report to the CSI administrator on time. Thus, many cancellations might have gone
unreported until the deadline, when the administrative process requires the project status. Indeed,
when we look at the uncensored distribution of recorded cancellation duration (see Figure A.8
in Appendix A.4), there is strong evidence of bunching right after the deadline. Therefore,
these dates are not likely to reflect true cancellation time frame accurately. In Appendix A.4,
I investigate this reporting issue in more details and find that this is a pervasive issue across
11This is also confirmed by the author’s communication with a CSI staffer.
12According to the author’s interview with a major solar company, the cancellation rate observed in this dataset is
lower than their own records. The primary cancellation reason for their customers is that further assessment lowers
estimated capacity due to changes in parameters such as shading or azimuth.
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(a) Complete Duration (within 1 year) (b) Cancellation Duration (within 1 year)
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Complete and Cancellation Duration
Notes: Panel (a) shows the distribution of completion duration, and panel (b) shows cancellation
duration. Only observations before the 1-year installation deadline are included, which account
for 96.2% of the 136,002 completed projects and 36.4% of the 18,653 canceled ones.
program administrators and contractors.
1.3.2 Purchase and Cancellation
The theory above generates testable implications of weather fluctuations on purchase (I1)
and cancellation (I2). While both implications will be empirically tested, the focus will be on
cancellation for a number of reasons.
First, cancellation can be analyzed at the individual level and its interpretation is clear.
As first proposed by Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang (2007) and later discussed by Busse,
Pope, Pope, and Silva-Risso (2015), projection bias can be directly tested by finding evidence
of consumers deciding ex post that a decision was a mistake. In contrast, the sign-up decision
can only be examined in the aggregate. This is due to a data limitation: we only observe realized
transactions but not the pool of potential buyers. As a result, instead of examining the binary
purchase outcome, we test whether there are more purchases in a zip code when conditions
become favorable. This is similar to prior research on health insurance take-up (Chang, Huang,
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and Wang, 2018). However, it is difficult to interpret the effect as a change in customer valuation
of solar panels, as this interpretation assumes that the pool of potential buyers does not change
based on weather conditions. This assumption might fail if, for example, a sunny period increases
the pool of potential buyers by reminding them of solar power. The test of (I1) does not rule out
this possibility.
Second, cancellation reflects larger economic consequences than purchase. The California
state law specifies a cool-down period of three business days for the customers to freely cancel
their contracts. Outside of that period, a cancellation penalty can be charged legally, depending
on the solar contractor and the progress of the installation.13 Moreover, cancellation also means
wasted time and effort by both the contractor and the customer. In contrast, a positive correlation
between purchase and sunshine might simply reflect short-run postponement of sign-up with
minimal welfare implications.
Because many of the recorded cancellation dates are invalid, we need to make alternative
assumptions about the relevant time frame of the cancellation decision. I use two separate
assumptions in the main analysis. First, I assume that the cancellation decision is made within
the same time frame as installation. Thus, I use the median complete duration (113 days after
the sign-up) as the relevant window for every project. Alternatively, the reported cancellation
dates are more likely to be accurate if the duration is of a reasonable length (for example, less
than 180 days). For this subset of observations, I assume the relevant time frame is the 30 or 60
days before the cancellation or completion date.
While both are imperfect proxies of the true decision time frame, the two assumptions
complement each other in their strengths and weaknesses. In the first assumption, the 113-day
period is consistent with the typical installation time frame specified in solar contracts. However,
it is too long for some projects and too short for others. This introduces measurement errors in
13Anecdotes suggest that some companies impose no penalty if the work has not started, while others are notorious
for their strict cancellation policy. The penalty could include the deposit, which is typically 500-1000 USD, a
restocking fee if equipments have been ordered, and potentially more if the installation is in later stages. Some
customers sued their contractors in order to exit from a contract, which incurs additional legal fees.
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the relevant weather variables and attenuates the estimates. In the analysis, I test the robustness to
alternative period lengths and whether the results are further attenuated as we move further away
from the preferred length. The second assumption might capture the true decision time frame
better. There are reasons to believe that more recent experiences of weather are more important
for the decision, such as an increased urgency of the decision and recency bias. However, this
assumption excludes the majority of cancellations in the data while the first allows us to examine
all applications. Thus, the second assumption delivers stronger evidence while the first provides a
more complete picture.
Besides cancellation, I also examine the purchase decision. In particular, I am concerned
that favorable weather might lead some customers to overestimate the profitability of solar and
sign contracts that will eventually get canceled. In that case, mean-reverting weather trends might
introduce mechanical correlations between cancellation and post-contract weather. While this
phenomenon is still consistent with projection bias, the main estimates on cancellation and the
welfare consequences will be harder to interpret. In the empirical analysis, I address this issue by
examining whether favorable weather is associated with more sign-ups or larger systems. I also
explore how the dynamics of pre- and post-period weather jointly affect cancellations.
1.3.3 Solar and Weather Data
The weather data in this paper comes from two main sources. I obtain station-level data
on daily maximum temperature and wind speed from the Global Surface Summary of the Day
(GSOD) dataset at NOAA. I exclude weather stations with elevation above 1,500 meters, which
leaves 191 stations operating in the sample period to be matched with 1,428 zip codes. Based
on the center coordinates of each zip code, I find all the weather stations within 100 kilometers
(62 miles) and calculate the mean of observations from these stations, weighted by inverse
distance. These measures might not be precise for each application. This problem is less severe
for temperature – which is more smoothly distributed across space – but more severe for wind
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speed, which can be highly localized.
Surface solar radiation is a key weather element for solar power generation. I obtain daily
observations of solar insolation from the Prediction of Worldwide Energy Resource (POWER)
Project at NASA.14 This data is derived using satellite observations and provided at a 1◦ latitude
by 1◦ longitude resolution. For each zip code, I extract data using its center coordinates. As a zip
code is much smaller than a grid cell, it is likely to lie entirely in the same grid cell as its center
coordinates.
Finally, I convert daily observations of weather into summaries over the relevant period for
each application: average solar insolation, average wind speed, number of days with maximum
temperature below 40◦F and the same for above 100◦F.
1.3.4 Summary Indices for Solar Production and Energy Demand
The weather affects both energy demand and solar production, and both are related to the
value of a solar PV system. To understand which factor plays a bigger role, I construct a proxy for
each of the two factors and analyze their effects on cancellation simultaneously. These measures
are calculated using data for solar insolation, wind speed, and temperature. As regressors, they
allow for easier economic interpretations compared to the original weather elements.
Increasing rate (energy demand) channel. Weather affects energy demand mainly through
heating (cooling) in cold (hot) days. A common practice is to calculate heating and cooling
degree days (HDD and CDD):
HDD = 1{Temp < 65} · (65−Temp) and CDD = 1{Temp > 65} · (Temp−65).
Heat is a major driver of electricity use in California, as air conditioners and fans all run
14Solar insolation is the amount of electromagnetic energy (solar radiation) incident on the surface of the earth,
measured in MJ/m2 per day. See Stackhouse Jr, Westberg, Hoell, Chandler, and Zhang (2015) for methodology and
accuracy of this measure.
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on electricity. On the other hand, cold weather might be less relevant for solar in California
because of its mild winters. Furthermore, electricity is not the primary choice for heating in
Californian homes, accounting for only 8.5% of the heating demand (EIA, 2016). As a result,
the time series of peak demand in the California ISO system is characterized by large spikes
in the summer (see Appendix Figure A.2). This suggests that CDD is a good proxy for energy
demand while HDD is not. I also define total degree days (TDD), the sum of CDD and HDD,
as an alternative to further account for the smaller spikes in the winter. Finally, for each CSI
application i, I calculate the daily CDD and TDD and then average them over the relevant period
(length T ):
CDDi =
1
T
T
∑
τ=1
CDDiτ and T DDi =
1
T
T
∑
τ=1
T DDiτ.
Solar production channel. Real-time solar generation is a nonlinear function of several
weather elements. Solar energy generation is primarily affected by the intensity of solar radiation,
but the conversion rate is also affected by heat negatively and wind positively. I use a PV
performance model developed by Kleissl (2013).15 This model simulates solar panel output for
given inputs of weather and system characteristics. For each CSI application i, I generate a series
of daily indices by plugging in daily weather variables:
ProdIndexiτ = F(Solariτ,Tempiτ,WindSpeediτ), where τ= 1, ...,T.
Similar as before, I calculate the average in the relevant period:
ProdIndexi =
1
T
T
∑
τ=1
ProdIndexiτ.
Since I keep system characteristics the same across applications, the production index measures
how favorable the current weather is for solar power generation.
15See Appendix A.3 for more information on the model.
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1.3.5 Economic Controls and Demographic Characteristics
Variations in weather are usually orthogonal to most other variables, but it is less certain
in this study because weather variables are averaged over a period. Therefore, I also control for
economic conditions that might drive solar demand. I collected the following monthly economic
variables: leading index and unemployment rate from the FRED database16, the prime interest
rate, and index of consumer sentiment and buying conditions for the West region from the Survey
of Consumers. The CSI dataset does not provide individual demographics. Instead, I collect
zip-code average demographics including race, education, income, housing cost, household size,
etc. They are either from the 2010 Decennial Census or 5-year estimates from the 2011 American
Community Survey (ACS). I use them to analyze whether responses to weather are heterogeneous
across different communities.
1.4 Econometric Framework
The main analysis focuses on testing implication (I2), or how weather fluctuations in the
post-contract period affect the probability of cancellation. The baseline estimating equation is a
linear probability model17:
1(Cancel)izt = β1Solarizt +β2Weatherizt +β3Systemi+β4Econzt +δz+δy+δq+ εizt , (1.5)
where i denotes an application (project), z denotes the zip code, and t denotes the application date.
1(Cancel)izt is an indicator of whether project i is eventually canceled. Solarizt is the average
solar insolation in the relevant period for project i. Weatherizt is a vector of temperature and wind
16The leading index for each state predicts the six-month growth rate of the state’s coincident index, which in turn
measures the current state of economic activity.
17Nonlinear models such as Probit or Logit are valid alternatives. However, a Probit model with zip code fixed
effects might yield inconsistent estimates due to the incidental parameter problem (Greene, 2004). Results based
on Logit models are reported in the Appendix, but marginal effects cannot be calculated because fixed effects are
included.
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speed variables to which households might also respond, corresponding to the same post-contract
period. The coefficients on both solar and weather variables are of interest. Systemi is a vector of
system characteristics in each application, including CSI rating (capacity), third-party ownership,
and out-of-pocket unit cost. Econzt are economic conditions in the month of date t, including the
leading index, unemployment rate, prime interest rate, indices of consumer sentiment and buying
conditions. δz, δy and δq denote zip code, year and quarter-in-year fixed effects, where the year
and quarter are associated with the application date.
This specification incorporates a number of important considerations. First, it includes
the relevant solar and weather variables simultaneously. Solar insolation is technically the most
important factor in solar power generation and likely the most salient for customers. Wind
speed and extreme temperature bins are also technically related to solar production and energy
demand. Including them simultaneously addresses the concern of confounding weather patterns
(Auffhammer, Hsiang, Schlenker, and Sobel, 2013). It also allows us to jointly examine the solar
production channel and the increasing rate channel.
Secondly, this specification includes a rich set of fixed effects (FE) to account for non-
weather drivers of cancellation that might be correlated with the weather. The zip code FEs control
for cross-sectional correlations between weather amenities and neighborhood characteristics on a
fine scale. The year FEs control for any statewide economic and policy shocks as well as climatic
cycles such as the El Nin˜o Southern Oscillation. The quarter-of-year FEs control for seasonal
labor market conditions, which might lead to changes in demand for solar PV systems.
There is a trade-off in the choice of FEs: a richer set of FEs helps to rule out confounders,
but it also eliminates meaningful variations. Adding more FEs might also exacerbate the atten-
uation bias due to measurement errors in the weather variables. To examine this trade-off in a
transparent manner, I present four other specifications in the main analysis as refinements of
the baseline. In my preferred specification, I control for seasonal economic dynamics specific
to the county by quarter-by-county FEs, and any trend in solar PV installations – or common
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economic and policy shocks to the entire state – by year FEs. Another specification includes
county-quarter-year FEs, which addresses the concern that local policy or economic shocks might
be correlated with the weather deviations. I also test the robustness of the results by adding
zip-code-specific linear time trends where appropriate.
To further enhance identification, I control for economic conditions at the monthly level.
I also include individual system characteristics as they might drive cancellation. In the later
analysis of channels and other outcomes, I use the same set of FEs and controls because the
threats to identification are similar.
Lastly, since there are overlaps in the weather stations matched with different zip codes,
the standard errors are clustered by county in most tables. The number of clusters is 54.
1.5 Results
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics. For the main analysis, I exclude applications
whose host (customer) sector is non-residential, whose CSI rating is above 100 (less than 0.03%),
and whose application submission starts after September 1, 2015. After cleaning, there are a total
of 154,655 residential applications, of which 18,653 (12.06%) were eventually canceled. The
average system cost is $35,377.04, which is more expensive than most home appliances. The
average incentive amount is about one-tenth of system cost.
Canceled projects are larger and more expensive than completed ones. They are slightly
more likely to be third-party-owned (TPO), that is, hosted by the customer but owned by the solar
company. Canceled projects also appear to be located in zip codes with a slightly smaller fraction
of whites and college graduates, and with lower median income.
In the formal analysis below, I first present a set of results and robustness checks on Equa-
tion (1.5). This establishes that residential customers indeed respond to weather fluctuations in
the post-contract period. Then, I extend the analysis by further disentangling the solar production
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
All Applications Completed Canceled
Variable Mean SD Mean Mean
A. Application Characteristics
CSI rating 4.86 3.02 4.82 5.22∗∗∗
total cost ($) 35,377.04 23,829.66 35,090.3 37,467.7∗∗∗
incentive amount ($) 3,551.24 4,838.65 3,526.86 3,729.01∗∗∗
net unit cost ($) 6,897.71 3,179.06 6,901.94 6,866.86
third-party ownership (TPO) 0.500 0.500 0.495 0.541∗∗∗
year 2011.11 1.83 2011.09 2011.27∗∗∗
N 154,655 136,002 18,653
B. Weather
solar insolation 18.96 5.85 18.98 18.81∗∗∗
max temp (F) 74.50 9.40 74.53 74.24∗∗∗
#days(max ≤ 40) 0.0160 0.214 0.0157 0.0177
#days(max > 100) 3.24 9.50 3.26 3.14
wind speed (knots) 4.99 1.48 5.00 4.93∗∗∗
#(precipitation> 0) 23.43 17.46 23.43 23.45
production index 98.51 31.45 98.63 97.66∗∗∗
cooling degree days 2.81 3.94 2.82 2.76∗
heating degree days 5.92 4.74 5.91 5.97
total degree days 8.73 3.79 8.73 8.73
C. Economic Conditions
leading index 1.41 1.42 1.39 1.55∗∗∗
unemployment 10.02 1.78 10.01 10.15∗∗∗
prime interest rate 3.56 1.04 3.57 3.46∗∗∗
index of consumer sentiment 74.2 8.13 74.19 74.27
index of buying condition 128.07 13.12 128.07 128.17
D. Zip Code Demographics and Interconnection Characteristics
white (%) 67.30 15.88 67.53 65.65∗∗∗
bachelor degree (%) 36.15 17.87 36.29 35.12∗∗∗
median income ($) 79,414.95 27,052.83 79,617.02 77,940.58∗∗∗
monthly housing cost ($) 2,170.04 655.63 2,172.93 2,148.93∗∗∗
mean household size 2.86 .460 2.85 2.88∗∗∗
urban (%) 91.5 18.7 91.5 91.7∗
current installed base 198.68 191.54 200.94 182.12∗∗∗
installed penetration 16.61 15.06 16.77 15.38∗∗∗
Notes: The weather variables in panel B are calculated over the 113-day period following the application
submission. See Table A.1 for a description of the variables. Statistical significance of the differences
between the completed and canceled subsamples are indicated in the last column.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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and increasing rate channel, and by examining the dynamics of purchase and cancellation in
response to weather shocks before and after the contract. I also explore potential heterogeneous
responses from residential vs. non-residential systems, and across a host of different system and
neighborhood characteristics. Last but not least, I discuss the implications of the empirical results.
1.5.1 Do Cancellations Respond to Weather?
In this section, I estimate Equation (1.5) to examine whether solar customers respond
to weather shocks. The primary variable of interest is the mean solar insolation in the relevant
time frame after sign-up. For the same period, I also include the following weather variables: the
number of days with maximum temperature below 40◦F, the same for above 100◦F, and average
wind speed. Including them simultaneously addresses the concern of confounding weather
patterns and provides a first sense of the relative importance of the solar production vs. the
increasing rate channel.
As discussed in Section 1.3.2, I analyze two mutually-nonexclusive time frames: (a) 113
days after the sign-up and (b) 30 or 60 days before the completion/cancellation. Table 1.2 reports
these results. Columns (1)-(2) present estimates under time frame (a), columns (3)-(4) show
those under time frame (b) with a 60-day period, while (5)-(6) shorten the period to 30 days.
In each pair of columns, the first column uses the baseline specification with zip code, year,
and quarter-of-year fixed effects (FE), and the second allows the quarter-of-year FEs to differ
across counties. As discussed in Section 1.4, the latter is my preferred specification because it is
well-balanced between keeping meaningful variations and eliminating threats to identification.
The coefficient on solar insolation is negative and statistically significant throughout.
This implies that a residential customer exposed to less sunshine after sign-up is more likely to
cancel the contract. The baseline estimate suggests that a one-standard-deviation decrease in
solar insolation is associated with a 7.1% increase in cancellations, while the cancellation rate is
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12.06% among all applications.18 The preferred estimate in column (2) shows a 9.8% increase.
Despite using different variation in the data, the estimates in columns (3)-(6) are remarkably
similar in scale to column (2). Other aspects of the weather also appear to play a role. Higher
wind speed is positively associated with cancellation, and an additional hot day has the opposite
effect. On the other hand, the effect of an additional cold day is not stable in either direction or
scale. In California, such days are very rare. This might have been a major contributing factor to
unstable results.
The key estimate on solar insolation is robust to three alternative fixed effects (FE)
specifications: thethe inclusion of county-year FE, county-quarter-year FE, and month-of-year
FEs (see Appendix Table A.2 for results under time frame (a), and Table A.3 for those under time
frame (b)). It is also robust to varying the set of weather variables included in the model (Table
A.4), and adding zip-code-specific annual or quarterly time trends (Table A.5). Finally, Table A.6
reports the results from Logit regressions with similar fixed effects. Although the fixed effects
prevent valid calculations of marginal effects, the qualitative patterns are very similar and roughly
proportional to the linear model.
I also look into the potential weaknesses of each time frame. The main concern for time
frame (a) is that it might fail to capture the relevant period if the period length is not specified
optimally. Table A.7 shortens the post-period length to 70 or 90 days. All of the results stand
similar to before, as is expected from period lengths that are close to the optimal. On the other
hand, time frame (b) relies on using a subsample with valid cancellation dates. In the main results,
this is done by imposing a sample restriction to observations with a reported duration under 100
days. In Table A.8, I explore the effect of relaxing this restriction to include observations with
duration up to 150 and 200 days. The qualitative pattern and statistical significance remain the
same, but the scale of the estimates decreases. This is consistent with our expectation that these
prolonged reports are less likely to be accurate. To briefly sum up, the results under time frame (a)
18Calculation: β1×SD(Inso)/D.V.Mean = 0.146×5.85/12.06 = 7.1%.
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Table 1.2: Cancellation and Solar Insolation
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
solar insolation −0.146 −0.203 −0.186 −0.192 −0.186 −0.205
[0.055]∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗ [0.048]∗∗∗ [0.050]∗∗∗
wind speed 0.262 0.799 0.815 0.754 0.617 0.593
[0.241] [0.271]∗∗∗ [0.173]∗∗∗ [0.162]∗∗∗ [0.139]∗∗∗ [0.143]∗∗∗
#days(tmax < 40) 1.055 1.406 −1.278 −1.572 −0.698 −0.691
[0.383]∗∗∗ [0.520]∗∗∗ [0.489]∗∗∗ [0.361]∗∗∗ [0.450] [0.490]
#days(tmax≥100) −0.020 −0.024 −0.256 −0.330 −0.149 −0.214
[0.023] [0.021] [0.030]∗∗∗ [0.065]∗∗∗ [0.023]∗∗∗ [0.048]∗∗∗
Samplea
Time Frame First 113 First 113 Last 60 Last 60 Last 30 Last 30
Duration All All 0-100 0-100 0-100 0-100
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70
R2 (within) 0.033 0.035 0.072 0.076 0.071 0.074
N 154,519 154,518 62,069 62,062 62,069 62,062
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System characteristics and monthly economic
conditions are controlled for in all columns. Standard errors in squared brackets are by county. Full results
and additional specifications are reported in Table A.2 and A.3. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
a: Columns (1)-(2) use the full sample and a time frame of 113 days after the sign-up. Columns (3)-(4)
restrict the sample to observations with a reported duration of less than 100 days and use a time frame of 60
days before the completion/cancellation. Columns (5)-(6) are similar but shortens the time frame to 30 days.
and those using the most reliable subsample under time frame (b) are consistent with each other.
Next, I further disentangle the two main channels outlined in Section 1.2.2. Specifically, I
replace the solar and weather variables in Equation (1.5) with two indices corresponding to the
solar production channel and the increasing rate channel, respectively. This specification directly
estimates and compares the effects of the two channels following the logic of an encompassing
test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). The identifying assumption is that the other unobservable
concerns are orthogonal to these two channels.
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Table 1.3: Channel: Solar Production vs. Energy Demand
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ProdIndexpost −0.761 −0.792 −0.650 −0.687 −0.830 −0.793
[0.263]∗∗∗ [0.259]∗∗∗ [0.323]∗∗ [0.362]∗ [0.247]∗∗∗ [0.252]∗∗∗
CDD −0.260 −0.223
[0.297] [0.341]
T DD(=CDD+HDD) −0.126 −0.003
[0.279] [0.314]
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
R2 (within) 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.035
N 154,519 154,518 154,519 154,518 154,519 154,518
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All indices are normalized. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System characteristics
and monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered
by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The construction of the two indices is detailed in Section 1.3.4. The index for solar
production channel is generated from an engineering model. As expected, it is highly correlated
with solar insolation (ρ = 0.98). As the increasing rate channel works through changes in
energy demand, it is represented by either cooling degree days (CDD) or the sum of heating
and cooling degree days (TDD). Both indices are normalized so that the estimates correspond
to percentage point change in cancellation rate associated with an increase in the index by one
standard deviation.
Table 1.3 reports these results under time frame (a). In columns (1)-(2) where the
production index is the only regressor, its coefficients are negative and statistically significant.
Columns (3)-(4) account for CDD, resulting in slightly smaller and less precise estimates on the
production index. This might be driven by the correlations between the two indices. Nevertheless,
they are still much larger in scale and more significant than the coefficients on CDD. The last
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two columns switch to TDD to represent energy demand. The coefficients on TDD are even
smaller, while those on the production index are similar to columns (1)-(2) in scale and statistical
significance. Overall, these estimates suggest that the solar production aspect plays a greater role
in the customers’ decisions.
There are several possible explanations for the weak response through the increasing rate
channel. For one, the channel does not apply to customers whose marginal electricity rate stays
the same with or without the solar PV system. Moreover, customers tend to respond to average
rather than marginal rate, which attenuates the rate increase. In fact, the increasing rate schedule
might not even be salient in this decision. Lastly, for those customers who are primarily motivated
by green preference, the billing aspect is simply unimportant.
These results are robust to using the the alternative time frame (b) (see Appendix Table
A.9). Using the production index, I also examine the validity of using a linear specification. This
is done by plotting the non-parametric relationship between cancellation and the index using
a fitted local polynomial and a binned scatter plot (see Appendix Figure A.3). Both show a
mostly linear relationship. Last but not least, I examine the attenuation bias regarding assumption
(a) further. As discussed in Section 1.3.2, using a period length that is further away from the
optimal point will result in larger attenuation bias and smaller estimates. I test this prediction by
estimating the same model using alternative windows of 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 days to construct
the production index (see Appendix Table A.10). The estimates are increasing in the length
of period and all except for the 90-day one are statistically different from the main (113-day)
estimate. This pattern is consistent with the assumption that 113 days are close to the optimal
length.
1.5.2 Do Sign-ups Respond to Weather?
This section tests implication (I1), that more favorable weather leads to an increase in
purchase. This, in fact, is a recurring finding in the previous studies. I provide evidence in a
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similar vein. Unlike cancellation, this outcome cannot be analyzed at the individual level as we
do not observe all potential solar customers. The unit of analysis is zip-code-by-month instead.
Moreover, since the relevant period for the sign-up decision is harder to infer, I show results with
various pre-contract windows.
Table 1.4 shows these results with zip code, year, and month-in-year fixed effects.
Columns (1)-(3) use the number of applications as the dependent variable, and columns (4)-(6)
use its log. Three estimates are shown for each dependent variable, corresponding to an assumed
window of 1, 2, and 3 months for calculating the production index.19 The estimates are all positive
and statistically significant for both level and log. When the index increases by one standard
deviation, the level estimates suggest 0.6-0.9 additional applications and the log estimates suggest
a 11.6-21.5% increase. I further test for harvesting effects by augmenting column (1) with one
lead and six lags of the production index. Full harvesting implies that the positive effects of
favorable weather should be followed by negative effects of similar magnitudes so that the net
effect is zero. The results show that the positive effect peaks at a month later and reverses signs
afterwards, but the overall effect is positive. This suggests that harvesting drives part of the
dynamics in sign-up, but not entirely. These results align with Lamp (2018)’s main finding in
Germany and complements the above findings on cancellation. On the intensive margin, favorable
weather does not appear to induce systematic selections into larger system sizes (see Appendix
Table A.11).
1.5.3 Response to Weather Updates
This section examines how the cancellation decision is affected by the dynamics of pre-
and post-contract weather. Because cancellation reflects a change in valuation, it might be a
19The window starts from the current month. For example, column (2) uses the average production index in the
current and previous month.
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Table 1.4: Pre-period Weather and Purchase
(Zip-code-by-Month) Number of Applications log(Number of Applications)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-period Length 1Mo 2Mo 3Mo 1Mo 2Mo 3Mo
ProdIndexpre 0.551 0.931 0.891 0.116 0.215 0.212
[0.188]∗∗∗ [0.194]∗∗∗ [0.274]∗∗∗ [0.034]∗∗∗ [0.033]∗∗∗ [0.047]∗∗∗
D.V. Mean 3.36 3.36 3.36 - - -
R2 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.481 0.482 0.481
N 45,875 45,858 45,768 45,875 45,858 45,768
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of applications for columns (1)-(3), and its log for (4)-(6). The
unit of analysis is zip-code-by-month. The length of the pre-period used to calculate the production index is
indicated in the header. Monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared
brackets) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
response to an update in post-period weather relative to the pre-period.20 Therefore, analyzing
the response to weather updates can provide insight into how customers are processing weather
information at different points in time.
In Table 1.5, I examine whether the customers are responding to the change in post-period
weather relative to the pre-period (“weather update” henceforth). I use a 30-day pre-period, a
113-day post-period, and the baseline FE specification in this analysis.21 Column (1) estimates
the relationship between cancellation and the pre-period production index. The coefficient is
positive but insignificant. In column (2) I add weather update, which yields a negative and
statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that conditional on the pre-period weather,
customers respond to weather updates.
Column (3) tests whether a negative update has a different effect on cancellation than
20Two other studies have touched on this point. Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang (2007) control for weather
in both periods without explicitly examining updates. Chang, Huang, and Wang (2018) show evidence that the
comparison is important.
21Using a 60-day pre-period yields qualitatively similar results (see Appendix Table A.12). Results under
alternative FE specifications are also very similar and available upon request.
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Table 1.5: Responses to Weather Updates
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProdIndexpre 0.253 −0.472 −0.055
[0.235] [0.313] [0.287]
U pdate −0.802 −0.124 −0.257 0.368
[0.269]∗∗∗ [0.601] [0.203] [0.443]
Indicator =
1(U pdate < 0) −2.027
[0.404]∗∗∗
1(ProdIndexpre > Indexz) −0.383
[0.687]
1(ProdIndexpost < Indexz) 0.437
[0.351]
U pdate× Indicator −1.746 −0.556 −0.976
[0.555]∗∗∗ [0.314]∗ [0.334]∗∗∗
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
R2 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.033
N 154,519 154,519 154,519 154,519 154,519
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ProdIndexpre is the normalized average production index for a 30-day pre-contract period.
U pdate is the average post-period index minus the pre-period one. 1(U pdate < 0) indicates whether
U pdate is negative. 1(ProdIndexpre > Indexz) is an indicator of whether the pre-period index is higher
than the zip-code average, and 1(ProdIndexpost < Indexz) is whether the post-period one is lower. All
coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Indicator in the interaction term in the last rows refers
to the indicator variable that is included in the same regression. System characteristics and monthly
economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by
county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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a positive one. The motivation is that a positive update might not be as informative given that
these customers have already self-selected into a contract. I include an indicator of whether the
update is negative and an interaction term of the indicator and the update variable, so that the
latter will capture the differential effect of a negative update relative to a positive one. Indeed, the
interaction term completely absorbs the effect of the U pdate variable and becomes twice as large.
This provides strong support for different information contents between positive and negative
updates.
In the next two columns, I estimate a similar model but change the content of the indicator:
it indicates whether the pre-period index is higher than zip-code average in column (4); and
whether the post-period index is lower than zip-code average in column (5). Larger impacts are
found on both margins. These results suggest that the customers fail to recognize the transient
nature of weather shocks.
1.5.4 Heterogeneous Effects
This section explores whether responses are heterogeneous across a variety of customer
and neighborhood characteristics. I classify each observation under one of two categories based
on the characteristic of interest. I then estimate the differential responses by adding an interaction
term of the production index and an indicator for one of the categories.
An informative margin of heterogeneity is residential vs. non-residential customers. The
latter group – including small businesses, government agencies, and NGOs – are also eligible
for the CSI rebate. Compared to residential customers, their decisions are more likely to involve
formal profitability calculations and less prone to psychological effects. There are altogether
8,704 non-residential applications in the cleaned dataset, including 1,730 small systems (<10kW)
and 6,974 large ones (≥ 10kW). To apply for CSI rebate, the small systems follow the same
2-step procedure as residential projects while the large systems follow a 3-step process. Rather
than a signed contract, CSI requires the payment of an application fee within 30 days of the initial
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Table 1.6: Cancellations of Non-residential Applications
All Small Systems Large Systems
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 : ProdIndexpost −0.629 −0.669 −0.743 −0.779 −0.677 −0.714
[0.260]∗∗ [0.257]∗∗ [0.265]∗∗∗ [0.257]∗∗∗ [0.255]∗∗ [0.253]∗∗∗
β2 : ProdIndexpost 1.194 1.237 2.228 2.171 1.117 1.206
×1(non-resid) [0.569]∗∗ [0.567]∗∗ [1.536] [1.552] [0.766] [0.760]
β1+β2 0.565 0.568 1.485 1.392 0.440 0.492
p-value: β1+β2 = 0 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.59 0.54
R2 (within) 0.057 0.058 0.040 0.041 0.055 0.057
N 163,059 163,058 155,947 155,946 161,336 161,335
Non-residential sample
D.V. Mean 27.90 27.90 21.45 21.45 29.50 29.50
N 8,504 8,704 1,730 1,730 6,974 6,974
Fixed Effects
Zip-type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions use pooled samples of residential and non-residential applications. Columns (1)-(2)
include all non-residential applications, (3)-(4) include only small systems (<10kW), and (5)-(6) include only
large systems (≥ 10kW). The last two rows in the top panel show the value of β1+β2, which is the weather
effect for non-residential customers, and the corresponding p-value. The production index is normalized, and
all coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System characteristics and monthly economic conditions
are always controlled for. Zip-code-by-type FEs are included instead of zip code FEs. Standard errors (in
squared brackets) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
application for large systems. Overall, non-residential applications are much more likely to be
canceled (27.90%), potentially due to greater complexity in the financing and installation process.
The regressions largely follow the baseline and preferred FE specifications but change the
zip-code FEs into zip-code-by-type ones to control for finer cross-sectional variations. Columns
(1)-(2) in Table 1.6 pool the residential sample with all 8,704 non-residential applications, while
columns (3)-(4) include only small ones, and (5)-(6) include only large ones. The coefficient on
ProdIndex captures the effect of weather on residential customers and is similar to the original
estimates in Table 1.3. The interaction term has a positive coefficient in all columns. The sum of
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these two coefficients suggests a slightly positive effect for the non-residential customers, which
is the opposite of the effect on residential customers. The positive effect is even larger for small
systems that are comparable in size to residential projects. Despite this puzzling observation,
the F-test fails to reject having a null effect in all columns. Overall, these results suggest that
non-residential customers do not fall under the same behavioral influence.
Next, I explore heterogeneous responses among residential applications in locations with
different solar market penetration. As peer effects are found to play a role in the adoption of solar
panels (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012), they might also affect the cancellation decision. For
instance, a solar customer might be less likely to cancel her contract if her neighborhood has
more solar PV systems installed. That customer might also learn from her neighbors with older
systems to recognize the transient nature of the fluctuations in solar power generation. These
hypotheses are tested below.
Identification of peer effects in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) relies on the fact that
installation typically takes place with some delay after the sign-up, and the peer effects begin
only after the installation. The increase in the current installed base (past sign-ups) is thus
predetermined and uncorrelated with other contemporaneous shocks to the peer group, yielding a
consistent estimate. Following this logic, I construct two measures of solar market penetration
at the zip-code-by-month level and merge them with each application based on the sign-up
month. They are predetermined under the same assumption. The first statistic is the number of
all interconnected (installed) solar systems per thousand households, and the second is one for
systems that are at least one year old. These calculations are based on the net energy metering
(NEM) interconnection dataset, which contains all interconnected projects in California with
information on zip code and the relevant dates.
Table 1.7 presents results of regressing cancellation on the production index, market
penetration, and their interaction. Columns (1)-(2) are estimated using the current installed base
and (3)-(4) are estimated using those older than one year. The coefficient on the production
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Table 1.7: Peer Effects in Cancellations and Response to Weather
Current Installed Base Installed Base > 1 Year
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
ProdIndexpost −1.005 −0.716 −1.037 −.751
[0.412]∗∗ [0.367]∗ [0.401]∗∗ [0.351]∗∗
Penetration −0.096 −0.086 −0.124 −0.109
[0.028]∗∗∗ [0.027]∗∗∗ [0.047]∗∗ [0.046]∗∗
ProdIndexpost ×Penetration 0.017 0.001 0.027 0.004
[0.016] [0.013] [0.022] [0.017]
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
R2 0.054 0.032 0.054 0.032
N 150,859 151,029 150,859 151,029
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes
Zip Code-quarter Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Market penetration is defined as the number of interconnected systems per thousand households
in columns (1)-(2), and that of systems which have been interconnected for at least one year in columns
(3)-(4). The production index is normalized. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System
characteristics and monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared
brackets) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
index is similar to before. As for market penetration, one more system per thousand households
decreases cancellation probability by around 0.09 percentage point in columns (1)-(2), and 0.12
percentage point in (3)-(4). This finding complements the previous studies: peer effect not only
motivates the households to sign up but also prevents them from regretting afterward. However,
the coefficient on the interaction term remains small and statistically insignificant throughout,
suggesting that having neighbors with older systems might not guard against the psychological
effects of current weather.
I also explore whether responses differ with system and application characteristics (see
Table 1.8). Column (1) shows that larger systems are more likely to be canceled, and (2) shows
the same for those with a lower average cost. However, the small coefficients on the interaction
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneous Effects by System Characteristics
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Characteristic System Size Average Cost Third-Party Near Incentive
Above Median Above Median Ownership Step Change
β1 : ProdIndexpost −0.753 −0.787 −0.449 −0.595
[0.309]∗∗ [0.275]∗∗∗ [0.251]∗ [0.280]∗∗
β2 : 1(Characteristic) 1.723 −1.221 0.837 1.863
[0.383]∗∗∗ [0.615]∗ [0.522] [0.580]∗∗∗
β3 : ProdIndexpost 0.007 0.081 −0.638 −0.251
×1(Characteristic) [0.270] [0.210] [0.292]∗∗ [0.334]
β1+β3 −0.746 −0.706 −1.087 −0.846
p-value: β1+β3 = 0 0.010∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
R2 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.033
N 154,519 154,520 154,519 154,519
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The characteristic of interest is described in the header. In particular, the indicator in column
(4) records whether the application is within 47 days to the next incentive step change. The production
index is normalized. The last two rows in the top panel show the value of β1+β3, which is the weather
effect for customers with the characteristic of interest, and the corresponding p-value. All coefficients
are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Other system characteristics and monthly economic conditions are
always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by county.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
terms suggest that these characteristics do not systematically affect response to weather. Column
(3) examines third-party ownership (TPO). TPO is a financing option that allows the household to
acquire the system without paying a large up-front cost. The household signs a power-purchase
agreement (PPA) or a lease with the solar company, who owns the system.22 About half of all
applications in the data are under TPO. It is unclear whether customers with TPO systems should
be more or less sensitive to weather. On one hand, TPO partially insures the risk from weather
variations by compensating the customer when production is particularly low. On the other hand,
22PPA allows the household to pay a low fixed rate for the electricity generated from the system, while the lease is
similar to a loan which the household need to pay back.
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selection into TPO is not random, as the option is created to appeal to customers who are more
liquidity-constrained, risk-averse, or hesitant. The estimates suggest that they are much more
sensitive to weather: the weather effect on them is more than twice of that on self-owned systems.
Column (4) examines heterogeneous effects based on whether the application is submitted
near the next incentive step change. Step changes occur when the total solar capacity reserved in
the program exceeds certain thresholds. Although the exact timing of the change is unknown,
solar companies might still be able to anticipate an imminent step change. They might even
take advantage of it and push marginal customers to sign up in order to secure a higher rebate.23
Therefore, we might expect higher propensity to cancel and a stronger weather effect among these
customers. I calculate the number of days to the next step change for each application based on
the realized schedule.24 The sample is split by whether this duration is less than 47 days, the
25th percentile of this variable (see Appendix Figure A.5 for the distribution of days to next step
change).25 The result suggests that these customers did have a substantially higher probability of
cancellation. They are also slightly more sensitive to weather but this effect is insignificant.
Lastly, I examine whether there are heterogeneous responses across zip codes based on
aggregate characteristics (as household-level characteristics are not available). These zip-code-
level characteristics include median income, the fraction white population, the fraction with a
bachelor degree, the fraction of urban households, average household size, average housing cost,
whether the zip code is in Northern California, and whether it is in non-coastal counties. The
results are reported in Appendix Table A.13. The only notable pattern is that the responses to
weather are entirely driven by zip codes that have more urban households than rural ones. The
rest of the zip code characteristics do not seem to split the sample in meaningful ways. This might
be because these aggregate characteristics are not informative about the highly-selected group of
23According to a CSI staff, “... there was always a flurry of reservations and overall activity around step changes”.
24Source: https://www.californiasolarstatistics.ca.gov/reports/budget forecast/#Step.
25The results are robust to other thresholds in a similar range. There is no special reason to focus on the 25th
percentile. The threshold should be far enough from the step change to have sufficient identifying variations while
close enough to reflect imminent change.
34
solar customers (Harding and Rapson, 2013; Borenstein and Davis, 2015).
1.6 Mechanisms
In this section, I propose a number of psychological and rational mechanisms that might
have driven the effects of weather in the solar market. Each mechanism is evaluated against the
empirical evidence.
Projection bias. Projection bias is the tendency for people to exaggerate the degree
to which their future preference will resemble the present one. This leads solar customers to
overestimate the total utility of going solar when weather conditions bring higher marginal return
and regret when conditions worsen. The empirical evidence on both cancellation and sign-up are
consistent with the theoretical implications of projection bias in Section 1.2.
Misprediction of utility from a durable good comes in two types: mispredicting either the
path of states or the utilities generated in those states. They generate the same predictions and
have not been disentangled empirically in the literature (DellaVigna, 2009). Since solar panels
are largely instrumental, I argue that mispredicting the objective states is more plausible.26
Salience effects. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) propose a theory of context-
dependent choice, where a consumer’s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods. I find
empirical evidence that the solar customers respond most strongly to weather patterns associated
with solar productivity. One explanation is that sunny weather makes the benefit from solar panels
more salient relative to the cost, leading to more sign-ups. Likewise, gloomier weather reduces
the benefit-cost ratio by reducing the salience of the benefit, thus leading to regrets. Therefore,
this mechanism also generates implications that are consistent with the sign-up and cancellation
results.
One way to distinguish projection bias from salience effects is to test if the consumers are
26This interpretation might not be valid for cases where there is a large subjective component in the utility of
going solar, such as a customer with strong green preferences.
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responding to the absolute “levels” of weather rather than deviations from the norm (Busse, Pope,
Pope, and Silva-Risso, 2015). However, the test conflicts with our need to control for non-weather
seasonal confounders. For this reason, the literature, including this study, has not been able to tell
them apart.
Bayesian learning. Another possibility is that customers are in fact extracting useful
information from weather fluctuations to guide their decision. Below, I discuss two main scenarios
regarding how learning might occur.
First, the customers might need to learn about existing weather patterns because they were
previously inattentive. However, the fixed effects in the regressions preclude the identification of
this type of learning. Once the zip code fixed effects absorb most of the meaningful correlations
between the short- and long-run weather, the former is no longer predictive of the latter (see
Appendix Table A.14). It is also hard to reconcile with the cancellation results. By the time
of the sign-up, the customers should have been informed by the installers on the estimated
benefits. In particular, these estimates are based on simulations of local climate, thereby making
it unnecessary for the customers to directly observe the weather.
Second, the customers might be learning about climate change, which might affect the
desirability of solar power. Previous studies find that exposure to unusual heat increases people’s
belief in climate change (Li, Johnson, and Zaval, 2011; Deryugina, 2013). However, the temporal
fixed effects should have absorbed the gradual movements driven by climate change, again
precluding identification of meaningful learning. Furthermore, the effect of solar insolation
remains highly significant after controlling for extreme heat or cold, while extreme heat has
minimal effect on adoption (Table 1.2). Therefore, learning about climate change is also not
likely to be the main mechanism.
Supply-side factors. Supply-side factors might also drive adoption. If solar companies
ramp up their promotion efforts to take advantage of the good weather, it would directly increase
sign-ups and might also help reduce cancellations if the latter is affected by visible marketing
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efforts. The anecdotal evidence has been mixed. For instance, one salesman notes that it is
easier to make a sale in the summer than the winter. On the other hand, my interview with
a major company finds no high-level awareness or effort to incorporate current weather into
the marketing plan. While the importance of this mechanism is difficult to gauge, it ultimately
relies on people’s psychological reactions to the weather. To the extent it is important the results
should be interpreted as the overall effect, including the demand-side response together with any
amplification effect from marketing practices.
Another possibility is that the solar workers are more productive in better weather. Solar
salesmen and installers are outdoor workers whose labor supply and productivity are subject to
weather fluctuations (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014). This could potentially change the entire
interpretation because it is independent of any demand-side effect. In particular, one concern is
that the installation might be repeatedly re-scheduled due to bad weather, eventually leading to
cancellation. I partially test the veracity of this scenario by examining, among the completed
projects, whether the completion duration is longer when the average weather (as measured
by production index) is worse. There is no evidence of a significant relationship therein (see
Appendix Table A.15). Moreover, I find little effect of extreme heat in Table 1.2. This is also
inconsistent with the existing literature on heat and productivity where the biggest impact is often
associated with extreme heat. Overall, there is little evidence in support of worker productivity
being the main mechanism.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of short-run weather fluctuations on cancellations of signed
solar contracts in California. This decision appears to respond most strongly to short-run weather
patterns associated with solar panel productivity. The main result shows that customers whose
sign-up for solar panels is followed by unfavorable weather are more likely to cancel their contract.
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Furthermore, they are more likely to cancel when they experience worse weather after signing up
relative to before, suggesting that the negative update changes their valuation of solar panels. I
also find suggestive evidence that non-residential customers do not respond to weather, and the
marginal ones respond more. The most plausible mechanism consistent with all these results is
psychological, such as projection bias or a salience effect. Under such mechanisms, the customers
rely too heavily on current weather to predict their future utility from solar panels.
These results suggest that projection bias or salience effects can substantially affect the
demand for a big-ticket item such as a solar PV system. Compared to the other contexts studied
in the literature, such biases in solar PV adoption create new welfare implications and policy
challenges. Solar panels are under-adopted socially since electricity generated from fossil fuels is
not correctly priced. They might also be under-adopted privately for reasons similar to the case of
energy efficiency. Therefore, the undervaluation caused by these biases creates a much larger
welfare loss than over-valuation. This highlights the importance of continual communications
with the customers who are waiting for their systems to be installed, especially during periods of
unfavorable weather. Given that cancellation reflects a wasteful cycle of over- and undervaluation
created by weather fluctuations, it is also important to “de-bias” the customers and mitigate these
cycles.
Finally, there are several limitations in this paper. For each I propose a direction for future
work. The first limitation is not having the precise cancellation dates. While solar PV adoption is
an interesting context where projections are continually updated within the relevant period, the
lack of precise dates prevent me from exploring how the weather dynamics within this period
are incorporated into decisions. Second, without demographic information of the customers, I
am not able to fully examine whether the effects differ by education background, income, or
household structure. Documenting these heterogeneities can help researchers deepen the current
understanding of behavioral biases, and it can also help solar companies and behavioral programs
to better target vulnerable populations. Third, this paper finds that information provided by the
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solar companies or peer effects by neighbors do not eliminate such bias. Future studies can
explore more effective strategies. Answering these questions are important for both economic
modeling and policy design.
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Chapter 2
How Hurricanes Sweep Up Housing
Markets: Evidence from Florida
Abstract
This paper examines the impacts of hurricanes on the housing market and the associated
implications for local population turnover. We directly characterize equilibrium dynamics in the
housing market using micro-level estimates. For this purpose, we assemble a comprehensive
dataset by combining housing transactions, parcel tax assessments, and hurricane history in
Florida during 2000-2016. Our results show that hurricanes cause an increase in equilibrium
prices and a concurrent decrease in the probability of transaction for homes in affected areas,
both lasting up to three years. Together, these dynamics imply a negative transitory shock to the
housing supply as a consequence of the hurricane. Furthermore, we match buyer characteristics
from mortgage applications to provide the first buyer-level evidence on population turnover. We
find that incoming homeowners in this period have higher incomes, leading to an overall shift
in the local economic profile toward higher-income groups. Our findings suggest that market
responses to destructive natural disasters can lead to uneven and lasting demographic changes in
affected communities, even with a full recovery in physical capital.
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2.1 Introduction
About three hurricanes make landfall every year along the Gulf and east coasts of the
United States. In 2017 alone, these giant, spiraling tropical storms cost a total damage of $265
billion (USD).1 While statistics of direct property losses and fatalities are readily available,
many questions remain unanswered regarding the adjustments in the economy beyond immediate
impacts. Little is known about how the distribution of physical capital responds to stochastic
events like hurricanes. From a welfare perspective, the literature is only starting to investigate how
individuals cope with natural disasters and their heterogeneous ability in doing so.2 Answering
these questions is important for assessing the long-run consequences of and adaptations to
hurricanes.
Using transaction-level housing data from Florida, this paper studies the responses to
hurricanes in housing markets for up to ten years after the hurricane strikes. The housing market
offers a unique vantage point for understanding the interaction between natural forces and the
local economy. Across localities, housing market conditions correspond closely to changes in
population and long-run economic projections (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). They also determine
who has access to a given location, which, in turn, affects access to economic opportunities and a
range of important local amenities (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005; Kling, Liebman, and Katz,
2007; Chetty, Hendren, and Katz, 2016). Therefore, studying the housing market allows us to
understand how hurricanes affect both the distribution of physical capital and the welfare of the
affected population.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we estimate the causal impacts of
1Recent studies in climate science observe that hurricanes have been intensifying and traveling more slowly,
possibly due to anthropogenic climate change (IPCC, 2013b; Kossin, 2018). Continuation of these trends would
mean greater damages from hurricanes in the near term.
2This emerging literature is largely motivated by and focus on Hurricane Katrina. Earlier studies present
descriptive evidence of migratory decisions made by Katrina evacuees (Groen and Polivka, 2008; McIntosh, 2008;
Paxson and Rouse, 2008; Sastry and Gregory, 2014; Fussell, 2015). More recent studies identify causal impacts of
Katrina on its victims’ employment outcome and debt level (Gallagher and Hartley, 2017; Deryugina, Kawano, and
Levitt, 2018).
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hurricanes on the dynamics of housing prices and transaction probability in exposed areas.
Together, they characterize the equilibrium adjustments in the housing market after the destructive
impacts of hurricanes. While many factors in housing supply and demand can be affected
by hurricanes, this approach identifies the dominant effect and provides evidence on whether
the effect is temporary or more enduring. Second, we investigate the implications of these
adjustments on affected neighborhoods, including potential changes in local demographics and
housing characteristics. The direction of these changes is theoretically ambiguous: the large
initial damage by hurricanes might induce further deterioration of affected communities, but it
might also be neutralized in a full recovery, even lead to some type of creative destruction, as
suggested by anecdotal evidence3 and some past studies on aggregate growth effects (Skidmore
and Toya, 2002; Crespo Cuaresma, Hlouskova, and Obersteiner, 2008; Pelli and Tschopp, 2017).
This paper provides the first micro-level evidence on this question.
Our analysis focuses on Florida in 2000-2016. As the most hurricane-prone state in the
U.S., Florida has experienced hurricanes with different strengths, ranging from severe outliers
– such as Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina – to milder ones. Therefore, our results
represent the impacts of an average hurricane. We assemble a detailed housing dataset by
combining transaction records and county tax assessments. The transaction data cover 95% of
the universe of housing transactions. The tax assessments provide rich information on hedonic
characteristics of any given parcel in repeated observations, which we use to infer characteristics
of the transacted home with accuracy. As such, this dataset allows us to identify and track
individual parcels over time, observing most transactions and major renovations that took place
between 2000 and 2016.
We use a staggered difference-in-differences framework that exploits the randomness in
the paths and timing of several hurricanes. Treatment is defined, for individual parcels, as being
exposed to hurricane-scale wind speed. We construct a measure of exposure based entirely on
3See, for example, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/03/28/creative-destruction.
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physical and geographic attributes of the hurricanes. There is an important distinction between
being exposed and being damaged. An exposed house is one that lies in the approximate area
around the segment of the hurricane path with high wind speed, but not necessarily damaged.
Essentially, our strategy compares areas exposed to a hurricane to unexposed ones before and
after the hurricane.
We find that home prices increase in exposed areas in the three years following a hurricane.
Compared to unexposed areas, home prices in exposed areas are 5% higher on average during
this period, with a peak of 10% in the second year. This effect is identified in two models. The
first uses variation within census tract while controlling for house characteristics, seasonality,
and differential economic growth across counties. The second employs parcel fixed effects and
restricts the identifying variation to be coming from repeated sales of the same structure. The
direction and scale of the estimates are very similar across the two models, providing strong
evidence that the effect is mainly driven by within-home appreciation rather than a shift in the
composition of transacted homes.
We also find that the transaction probability of homes in exposed areas falls by 0.6
percentage points, or 6% of the baseline probability. The timing of this effect is the same as the
price effect: both last around three years before returning to the baseline. Taken together, they
suggest that the housing markets at exposed areas are dominated by a negative supply shock, but
this effect is temporary. These results are consistent with the mechanism that hurricanes lead to
significant physical damages to and destruction of part of the housing stock, thereby temporarily
contracting available supply, and in turn, reducing sales and driving up prices. Housing shortage
of this nature has been increasingly identified by media reporting on recent hurricane events.4
Moreover, it takes time for hurricane victims to seek financial aid from insurance companies or
federal agencies, and to eventually restore their damaged homes to habitable or salable conditions.
4See, for example, the Wall Street Journal’s coverage of the impact of Hurricane Irma in Florida Keys
(https://www.wsj.com/articles/hurricane-irma-destroyed-25-of-homes-in-florida-keys) or that of Hurricane Florence
in North Carolina (https://www.wsj.com/articles/hurricane-florence-creating-housing-shortage-for-displaced-north-
carolinians).
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This explains the duration of the effect.
While the adjustment in the market equilibrium appears to be transitory, it generates
lasting impacts on local demographics. We match a subset of our housing transactions to Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) records to obtain income and demographic information of the
home buyers.5 Using this subsample, we show that the average income of new buyers increases
nearly proportionally to the rise in home prices. This illustrates a greater ability of higher-income
individuals to acquire homes even in disrupted market conditions. Moreover, both average
transacted prices and buyer incomes return to the baseline level but not below in subsequent years.
The three-year increase thus leads to a stock effect of around 28% of homes being occupied by
households with higher income. In this light, hurricanes act as a place-based policy that leads to a
substantial increase in neighbors with higher income, which could spur subsequent neighborhood
improvements (Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007; Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 2008; Guerrieri,
Hartley, and Hurst, 2013; Diamond, 2016).
Our estimation strategy combines a staggered difference-in-differences framework and
the repeat sales model. The former is common among studies that use variation from several
hurricanes, but is often applied to aggregate data. On the other hand, the latter method is widely
used in the real estate literature to estimate price effects that are free of confounding shifts in the
composition of transacted homes. In particular, it is used in several papers to study the impact of
a single hurricane on housing prices (Bin and Polasky, 2004; Hallstrom and Smith, 2005; Bin and
Landry, 2013; Gibson, Mullins, and Hill, 2019). Our strategy extends this previous literature to a
broader set of hurricanes while maintaining a credible identification of within-home price change.
To our best knowledge, this is the first paper to employ this combination.
Our main point of departure from the literature on housing prices lies in the conceptual
framework. These studies follow the tradition of using hedonic regressions to estimate the
marginal willingness to pay for nonmarket goods, as first established in the seminal work by
5This subset of transactions are representative of the entire market in terms of home characteristics and price
dynamics.
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Rosen (1974).6 Their analyses focus on the hurricanes’ role in conveying risk information to
households. As full capitalization requires a fixed housing stock, most of these studies deliberately
avoid direct-hit locations and estimate the hurricane’s effect on flood risk premium in near-miss
areas. While perceived flood risk is a major factor in the adaptation to natural disasters, it is not
the only way in which hurricanes affect the final allocation of housing through market interactions.
For this reason, we compare exposed areas with unexposed ones, thereby obtaining estimates that
reflect changes in the market equilibrium. This conceptual framework can be applied to other
scenarios where the housing stock is exogenously altered by natural disasters, wars and social
turmoil, private investments, or government policies.
This paper adds to a recent literature that estimates the impacts of hurricanes on a variety
of economic outcomes. These include household responses (Gallagher, 2014; Gagnon and
Lopez-Salido, 2015; Bleemer and Klaauw, 2017; Gallagher and Hartley, 2017; McCoy and Zhao,
2018), migration patterns (Paxson and Rouse, 2008; Boustan, Kahn, Rhode, and Yanguas, 2017),
industry and labor market consequences (Groen and Polivka, 2008; McIntosh, 2008; Belasen
and Polachek, 2009; Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt, 2018; Seetharam, 2018), macroeconomic
growth (Hsiang and Jina, 2014; Strobl, 2011), and government spending (Deryugina, 2017).
Our analysis of the housing market not only adds an important outcome to this collection but
also complements previous results on mortgage payback and migration to shed light on how
market processes contribute to post-hurricane demographic adjustments. Our finding on higher
housing prices is qualitatively similar to Murphy and Strobl (2010) and Aqeel (2011). Our
transaction-level data, however, enables us to also observe transaction probability, which provides
crucial evidence to clarify the nature of the equilibrium price shift.
This paper also contributes to a literature that examines the impacts of capital and in-
frastructure destruction on local economic activity. In different contexts of wartime destruction,
past studies generally find a relatively rapid recovery, in line with our results on housing market
6See Kuminoff, Smith, and Timmins (2013) for a recent review on the broad literature of hedonic models.
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adjustments (Ikle, 1951; Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Miguel and Roland, 2011; Feigenbaum,
Lee, and Mezzanotti, 2017). In addition, we provide the first micro-level evidence on population
turnover, which presents a more nuanced view of neighborhood changes.
Last but not least, our findings are related to several lines of research in urban economics,
from taste-based sorting by individuals to neighborhood gentrification and urban transformation.7
Our results suggest that destruction by exogenous natural events do not alter the fundamental
forces underlying urban change. Moreover, our finding on buyer income in disrupted markets
sheds light on potential distortions by credit constraints in taste-based sorting and raises further
research and policy questions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data, Section
2.3 presents our estimation framework, Section 2.4 reports and interprets the results, and Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Background
We have two objectives in this paper: first, to examine the equilibrium adjustments in
the housing market following a hurricane; second, to understand the implications for population
turnover. The first objective requires data that represent the universe of transactions, and the
second requires demographic information on the home buyers. We build a comprehensive dataset
that combines Florida housing transactions, tax assessments, demographics of mortgage holders,
and hurricane exposure. This section gives an overview of the data and the background in this
study.
7There is an extensive literature in each of these topic areas. Examples include Glaeser and Gyourko (2005),
Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008), Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst (2013), Albouy and Stuart (2014), Bayer, McMillan,
Murphy, and Timmins (2016), Diamond (2016), and Diamond and McQuade (forthcoming)
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2.2.1 Florida Housing Market
Florida is the third most populous state in the U.S., with varying demographic composition
across locations (see Figure B.2 for the demographic composition in Florida counties and nearby
states based on the 2010 Census). Most Florida counties have a population that is more than 70%
white and less than 15% black. Several counties in Central and South Florida have a high median
age at 45-55. Compared to nearby states, the population in Florida is older, significantly more
white and less black, and with a larger percentage of Hispanics especially in South Florida.
Florida has a similar percentage of family households as surrounding states (see Figure B.4
for statistics on family and housing in Florida counties). On the other hand, both the homeowner
vacancy rate (2-6%) and rental vacancy rate (10-20%) are significantly higher than nearby states.
The percentage of occupied housing units is also lower in Central and South Florida. These
patterns might be explained by a higher percentage of timeshares and vacation homes associated
with its vibrant tourism industry.
The main source of our housing data is Zillow Transaction and Assessment Dataset
(ZTRAX). We obtain data on Florida housing transactions between 2000 and 2016, which
accounts for around 95% of all transactions over this time period. Each transaction record
contains information on the timing, transaction price, mortgage profile (including loan amount
and lender’s name), location and condition of the property, along with buyers’ and sellers’ names.
We exclude three types of transactions where the price might deviate from the market value:
(1) non-arm’s-length transactions8; (2) foreclosure sales9; (3) transactions that involve multiple
homes on different parcels.
8An arm’s length transaction is one in which the buyers and sellers act independently and do not have any
relationship to each other. An example of a non-arm’s-length transaction is one between family members, whose
price often do not reflect market conditions. We rely on a combination of Zillow’s internal code and the type of deed
to determine the nature of the transaction.
9In theory, foreclosed properties might be auctioned off at their market values. In practice, however, the foreclosure
process is subject to the negotiating process and idiosyncratic procedure of the bank. According to extensive analysis
by the Zillow group, foreclosure sales are generally made at substantial discounts to comparable non-foreclosure
sales. Moreover, foreclosed properties are often in more dilapidated conditions, which is unobservable to the
econometrician.
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Figure 2.1: Florida Housing Market Sales and Composition
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ZTRAX data.
Notes: The top panel plots the monthly median prices for the three major home types. The
bottom panel plots the annual sales percentages of each home type. These time series are based
on the full sample of Florida home buyers.
We also obtain parcel-level10 assessment records over the same period from ZTRAX,
which are originally generated by county assessor’s offices. The assessment data contains an
essential set of hedonic characteristics for each parcel, including square footage, year built and
remodeled, lot size, number of rooms, number of bathrooms, number of units in building, and
land use code, among others. Importantly, we observe multiple assessments for a single parcel
and hence can track changes in these characteristics over time. We match the two datasets together
by parcel and assessment year to ensure each house’s condition at the time of the transaction is
accurately reflected in the data.
10A parcel is also known as a lot or plot. It is a defined piece of real estate, usually resulting from the division of a
large area of land.
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Our data contains precise geographic coordinates for each parcel.11 This has two major
advantages. For one, we can determine the hurricane exposure of any home by directly calculating
its distance from the hurricane tracks. We also use the coordinates in conjunction with detailed
shapefiles12 to accurately assign, for each parcel, the statistical geographic area in any given
vintage. This allows us to match the housing data to mortgage records from HMDA with high
accuracy, and to use fine geographic variation in our estimation.
Figure 2.1 plots the monthly median price by home type in the top panel. Median home
prices experience large fluctuations. It started around $100,000 in 2000, rose to over $200,000
at the peak around 2007, declined back to $100,000 in 2010-2012, and gradually climbed back
afterward as the economy recovered from the financial crisis. On the other hand, the lower panel
shows that the composition of home types among sales remained stable over time. Single family
residences account for around 70% of the sales, condominiums around 20%, and townhouses less
than 10%. As we will match buyers with a mortgage (henceforth “borrowers”) to HMDA records,
we also report the time series of median price for the subset of all Zillow borrowers and the share
of such sales (see Figure B.1 in the Appendix). The pattern of prices closely resembles those of
all buyers although the share of sales with a mortgage decreases from 75% in 2007 to 50% in
2010 as the financial crisis took place.
2.2.2 Hurricane History and Exposure
Much of Florida is on a peninsula between the Gulf of Mexico and the North Atlantic.
Its unique geography has exposed it to more hurricanes than any other U.S. state. The average
Florida hurricane is much milder compared to the ones most studied in the past literature (i.e.
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Andrew).
Between 1992 and 2017, a total of 15 hurricanes swept past parts of Florida. We obtain
11The longitude and latitude measures are down to five decimal places (1.11 meter at equator).
12Source: TIGER/Line Shapefiles, Census Bureau. Available at https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-
line.html.
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Figure 2.2: Exposure to Hurricanes by Census Tracts, 1992-2017
Notes: This graph shows the number of times a census tract is within the radius of hurricane-
scale wind speed (64 nautical miles per hour) during 1992-2017. Calculations are based on
detailed hurricane track points and census tract population centroid.
their physical attributes from the Tropical Cyclone Extended Best Track dataset.13 Each tropical
cyclone is recorded in six-hour intervals. Each observation reports the geographic coordinates of
the center, maximum sustained wind speed, and maximum radial extent of 34, 50 and 64 nautical
miles per hour (kn) wind.14 We approximate the full hurricane path by linear interpolation
between consecutive observations.15
Hurricane damages rise exponentially with wind speed. We are thus interested in determin-
13Data source: Demuth, DeMaria, and Knaff (2006). Available at
http://rammb.cira.colostate.edu/research/tropical-cyclones/tc-extended-best-track-dataset/.
14A tropical cyclone is classified as a hurricane when the 1-minute sustained winds reach 64 kn (74 mph or 119
km/h). Thresholds for the SaffirSimpson hurricane wind scale are: Category 1, 74-95 mph; Category 2, 96110 mph;
Category 3, 111129 mph; Category 4, 130156 mph; Category 5, 157+ mph.
15We also assume the hurricane center travels with constant speed between two consecutive observations, while
wind speed and radii change linearly with time. See Appendix B.3.2 for more details on the interpolation procedure.
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Figure 2.3: Severe Exposure by Census Tracts, 1992-2017
Notes: This graph shows the number of times a census tract is within the radius of category 3+
wind speed (96 nautical miles per hour) during 1992-2007. Calculations are based on detailed
hurricane track points and census tract population centroid.
ing exposure to Category-3-and-beyond hurricane wind speed (96+ kn or 110+ mph) separately
for heterogeneity analysis.16 Since maximal reach radii of 96 kn is not provided in the dataset,
we calculate our own measure by estimating a nonlinear relationship between wind speed and its
reach radii (see Appendix B.3.1 for details on this procedure and the validity checks).
Throughout this paper, we define hurricane exposure by whether a location was ever
within the reach of a 64 kn wind speed radius along a hurricane path. Severe exposure is similarly
defined but with a 96 kn wind speed. This requires both proximity to the hurricane path and high
sustained wind speed at that stretch of the path. The radius average 95 miles for observations
16We use the category 3 speed threshold both to be in line with previous literature, and because we do not believe
the difference between the categories 1 and 2 thresholds is sufficient to produce measurable differences in outcomes.
Category 4 wind speeds, on the other hand, almost never reach Florida shores over our hurricane time period.
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with wind speed above 64 kn, and 45 miles for those above 96 kn. It is important to note that our
exposure measure does not indicate actual damage. Houses lying outside of hurricane-scale wind
speed radius, for example, might also be affected by heavy precipitation or flood, while those
inside might sustain little damage due to strict building code or high elevation. Rather, we use
this measure to identify homes located in areas that are likely to suffer from most direct impacts.
Ultimately, we are interested in estimating equilibrium adjustments in these areas rather than the
impact of being damaged.
Figure 2.2 shows the geographic distribution of hurricane events by census tract, defining
exposure using their population-weighted centroids. Around 90% of tracts experience at least one
hurricane event between 1992 and 2017, with high variation in frequency across locations. We
plot the distribution of severe exposure events separately in Figure 2.3. This set of locations is
much more limited (16%) and mostly concentrated in south Florida. The average census tract
experiences 2.6 hurricane events and 0.16 severe exposure event between 1992 to 2017.
2.2.3 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), enacted by Congress in late 1975, requires
all large financial institutions17 to disclose all of their home lending activity every year. The
loans reported are estimated to represent about 80 percent of all home lending nationwide. These
records are made publicly available in an effort to improve home financing market transparency.18
The HMDA data provide the date, property location (census tract), mortgage loan amount, purpose
of application (purchase, improvement, or refinancing), mortgage lender’s name and applicant
demographics including annual income, gender, and race.
We merge the subset of successful loan applications for purchases from HMDA to our
transaction data following the matching procedure described in Bayer, McMillan, Murphy, and
17By current definition, a large financial institution is one with more than $45 million in assets. This threshold is
subject to yearly revision.
18See http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda for more details.
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Timmins (2016). Matches are based on the year of each transaction, the census tract of the home,
the loan amount (in 1000s), and the lender name.19 The full procedure ultimately matches just
over half of the original Zillow borrowers data, with no significant yearly variation in pairing
success. This match rate is similar to that in Bayer, McMillan, Murphy, and Timmins (2016),
which merges HMDA data to the universe of housing transactions in the Bay Area. The merged
data enables us to look at the evolution of borrower demographic characteristics following
hurricane events.
2.3 Econometric Framework
This section presents our research design. The first part of our analysis concerns post-
hurricane adjustments in the housing market. We study two main outcomes that characterize the
equilibrium – housing price and transaction probability – and use a separate regression model
for each. The models differ in the dependent variable and the unit of analysis. Despite these
outward differences, both essentially rely on the randomness of hurricane paths and timing as
the identifying variation. In the second part of the analysis, we use a similar specification to the
housing price model to examine the associated population turnover.
2.3.1 Housing Price Model
We model the transaction price of a home as follows:
log(Priceihmy) =
10
∑
τ=−6
βτHurrτimy+ γ
′HouseChariy+δht +δhm+δhcy+ εihmy (2.1)
19See Appendix B.4 for more details on the matching procedure.
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where i denotes an individual transaction, h the housing type,20 m the month and y the year
of the transaction, and t and c the census tract and county in which the transaction occurred,
respectively.21 The unit of analysis is an individual transaction. log(Priceihmy) is the log of price
in transaction i, which involves a house of type h and takes place in month m of year y. Hurrτimy is
a set of indicators specifying whether the transaction occurs τ years after the house was exposed
to a hurricane (τ = 0 refers to transactions in the first twelve months after a hurricane, τ = 1
the next twelve months, and so on; a negative τ indicates the transaction happens before the
hurricane). HouseChariy is a set of house characteristics commonly used in hedonic models and
include lot size, structural age, effective age,22 number of stories and number of bathrooms. We
control for the latter two characteristics flexibly using a set of value bins. These variables are
taken from an assessment in the year of the transaction. For a given parcel, these variables might
not remain the same over time and will be reflected in the data if the home is transacted multiple
times.
We also account for both fixed and time-varying regional differences in housing attributes
and local amenities by using a rich set of fixed effects. δht is type-by-tract fixed effects, which
absorb cross-sectional correlations in the likelihood of being hit by a hurricane and time-invariant
local amenities, such as proximity to the coast. δhm is type-by-month fixed effects that control for
the seasonality in both home prices and the timing of hurricanes. It is also important to account
for the housing booms and busts during our sample period, especially given their uneven impacts
across markets (Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, 2018). We use type-by-county-by-year fixed
effects (δhcy) to control for changing macroeconomic conditions at the county level.
The key variables of interest are the hurricane indicators. They are constructed based on
20We group homes into six main housing types based on land use classification in county tax assessments.
They include single family residential (68.3%), condominium (21.7%), townhouse (6.83%), residential-multifamily
(2.61%), vacation home (0.14%) and miscellaneous (0.4%).
21Census tracts and counties are defined according to the 2000 census definition throughout to maintain geographic
consistency across time.
22The time (in years) since the house last had a major remodel.
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the definition of hurricane exposure for individual parcels as described in Section 2.2.2.23 Their
identification requires that the idiosyncratic shocks to transaction prices are uncorrelated with
them:
E[εimy×Hurrτi |HouseChariy,δht ,δhm,δhcy] = 0 ∀τ.
In essence, this is a staggered difference-in-difference (DID) framework with many hurricane
treatments at different times.24 Areas exposed to a hurricane are compared to unexposed ones
before and after the hurricane in a repeated cross-section of housing transactions. Intuitively,
because hurricane paths and timing are exogenous, exposed and unexposed areas are comparable
absent the hurricane.
There are two main advantages of using this set of event time indicators rather than a
single indicator as in a standard DID specification. First, the post-hurricane housing market might
have transitional patterns that last an indeterminate duration. Analyzing these dynamics can
provide key insights into the market adjustment process. Our set of post-hurricane indicators let
them play out without imposing any restriction on the trend or duration. Second, the pre-hurricane
indicators also allow for full flexibility in the pre-trends. This provides important evidence for
us to assess the key identification assumption of DID, which requires the treatment and control
group to have parallel trends absent the treatment. Our specification allows for powerful detection
of differential pre-trends and provides a transparent partial test of the assumption.25 To sum up,
we adopt a data-driven approach to minimize misspecification and maximize the transparency of
our research design.
Throughout this paper, we cluster standard errors at the county level to allow for correla-
23Specifically, we calculate exposure to each of the 15 hurricanes for each transacted home. We then construct the
hurricane indicators based on the transaction timing relative to all hurricane events the house is exposed to.
24This design has been used by several studies of the economic impacts of natural disasters such as Belasen and
Polachek (2009), Strobl (2011), Gallagher (2014), Hsiang and Jina (2014), Deryugina (2017), and Boustan, Kahn,
Rhode, and Yanguas (2017)
25In fact, Deryugina (2017) points out that the parallel trend assumption can be relaxed given the exogeneity of
the hurricane. See also Malani and Reif (2015). Our approach therefore provides extra assurance on the validity of
our identifying variations.
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tions in the idiosyncratic shocks to all transactions occurring in the same county over the entire
sample period. We also estimate four variants of it, as described below.
Repeat sales. Hurricanes might change the composition of transacted homes. Equation
(2.1) addresses this concern using a rich set of controls which greatly limits the extent of
composition shifts in the estimates. To further eliminate within-tract selection of transacted
attributes, we replace the census tract fixed effects with parcel-level ones:
1(Transacted)py =
10
∑
τ=−6
βτHurrτpy+ γ
′HouseCharpy+δp+δhy+δcy+ εpy. (2.2)
This approach restricts the identifying variation to price changes from repeated sales of the same
home and holds all time-invariant characteristics fixed. This method is used to generate several
major house price indexes26 and also widely adopted in academic research (Cannaday, Munneke,
and Yang, 2005; Hallstrom and Smith, 2005; Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans, 2007).
Wind intensity heterogeneities. We explore heterogeneous effects of different wind
intensities, as stronger winds bring much more severe damages to the housing stock. Specifically,
we split the exposed areas into those under category 1-2 wind speeds and those under stronger
winds as discussed in Section 2.2.2. We estimate the dynamics of both groups simultaneously by
interacting the indicator for each group with the event time indicators.
Other outcome variables. Hurricanes might change the set of homes transacted or the
type of home buyers. Understanding any systematic shift is important for us to assess the nature
of market responses to hurricanes. To do so, we replace the outcome variable in Equation (2.1)
with a given characteristic of interest, such as lot size or log income of the buyer.
Standard DID. For ease of interpretation, we also estimate a standard DID model, defining
treatment as being exposed to a hurricane in the last 36 months. The validity of this specification
can be inferred from results on the event study, as the identification assumption is essentially the
26These indexes include the Case-Shiller Index, Federal Housing Finance Agencys (FHFA) monthly House Price
Index, and CoreLogics LoanPerformance Home Price Index.
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same for the two models.
2.3.2 Transaction Probability Model
A market equilibrium is characterized by both the price and the quantity. At the individual
home level, transacted quantity is either zero or one. Formally, let 1(Transacted)py be an indicator
of whether a transaction record exists for parcel p in year y. We model its relationship to hurricane
events as follows:
1(Transacted)py =
10
∑
τ=−6
βτHurrτpy+ γ
′HouseCharpy+δp+δhy+δcy+ εpy. (2.3)
where p, h, y, and c denote parcel, housing type, year, and county as before. The unit of analysis is
now a parcel-year. We construct a balanced panel of most parcels that have been transacted during
the sample period. We treat all parcel-year observations without a transaction record as having
no transaction. This approach introduces measurement error if there are unreported transactions,
and can even lead to biased estimates if the missing pattern is endogenous to or correlated with
hurricane events. In our analysis, we take into account detectable patterns of missing records in
a few county-years by omitting these entire counties from our sample. The combined sales in
these counties account for less than 1% of total sales as they are all small counties. Therefore,
our approach of omitting the entire sales histories does not yield any distinguishable differences
in results from omitting only the missing years. We also include only parcels that have been
built before 2000, so that the panel consistently tracks the housing stock that has been present
at the beginning of the study period. Florida is subject to tight land supply due to geographic
constraints (Saiz, 2010). This endogenously generates strict zoning regulation and hinders new
developments, especially in dense urban areas.
We construct the panel by year rather than by month due to computational constraints. As
most hurricanes take place in August, many transactions in the same calendar year might have
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happened before the hurricane. This will severely attenuate the estimate of the year 0 hurricane
indicator if we define the event time based on the calendar year. Instead, we redefine event years to
begin in August and end in July. For example, a transaction in an area exposed to Katrina (August
2005) will have its year 0 indicator turned on only if it occurs between August 2005 and July
2006. This ensures a correct event year classification for most transactions, an uncontaminated
event year -1 indicator, and a small and predictable downward bias in the estimate of the event
year 0 indicator.27
Despite the differences in the data structure, this model shares many similarities to the
previous one on housing price. We keep the same event-study specification. The model also
controls for time-varying house characteristics observed from repeated assessments. Because
the threat to identification is similar to that in the previous model, we also include parcel fixed
effects to isolate within-home variation, county-by-year fixed effects to control for differential
growth across counties, and type-by-year fixed effects for differential changes in home types. The
identification assumption is also similar:
E[εpy×Hurrτp|HouseCharpy,δp,δhy,δcy] = 0 ∀τ.
Our dataset includes three main parcel types: single family residence, condominium, and
townhouse. Due to limited substitutability between these types, their dynamics might be different.
Therefore, we also estimate this transaction probability model separately for each type. The
type-by-year fixed effects are eliminated in these estimations. The standard errors are clustered at
the county level throughout.
27Some hurricanes in our sample occur as late as October. The year 0 indicator might still get attenuated because
it captures some transactions in areas affected by these hurricanes right before they actually took place. Given our
approach to begin the year in August, this mechanical issue can only affect transactions occurring in the three months
preceding hurricane Wilma (October 2005) or the two months preceding Frances and Jeanne (both dissipating in
September 2004). The ensuing attenuation bias to event year 0 indicator is small and predictable. An alternative is to
begin the year even later. However, this other alternative misclassifies some transactions of actually exposed homes
to event year -1. We choose to remove a few observations from the event year -1 group but keep it uncontaminated: a
future hurricane cannot have a causal effect on any of our outcomes before it hits because its path is unpredictable.
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2.3.3 Variation in Hurricane Exposure
Hurricanes are rare events. Although their paths and timing are random, they might hit
locations with distinctive characteristics and growth patterns by pure chance. This is an issue
discussed and explicitly accounted for in the past literature (Deryugina, 2017). We alleviate this
concern by using a longer hurricane history and hence a larger set of hurricanes. This approach
reduces small sample bias28 while preserving unbiasedness so long as hurricanes are exogenous.
It also allows us to maintain the interpretation of our results as the effects of an average hurricane
in Florida rather than a small, selected subset of hurricanes. From Figure 2.2, we can see that
Florida hurricanes during 1992-2017 create a fairly disperse geographic distribution together. In
this section, we take a closer look at variation over time as well as contribution by individual
hurricanes.
For each separate hurricane, we first examine the percentage of transactions that are in its
affected area, in each of the 10 years before and after its occurrence (see Table B.3 for a summary
of these percentages). Looking across hurricanes, we obtain a snapshot of the composition of
hurricane variations used in Equation (2.1), the housing price model.29 These variation profiles
illustrate that the seventeen-year width of our sample constrains the length of pre- and post-
hurricane dynamics that we can estimate in our models. Event years -5 to 10 all contain variation
from at least ten out of sixteen hurricanes and 8-12% of transactions in exposed areas. Event
year -6 contain variation from six hurricanes and a total 5% impacted transactions. However,
variation in event years -10 to -7 come from only two hurricanes, raising serious representativeness
concerns.
We also generate similar variation profiles for Equation (2.3), the transaction probability
model (see Table B.4). As this model is estimated using a balanced panel of parcels, the exposed
28“Small sample” refers to a limited set of hurricanes.
29The last row of each panel in Table B.3 reports cumulative exposure in each event time year. Note that this
percentage is less than or equal to the sum of individual hurricane exposure because transacted homes may have been
hit by multiple hurricanes in an event year.
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percentage is constant for each hurricane across event years. Again, we see a similar pattern
where earlier event years pick up variation from very few hurricanes, while event years starting
from -5 capture exposure to more hurricanes. In these later years, exposed areas also account
for around 10% of all parcels. Overall, these patterns attest to the similar nature of identifying
variation used in the two models.
Based on these patterns, we exclude indicators for event years -10 to -7 from the estimation.
This leaves us with six pre-periods and ten post-periods, comparable to the past literature that
studies natural disasters using an event study design (Murphy and Strobl, 2010; Gallagher, 2014;
Gallagher and Hartley, 2017; Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt, 2018). We have also estimated
models with shorter dynamics and found the results robust in both direction and scale.
Lastly, we examine variation in severe exposure (category 3 or greater wind speeds) in the
same way (see Tables B.5). The fraction of transactions subject to high wind speeds is not only
small (less than 1% in all years) but also limited to 5 hurricanes in total. This will greatly limit
the power when we estimate the heterogeneous effects of higher wind speeds. In addition, the
geographic concentration of severe exposure is high according to Figure 2.3. This limited set of
locations are less likely to have parallel pre-trends with the rest of Florida.
2.4 Results
The results are presented in several subsections below. We begin by estimating the post-
hurricane dynamics in housing prices for areas affected by hurricane while addressing potential
composition effects in Section 2.4.1. Likewise, we estimate how transaction probabilities adjust
for parcels in these areas in Section 2.4.2. Together, these two outcomes characterize equilibrium
shifts in the housing market as it recovers from hurricanes, which we interpret further in Section
2.4.3. In Section 2.4.4, we examine the implications of these market adjustments on local
population turnover. In Section 2.4.5, we explore whether the previous effects are heterogeneous
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according to hurricane intensity.
2.4.1 Post-Hurricane Price Dynamics
We first estimate the post-hurricane dynamics of housing prices using the full sample
of all transactions. The average price and home attributes in these transactions are reported in
the first two columns in Table B.1. We use a flexible difference-in-differences specification as
detailed in Equation (2.1). The standard errors were clustered by county over the entire sample
length.
The estimated coefficients of event year indicators are plotted along with their 95%
confidence intervals in Figure 2.4 (the full results are reported in the first column of Table
B.6). None of the estimates for pre-hurricane indicators are statistically different from zero,
supporting our choice of fixed effects that control for preexisting differences in average census
tract prices, seasonality, and county-specific dynamics. Our event year 0 and 1 estimates suggest
that hurricanes result in increases in home prices of 5% in the first and 10% in the second
twelve-month periods after the strike. The surge in prices appears to end sometime in the next
twelve-month period (event year 2) as the estimated increase relative to unaffected homes drops
to 2% and is no longer statistically significant. All later event year estimates are small and not
statistically distinguishable from zero. In short, the estimates suggest a temporary surge in prices
in the three years immediately following a hurricane in exposed areas. In Table B.7, we provide
additional results using a standard DID specification, defining treatment as being in event year
0-2, for the overall market as well as by home types. The main takeaway is, while there is an
overall increase in home prices, the effect is particularly pronounced for condominia.
One possible interpretation is a shift in the distribution of transacted homes: in the
aftermath of a hurricane, homes with greater hurricane resistance, quality or general desirability
might be more likely to get transacted. In the extreme, the price surge could have been entirely
driven by such composition shift without actually reflecting change in any individual home’s
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Figure 2.4: Hurricane Effects on House Prices – Full Sample
Notes: Estimates from Equation (2.1) are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals. The
model controls for standard hedonic variables and census tract, month, and county-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by county. The results are based on the full sample of
Florida home sales (N = 7,408,259).
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Figure 2.5: Hurricane Effects on House Prices – Repeat Sales
Notes: Estimates with parcel, month and county-year fixed effects are plotted with their 95%
confidence intervals. The model also controls for age and effective age at time of sale. Standard
errors are clustered by county. The results are based on only parcels with repeated transactions
appearing in both pre- and post-hurricane periods (N = 1,338,384).
62
price. Our model partially addresses this possibility by controlling for a standard set of hedonic
variables. The estimated effect is thus free of a shift in observed quality or any unobserved aspect
that is strongly correlated with the observed characteristics.
Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out this possibility due to limited observability
of damage-related house characteristics such as base elevation or roof condition. To investigate
this issue further, we re-estimate our price model with the inclusion of parcel fixed effects, and
restrict the sample to only include homes which were transacted at least once both before and
after a hurricane. The result is plotted in Figure 2.5 and reported in the second column of Table
B.6. The standard errors are slightly larger due to the extensive fixed effects and a smaller sample
size. On the other hand, this specification yields stronger evidence of parallel pre-trends which
suggests greater credibility in identification. More importantly, the previous patterns are closely
reproduced and if anything, larger in scale. Our point estimates imply that these homes on average
sold at 5% higher prices in the event year immediately following the hurricane, as much as 14%
in the next event year, and 8% in the third event year. These results suggest that the homes
sold in the first two to three years in exposed areas appreciated relative to when they were sold
outside of this post-hurricane window. Moreover, such within-home appreciation is likely to
be the main driver of the price effect in the full sample, given its slightly larger magnitude. In
order to better understand the mechanisms behind this finding, we now turn towards the potential
hurricane-induced changes in the probability of home transaction.
2.4.2 Post-Hurricane Dynamics of Transaction Probability
We estimate the post-hurricane dynamics of transaction probability using Equation (2.3).
As described in Section 2.3, we use a balanced panel of parcels where each observation is a
parcel-year with an associated indicator for whether or not a transaction occurred in that year.
Our analysis focus on only parcels with a structure built before 2000. The summary statistics are
reported in Table B.2.
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Figure 2.6: Hurricane Effects on Transaction Probability by House Type
Notes: The estimates from Equation (2.3) are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered by county. Panel (a) plots the results based on all parcel types (N =
49,120,139), panels (b)-(d) are based on single family residence (N = 33,651,628), condominium
(N = 12,836,476), and townhouse (N = 2,976,067), respectively. The model controls for effective
age, parcel and county-year fixed effects. In panel (a), the model also includes type-year fixed
effects.
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The estimates from the full sample are plotted along with their 95% confidence intervals in
Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 (as well as reported in the third column of Table B.6). The standard errors
are again clustered by county over the entire sample length. Baseline probability of transaction is
around 10%. Again, we see a stable pre-trend with all pre-hurricane indicators being statistically
indistinguishable from zero. In event year 0, the estimate indicates a drop of 0.9 percentage
points, or nine percent of the baseline probability, which is also statistically significant at the 5%
level. The effect shrinks to 0.3-0.5 percentage points in the next three event years, and gradually
returns to the baseline.
There are three main types of parcels in this dataset: single family residence, condominium,
and townhouse. As shown in Table B.2, their characteristics are quite different and substitutability
between them might be limited. Considering also the wide confidence intervals for the above
estimates, it is likely that these market segments might have different equilibrium dynamics.
Therefore, we also estimate the model for each type separately. These results are reported in
panels (b)-(d) in Figure 2.6.30
Single family residences are the largest segment of the housing market and make up
around 70% of all transactions. For them, we observe a negative but small effect that peaks at 5
percentage point in event year 1, and none of the event year indicators is statistically significant
at the 5% level. In contrast, we observe larger changes in transaction probability for the latter
two types of homes. Condominia, which usually represent 20% of transactions, are nearly 3
percentage points less likely to be transacted in event year 0, 1 percentage points in the following
two event years, and around 0.5 percentage point in the next, before returning to the baseline.
Townhouses make up the smallest share of the market at under 10%, and experience a drop of 1
percentage point in the first two event years.
Taken together, our results show a 6% decrease in transaction probability in the entire
market, averaged over three years. We provide a more direct display of these scales by home type
30We use the same specification except for dropping house-type-by-year fixed effects.
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in Table B.8, where we report estimates from a standard DID specification. The results again
show substantial heterogeneity: the effects range from a 20% drop for condominia to only 3%
for single family residences. We consider the potential sources of such heterogeneity in the next
section as part of a discussion of mechanisms.
2.4.3 Mechanisms for Price and Transaction Probability Dynamics
In the previous two sections, we find that post-hurricane housing markets see an increase
in housing prices and a concurrent fall in transactions. These dynamics together are consistent
with a negative supply shock. We further find that this shock is temporary, as both price and
probability appear to respond for two to three years and eventually return to the baseline.
To clarify, this does not imply that hurricanes only induce supply-side adjustments. In
fact, localities exposed to hurricanes are likely to experience changes in housing demand through
mechanisms such as people updating their beliefs in local disaster risk (Bin and Polasky, 2004;
Hallstrom and Smith, 2005; Bin, Kruse, and Landry, 2008; Gibson, Mullins, and Hill, 2019),
disruptions to local industries and labor market (Belasen and Polachek, 2009; Seetharam, 2018),
among others. However, it is very hard to exhaust all possible factors in demand or supply
that might shift after a hurricane and estimate the magnitude of each. Instead, we remain
agnostic about them so far but choose to estimate directly the first-order effect driving the market
equilibrium. Below, we interpret these findings further by discussing the nature of the negative
supply shock and exploring a number of alternative explanations.
Mechanism 1: Physical damage and repair process.
Hurricanes generate extreme winds and severe flooding that can destroy or cause sufficient
damages to buildings. As a result, part of the housing stock in exposed areas becomes uninhab-
itable in the short run, which explains the negative supply shock. It also creates a mechanical
drop in the transaction probability because it is very hard to sell a house in a damaged state.
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Affected homeowners may seek to temporarily relocate to habitable properties nearby through
renting, which is covered by insurance companies and federal assistance in most cases. Demand
increases in the rental market, which, in turn, put upward pressure on housing prices. This might
partly account for the large price increase for condominia: a larger percentage of them are rental
properties and might see more appreciation.
It takes time for homeowners to restore their homes to the original condition. For one,
a large majority of affected homeowners seek post-hurricane financial relief in the form of
insurance payment or FEMA assistance.31 This requires homeowners to go through the filing
process, wait for assessment of the damages to be performed, and settle potential disputes with
the insurance company. This process can take months because federal institutions and private
insurance companies are often overwhelmed by claims at times of large-scaled disasters. The
findings in Gallagher and Hartley (2017) directly shed light on the time frame for households to
obtain disaster aid: while victims of hurricane Katrina use disaster relief to pay down home loans,
the effect did not stabilize until after a year.
The rebuilding or repairing process can also take a long time. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that post-disaster recovery is often hindered by a shortage of construction labor. In the end, most
people find it takes at least 18-24 months to repair, rebuild, or replace their home and possessions
after a large loss. Notably, this duration is consistent with the observed effects on price and
and probability. In particular, according to the Florida Condominium Act, the condominium
association is responsible for repairing the exterior damages rather than the homeowners. This
division of responsibility could further restrict condo supply in the market, which is also consistent
with the particularly large effect in this market segment. Overall, physical damage and destruction
provides a plausible explanation that matches the findings well.
31There are various types of financial relief homeowners can seek after a disaster. For example, wind damages
are often covered by homeowner’s insurance, while flood damages are separately covered by flood insurance.
Homeowners might also seek relief from the federal government for uncovered damages through the Individual
Assistance program (Kutz and Ryan, 2006; Michel-Kerjan, 2010; Hoople, 2013; Gallagher and Hartley, 2017;
Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt, 2018; Kousky, Michel-Kerjan, and Raschky, 2018).
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Figure 2.8: Changes in Characteristics of Transacted Homes – Effective Age
Notes: The estimates of difference-in-differences coefficients are plotted with their 95% confi-
dence intervals. The dependent variable is effective house age, which is the number of years
since last remodeled, if applicable. The specification is similar to Equation (2.1), which controls
for census tract, month, and county-year fixed effects.
Mechanism 2: Quality improvement through rebuilding.
Another possibility is that the rebuilding process not only restores but also improves the
quality of the home, thereby driving up its value. This could happen for a number of reasons.
First, if the repair is funded by insurance payment or government assistance, the homeowner
has an incentive to overuse the construction service (e.g. to better account for the possibility of
future events through investment in more disaster-resistant structures and materials). Second, the
building codes in Florida have been updated multiple times over the sample period largely for
the purpose of enhancing resistance to natural disasters. The restoration project might thus be
subject to stricter codes compared to its original construction.32 Lastly, hurricanes might destroy
some houses with particularly poor quality, sparing homeowners the fixed cost of tearing down a
building and setting in motion a renovation process that would have taken place later. Any of
32A 2018 report on new residential building codes and enforcement systems by the Insurance Institute for Business
& Home Safety gave Florida a rating of 95/100, the highest score among all the states it evaluated.
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these scenarios is consistent with an increase in price. However, given what we know about repair
time, it is questionable whether such rebuilding can be speedy enough to drive the peak increase
in the first or second year after the hurricane.
We explore this possibility by estimating whether there is a systematic change in the
effective age of houses transacted after a hurricane using a variant of Equation (2.1). Effective age
records the years since the house was last remodeled. It is likely to capture (a) repairs funded by
private insurance and (b) large renovations as both are likely to be permitted. On the other hand,
it would fail to capture renovations that are not permitted, which is a caveat to this analysis. If
this mechanism is important, we would expect the houses transacted during the adjustment period
to have a smaller effective age because they have just been renovated. Instead, the estimates show
no change at all (Figure 2.8), providing little empirical support for this mechanism.
Mechanism 3: Composition shift through information revelation.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, we control for major hedonic characteristics and parcel
fixed effects, which addresses most types of composition shift. Still, we cannot rule out a subtle
composition effect: hurricanes provide an opportunity for the more disaster-resistant houses to
overcome the information asymmetry problem on the market. These are houses that sustain
minimal damage despite having been exposed to a hurricane, potentially due to better building
materials or structural factors. In normal times, the home buyers might not be able to recognize
their superior ability to withstand hurricanes. After a hurricane passes, however, these houses are
valued at a premium because their quality has been revealed. This mechanism is consistent with
the within-home appreciation and immune to our controls.
This mechanism generates two testable implications. First, hurricanes induce differential
capitalization so that certain characteristics will be valued more. Second, hurricanes induce a
composition shift toward these characteristics in transacted homes. Unfortunately, such character-
istics – building materials, roof conditions, etc. – are not easily observable. Here, we provide
69
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
Lo
t S
iz
e
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event Time Years
(a) Lot Size
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
H
ou
se
 A
ge
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event Time Years
(b) House Age
-.03
-.02
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03
N
um
be
r o
f S
to
rie
s
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event Time Years
(c) Number of Stories
-.03
-.02
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03
N
um
be
r o
f B
at
hr
oo
m
s
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event Time Years
(d) Number of Bathrooms
Figure 2.9: Changes in Characteristics of Transacted Homes
Notes: The estimates of difference-in-differences coefficients are plotted with their 95% confi-
dence intervals. Each panel has a different dependent variables: panels (a)-(d) correspond to lot
size, house age, number of stories, and number of bathrooms, respectively. The specification is
similar to Equation (2.1), controlling for census tract, month, and county-year fixed effects.
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a partial test of these implications using observed characteristics that are predictors of disaster
resistance. One such characteristic is house age: newer houses are more resistant to hurricanes
because of improvements in building technology and more stringent building codes. Compared
to effective age, the age of the house might better reflect the quality of the structure. Another
characteristics is the number of stories, as taller buildings are more susceptible to wind damage.
To test for differential capitalization, we interact the treatment in the standard DID
specification with each of the home characteristics. These interaction terms will capture any
differential capitalization effect during the adjustment period. As reported in Table B.9, there is
no differential capitalization effect for house age or being a one-story building. We also find a
smaller effect of being recently renovated, which is contrary to the expectation that these homes
might be more resistant to hurricanes. On the other hand, there is an increase in the value of lot
size and a decrease in the value of bathrooms. These changes are consistent with the appreciation
of habitable space due to the negative supply shock.
We also test for any systematic change in these variables among transacted homes, as
predicted by the second testable implication. As shown in Figure 2.9, none of these characteristics
see detectable change after the hurricane. If anything, there is a gradual rise in average house age,
which is likely a mechanical effect due to aging of the housing stock.
2.4.4 Implications for Population Turnover
Equilibrium shifts in the housing market, as documented in the previous section, might
change the match between housing and potential home buyers. In turn, these dynamics might
have demographic implications for hurricane-battered communities. In this section, we turn
our attention to how the average income level of home buyers evolves following hurricanes.
The analysis is based on a subsample of home buyers for whom we find a valid match in the
Zillow-HMDA matching procedure. Before we present the main results, we will first discuss the
representativeness of this subsample.
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Figure 2.11: Hurricane Effects on House Prices – HMDA Sample
Notes: Estimates from Equation (2.1) are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals. The
model includes standard hedonic variables and census tract, month, and county-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by county. The results are based on the HMDA sub-sample (N =
1,967,334).
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Figure 2.12: Hurricane Effects on Buyer Income – HMDA Sample
Notes: Estimates on buyer income are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals. The model
includes standard hedonic variables and census tract, month, and county-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by county. The results are based on the HMDA sub-sample (N =
1,881,208).
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A hurricane might induce changes in the composition of mortgage borrowers that are
different from the whole market. Lenders might change their lending criteria. If the would-
be buyers are local, they might have lower liquidity level. To shed light on these potential
mechanisms of selection, we estimate whether hurricanes affect the share of home sales involving
a mortgage. There is no evidence of change (Figure B.8), although we cannot rule out the
possibility of opposite selection forces canceling each other out. Next, we directly compare
variables in the three samples: all transactions, transactions with a mortgage, and HMDA-matched
transactions. Table B.1 reports the mean and median of various characteristics of transacted
homes. The full sample appears to contain more outliers, or expensive homes with a large lot
size. Since these are likely to be estates of the uber-wealthy, their transaction is not likely to
be financed by a mortgage and thus would not show up in the borrower or HMDA subsample.
Apart from that, most characteristics are comparable across samples in terms of the median. We
also re-estimate Equation (2.1) on the subsamples to examine whether the price dynamics there
are similar to that in the full sample. The price response in the HMDA subsample (Figure 2.11)
indeed closely resembles those from both the full sample (Figure 2.4) and the borrower subsample
(Figure B.6). Overall, the transactions in the HMDA subsample appear to be quite comparable to
the full sample.
Using the HMDA subsample, we now estimate the effect of hurricanes on the average
income of new buyers by replacing the outcome variable in Equation (2.1) with buyer income. We
find the dynamics of post-hurricane income are strikingly similar to those of prices: the average
income increases by around 4% in the first event year and nearly 7% in the second, then reverts
to a 4% rise in the third before returning to their pre-hurricane baseline in later years. Since
we control for home characteristics, this effect is not driven by better homes being transacted.
Rather, homes of comparable quality as before are being transferred to buyers with higher income.
Moreover, the subsequent dynamics exhibit some fluctuating but mostly positive effects. A back-
of-envelope calculation suggests that a total of 28% of local homes are occupied by households
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with higher income after the 3-year market adjustment period. Given that home ownership is a
long-term decision, this pattern likely represents a lasting change in the economic profile of local
communities toward higher-income groups. An influx of higher-income households might also
trigger further gentrification of these neighborhoods (Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 2008; Guerrieri,
Hartley, and Hurst, 2013). This raises concerns for future disaster costs, in terms of both private
damages and the burden on federal budget.
The present finding, in conjunction with the market adjustment results, suggests that
a negative shock to housing supply induces a selection of buyers with higher avarage income.
We present a model in Appendix B.5 to explore underlying channels of such selection. The
model features households with heterogeneous income and idiosyncratic taste for a given location.
The first channel is preference, where willingness-to-pay for these locations are different across
income groups. The second channel concerns credit constraints, which directly relate household
income with the home price a household can afford (Greenwald, 2018). In the model, we derive
two conditions that can explain the empirical relationship:
1. In an unconstrained market, valuation for hurricane-affected areas must be systematically
higher for households with higher income.
2. The presence of a credit constraint relaxes the above requirement.
These conditions provide two plausible explanations for the positive income selection.
First, higher-income households simply have higher willingness-to-pay for a given location.
This is consistent with a mechanism of Tiebout sorting, as outlined in Banzhaf and Walsh
(2008). In short, suppose communities can be ranked by amenity quality, which is valued more
by higher-income households, households with similar income levels will sort into the same
community. Within each community, the households’ willingness-to-pay will line up with their
income level, as lower-income households have a stronger tendency to substitute location benefit
with consumption. However, this mechanism might not be able to account for cases where
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household preferences for locations are not monotonically changing with income.33 As suggested
by the second condition, an alternative explanation is the presence of credit constraints. As credit
constraints directly restrict the set of houses a household can afford, lower-income households
face greater difficulty to adjust to the disrupted market conditions. By driving up housing prices,
hurricanes exacerbate this pre-existing problem and further constrained their mobility. If an
equitable recovery is the policy goal in post-disaster assistance, policymakers need to pay more
attention to this interaction.
2.4.5 Heterogeneous Effects
In this section, we explore the heterogeneous effects of different wind speed exposure. For
post-hurricane exposure, we separately define exposure to 64-96 kn wind speed (low-intensity),
and 96 kn and above (high-intensity), as described in Section 2.2.2. We then estimate a variant of
Equation (2.1) which allows for separate post-hurricane dynamics for each level of exposure.34
The results from this exercise are plotted in Figure 2.13. Most instances of exposure are
of low intensity. Naturally, the price dynamics generated by low-intensity exposure are very
similar to the overall pattern shown in Figure 2.4. The high-intensity exposure estimates, on the
other hand, suffer from a lack of statistical power as a result of the significantly lower treatment
saturation.35 The general pattern is very similar: the average price jumps up in event year 0,
peaks at event year 1, and tapers down in subsequent years. The point estimates are larger for
high intensity, with a peak of 15% compared to 10% for low intensity. The effect also appears to
be more persistent: the fourth year after high-intensity exposure still see a statistically significant
effect of 5% higher price, whereas the corresponding estimate is small and insignificant for low
intensity. Despite these patterns, the lack of statistical power constrains our ability to detect
33This is referred to as the “single crossing” property in Banzhaf and Walsh (2008).
34We pool the pre-hurricane indicators for the two types of exposure to enhance power.
35At most 1% of homes are ever sold from areas affected by category 3 and above wind speeds in any year before
or after a hurricane, as such wind speeds rarely affected Florida over our sample period (recall Figure 2.3, with the
caveat that it depicts tract-wide and not individual home category 3 hurricane exposure).
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Figure 2.13: Heterogeneous Effects by Hurricane Intensity – Full Sample
Notes: Estimates for separate wind categories are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals.
The model includes standard hedonic variables and census tract, month, and county-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by county. The results are based on the full sample of
Florida home buyers (N = 7,409,258).
differential effects. We find the same pattern for price and income in the HMDA subsample,
where the high-intensity exposure is associated with a higher but imprecisely estimated peak (see
Figures B.9 and B.10).
2.5 Discussions and Conclusion
This paper provides two sets of findings. First, we estimate the equilibrium dynamics in
Florida housing markets in the wake of a hurricane. We find an increase in housing prices and a
concurrent decrease in transaction probability, both lasting up to three years. The direction and
duration of these effects are consistent with the mechanism in which part of the housing stock
were first damaged by hurricanes and later restored. We find little empirical support for alternative
explanations. Second, we examine demographic changes in local communities associated with
these market adjustments, and find that incoming home buyers during the recovery period have
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higher average income conditional on characteristics of homes transacted. This results in an
enduring change in local economic profiles toward higher-income groups.
Several interesting implications emerge from these findings. For one, our results suggest
there is a limit to the extent of any demand response. In the short run, any behavioral responses
on the demand side of the market is dwarfed by the effect of the supply shock. It is likely that the
potential home buyers are well informed about the general risk of hurricane exposure in Florida.
For them, the realization of a hurricane conveys no more information beyond the very local
effect pertaining to homes located in flood zones, as identified in previous studies. Moreover,
we find remarkably little evidence of downward price adjustments beyond the response to the
supply shock, which suggests that hurricanes do not fundamentally change the long-run demand
for housing in affected areas. This is also illustrated in Figure B.7, where population trends in
affected and unaffected counties are shown. There is no evidence of differential growth trends,
whether or not they were recently impacted by a hurricane. This might be due to the growing
importance of warm weather as an urban amenity in recent years. Locations with warm winter
across the U.S., such as most of Florida, have seen steadily increasing demand (Glaeser and
Gyourko, 2005).
In addition, we find that the transaction probability return to the baseline in three years,
implying a close-to-full recovery in terms of the housing stock. This fast recuperation of physical
capital is in line with past studies on capital destruction by war (Davis and Weinstein, 2002;
Miguel and Roland, 2011; Feigenbaum, Lee, and Mezzanotti, 2017). In the case of hurricanes,
however, this finding stands in contrast to Gallagher and Hartley (2017), who find a substantial
portion of Katrina victims in New Orleans use insurance payments to pay down home mortgage
and move away instead of repairing their homes. An important factor contributing to this
difference is the incentive to rebuild, which is governed by the comparison between construction
costs and housing prices (Gyourko and Saiz, 2004). Hurricane Katrina’s impact in New Orleans
is much more severe than most of the hurricanes studied in this paper, which might have driven up
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reconstruction costs and affected local amenities and industries to the point of reducing long-run
demand.
Finally, we return to the increase in average income of home buyers. As average buyer
income increases after the strike without later dropping below their pre-hurricane baselines,
these findings depict a richer demographic inhabiting hurricane-affected communities following
a disaster. To the extent that such a demographic brings along more expensive assets, and
spurs more economic development in these areas, this could result in more expensive future
hurricane damage claims to publicly funded disaster relief organizations like FEMA. Moreover,
the empirical relationship between housing supply and buyer income is interesting in and of
itself. Our model highlights financial constraints as the potential drivers of such a relationship.
This finding raises concerns on housing affordability issues in the recovery process, especially
under hard credit constraints. We believe a more in-depth understanding of the roles played by
hard and soft financial constraints is an important area for future work. It provides implications
on promoting a more equitable recovery through housing policy from future (and likely more
intense) natural disasters.
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Chapter 3
Extreme Weather and the Politics of
Climate Change: a Study of Campaign
Contributions and Elections
Abstract
In this paper we study how extreme weather and natural disasters affect political outcomes
such as campaign contributions and elections. We suggest that weather events associated with
climate change may influence these outcomes by (1) leading individuals to update their beliefs
about climate change and act on these beliefs politically; and (2) increasing the salience of
climate change for individuals who are already politically active. In a short-run analysis, we
find that the number of contributions to the Democratic Party increases in response to weekly
average temperature, and that the effect is stronger among constituents in counties with more anti-
environment incumbent politicians. In a medium-run analysis, we find suggestive evidence that
after a natural disaster, total fundraising and the number of donors in an election cycle is higher
if the incumbent has a more anti-environment stance, indicating a higher level of competition.
Further, we find evidence that after a disaster, the more anti-environment the incumbent, the
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higher the chance is of a challenger entering the race. Finally, we address alternative mechanisms
and explanations for our results.
3.1 Introduction
Public opinion on key issues is thought to play a crucial role in shaping policies and
elections in a democracy. Therefore, it is important to understand what factors contribute to the
formation of these opinions as well as their political ramifications. One such key issue is climate
change, which has received significant policy attention for decades.
In the United States, both the public and legislators remain divided when it comes to
climate change, which has prompted several studies of Americans’ attitudes towards it (Akerlof,
Maibach, Fitzgerald, Cedeno, and Neuman, 2013; Howe, Mildenberger, Marlon, and Leiserowitz,
2015; Myers, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Akerlof, and Leiserowitz, 2013; Spence, Poortinga, Butler,
and Pidgeon, 2011; Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, and Weber, 2014). These studies document great
heterogeneity in beliefs across the country and provide important insights into the factors that
shape such beliefs. In particular, as extreme weather events and natural disasters have become
widely associated with climate change (IPCC, 2013a), one recurring finding is that exposure to
these events leads individuals to change their reported perceptions of the issue.
Even though weather anomalies have been shown to influence stated beliefs regarding
climate change, less is known about how they may impact costly, real-world actions. Importantly,
people may misreport their true preferences due to social or strategic considerations, so surveys
of stated beliefs can be misleading. Furthermore, it is unclear whether these extreme weather
events can, through changes in beliefs, have real-world political consequences. In particular,
it remains an open question whether politicians will be held accountable for their positions on
environmental issues as beliefs regarding climate change vary.1
1One reason changes in beliefs might not lead to political consequences is that climate change may not always be
a top policy priority (Davis and Wurth, 2003; Guber, 2001).
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In this paper, we present direct evidence of campaign finance and electoral responses to
extreme weather events. We assemble a comprehensive dataset of extreme weather shocks, natural
disasters, and U.S. House of Representative elections. These data allow us to examine various
response margins, from campaign contributions to the competitiveness of elections and their
outcomes. Moreover, we collect information on the environmental voting records of members
of Congress to assess where they stand on the anti-environment to pro-environment spectrum.2
Importantly, we test for differential effects of weather and disaster shocks depending on the
environmental stance of incumbent politicians. This approach helps us shed light on whether
environmental ideology is a driver of campaign contributions and political support for candidates
in elections. Our results document a margin of political behavior in this context that is, to the best
of our knowledge, novel in the literature. They also shed light on the mechanisms through which
public opinion may shape climate change adaptation and mitigation policies.
Our study follows the literature closely in terms of choosing regression frameworks and
constructing measures of weather shocks. In terms of their empirical strategies, previous studies
can be classified into three categories. The first set of studies focuses on short-run weather
shocks, over a period of a month or less (Egan and Mullin, 2012; Hamilton and Stampone, 2013;
Joireman, Truelove, and Duell, 2010; Li, Johnson, and Zaval, 2011; Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, and
Weber, 2014). The second set of studies uses medium-run temperature shocks, over a period of
a month to a year (Deryugina, 2013). The third set of studies focuses on medium-run natural
disaster shocks, also over a period of a month to a year (Lang and Ryder, 2016; Sisco, Bosetti,
and Weber, 2017; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, and Pidgeon, 2011). In order to relate to the existing
literature, in our study we focus on both short-run and medium-run temperature variations as well
as medium-run natural disaster shocks.
In the short-run analysis, we examine how weekly temperature shocks affect contributions
to Democratic candidates through ActBlue, an online fundraising platform, over the 2006-2012
2These terms are used for concise communication with the reader and do not necessarily represent the views of
the authors on these issues or the politicians involved.
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period. The identification relies on two features. First, temperature shocks are measured by
deviations of weekly mean temperature from the historical average in the same month and
location, which eliminates most cross-sectional variation and seasonality that may be correlated
with unobserved confounding factors. Second, we control for a rich set of fixed effects including
county, week-in-sample, and state-by-election cycle. The results reveal an extensive-margin
response: a 1 oF increase in weekly average temperature has a contemporaneous effect of a 1.2%
increase in the contribution rate, and a cumulative monthly effect of 2.7%. In our main analysis,
we do not detect any intensive-margin effect. When looking across incumbent characteristics
such as party membership and environmental attitudes, we find stronger responses to temperature
shocks among constituents with more anti-environment incumbents. Together, these results
suggest that following a temperature shock, Democratic candidates are rewarded for their pro-
environment stance when the incumbents in the contributor’s district are more anti-environment.
This effect is mainly driven by an increase in the number of contributions.
In the medium-run analysis, we start by exploring how natural disasters in an election
cycle interact with an incumbent’s stance on environmental issues to influence both campaign
finance and electoral outcomes. We examine the universe of individual and political action
committee (PAC) contributions to candidates in U.S. House of Representatives races during
election cycles 1990-2012. Importantly, this analysis includes both Republican and Democratic
candidates. We use two distinct regression specifications. The first is our main specification and
exploits variation in the incumbent’s stance on environmental issues regardless of party affiliation,
whereas the second utilizes within-party variation. Using the main specification, we find that
after a natural disaster, total fundraising and the number of donors in an election cycle is higher if
the incumbent has a more anti-environment stance, and there is some suggestive evidence that
the effect is stronger for donations to challengers than for incumbents. Further, we find that after
a disaster, the more anti-environment the incumbent is the higher the chance of a challenger
entering the race, leading to a slightly lower re-election probability for the incumbent. When we
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use within-party variation in incumbents’ environmental stances, we find that estimates generally
point in the same direction as before, but they are now imprecisely estimated and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The one exception is the probability of an incumbent entering
the race as a response to a natural disaster, which is still higher the more anti-environment the
incumbent is and remains statistically significant. In addition to natural disasters, we also focus on
medium-run temperature shocks by using a similar methodology but treating hot and cold cycles
as separate events. While we do not have enough power to rule out null results, the magnitude
and direction of the effects of hot weather events are similar to that of natural disasters. In the
case of cold weather events, we find that the effects are typically opposite in sign, which points to
the possibility that in this context people react differently to hot and cold weather abnormalities.
These results complement the short-run analysis since we are able to utilize the universe of
contributions to House candidates, both Republican and Democrat, online and offline.
We explore a number of possible explanations for our results and argue that the most
plausible explanation is the environmental preference mechanism. We suggest that there are two
margins at play within this mechanism. First, extreme weather events prompt people to update
their beliefs about climate change and become more politically active as a result. Second, extreme
weather events make environmental issues more salient, serving as a call to action for people with
static beliefs who are politically active. Furthermore, we note that in a competitive environment
such as the electoral system, people on both sides of the climate change debate may be galvanized
by extreme weather events, either independently or as a response to the other side’s actions.
This paper contributes to several research areas. Firstly, it is one of the few existing
studies that adopt a revealed preference approach to studying the effects of weather shocks on
people’s beliefs about climate change. Previous studies have focused on outcomes such as Google
searches (Herrnstadt and Muehlegger, 2014; Lang and Ryder, 2016) and Twitter posts (Sisco,
Bosetti, and Weber, 2017; Moore, Obradovich, Lehner, and Baylis, 2019). Li, Johnson, and Zaval
(2011) show that respondents in a survey donated more money to an environmental charity if they
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thought that day was warmer than usual, although this donation came from the fee they were
awarded for completing the study. Importantly, the outcomes in this study are more costly and
spontaneous, thereby providing more meaningful reflections of people’s beliefs. Moreover, we
also directly examine the political processes through which public opinions on climate change
might shape policies, which has been a goal of this literature.
Secondly, our results contribute to the current understanding of the motivations for
political giving. Our results show that the responses to short-run temperature shocks in terms
of ActBlue contributions occurr mostly on the extensive margin. This is consistent with the
mainstream view that individuals make campaign contributions for ideological reasons (Barber,
2016; Bonica, 2014; Ensley, 2009; Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox, 2003) and that
they derive direct utility from contributing to their candidate of choice, as if they were consuming
an ideologically-motivated consumption good (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder, 2003).
Our findings are also consistent with the idea that online fundraising platforms like ActBlue have
enabled such “political consumption” by significantly lowering transaction costs (Karpf, 2013).
Our medium-run results provide insights into PAC contributions, whose motivation has not been
unanimously agreed upon in the literature. While a prevalent theory is that PAC contributions
have a quid pro quo nature, recent studies reveal that ideological considerations are also at play
(Barber, 2016; Bonica, 2013; Bonica, 2014; Bonica, 2013; Snyder, 1990). Our evidence that
PAC contributions also respond to natural disaster shocks lends further support to the ideological
mechanism.
Thirdly, our results shed light on whether politicians are held accountable by constituents
for their policy positions. On one hand, there is evidence to suggest that voters make seemingly
irrational decisions, since same-day weather conditions or financial windfalls from lotteries
have been shown to affect voting outcomes (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause, 2007; Bagues and
Esteve-Volart, 2016; Meier, Schmid, and Stutzer, 2016; Jachimowicz, Menges, and Galinsky,
2017). On the other hand, there is also evidence that incumbents are held partially accountable
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for their roles in disaster preparedness and post-disaster relief. For example, Arceneaux and
Stein (2006) show that voters punish the incumbent mayor following a flood if they believed
the city was responsible for flood preparation. Gasper and Reeves (2011) show that electorates
may punish presidents and governors for severe weather damage, but that only the president is
punished if a request by the governor for federal assistance is rejected. Healy and Malhotra (2009)
show that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending.
Our analysis complements these previous studies by exploring legislative elections to the U.S.
House of Representatives. We also go beyond the direct impact of natural disasters in our context,
by focusing on differential political consequences for incumbents with varying environmental
stances. Further, our results shed light on those in Herrnstadt and Muehlegger (2014), who
show that congresspersons are more likely to vote in favor of environmental legislation following
natural disasters in their state. While there are multiple possible channels for their results, a
higher probability of being challenged could certainly put pressure on incumbents to change
voting behavior.
Finally, our findings also have important policy implications. Even though environmental
issues are usually not front-and-center in U.S. elections, we demonstrate that the electorate is
responsive to the salience of these issues. However, we caution that these responses may not be
rational, since people may process shocks with psychological biases.3 Further, these responses
may also reflect a suboptimal allocation of attention. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that
scientific outreach or other approaches that raise issue salience have the potential to induce
substantial changes in political behavior.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
sources we draw upon for our analysis, while Section 3.3 describes our empirical strategy. In
Section 3.4 we report and discuss the results. We conclude in Section 3.5.
3For example, Gallagher (2014) examines flood insurance take-up following flood events and finds a pattern
indicative of availability bias or other forms of Bayesian learning with incomplete information.
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3.2 Data
3.2.1 Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections
The political data we use come from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics,
and Elections (DIME) (Bonica, 2016). This database includes over 100 million campaign
contributions made by individuals and organizations to candidates in local, state, and federal
elections from 1979 to 2016. The main source of the data are administrative records from the
Federal Election Commission (FEC). In addition to campaign finance data, the database includes
characteristics of the candidates receiving contributions, as well as information on election
outcomes.4
For our study of the impact of short-run weather shocks on political campaign contribu-
tions, we use a subsample of the individual contributions data from DIME. The reason is that
while individual contributions have dates assigned to them, these dates do not always match
the contribution date. Instead, they may indicate the date the campaign or candidate filed these
contributions. Since we are interested in people’s response to short-run, time-varying weather
shocks, it is essential for us to make use of accurate date information. In order to circumvent this
problem, we focus on contributions made through the online fundraising platform ActBlue, since
the reported date matches the date of the contribution in this sample. We assess the implications
of using ActBlue data in the following section.
For our study of the political consequences of natural disasters and medium-run weather
shocks, we use the recipients file of the DIME database. This file contains information at the
election cycle-by-candidate level and includes the total amount of funds raised by candidates
from different sources, the seat sought, and the result of the election.
4For a detailed description of the database and data sources, please visit https://data.stanford.edu/dime.
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3.2.2 ActBlue
In our short-term study, we focus on campaign contributions made through ActBlue,
which is an online fundraising platform for Democratic candidates. The site was founded in
2004 and its popularity rose quickly thereafter. In our sample, ActBlue accounts for 4.3% of
contributions and 0.8% of the total amount contributed to Democratic candidates.5
The main advantage of using ActBlue data is that the dates on ActBlue records are accurate,
as they are electronically recorded at the time the contribution is made. Offline contributions, on
the other hand, are at risk of being inaccurate in a non-random fashion, with the associated date
often corresponding to the campaign’s filing date. Naturally, relying on accurate date information
is crucial for estimating responses to short-run weather variations. Another advantage of using
ActBlue is that the contributions made on the site are typically small in quantity (see Figure C.2).
For our purposes, these donations are very relevant, since they correspond to more spontaneous,
lower stakes contribution decisions that may be affected by short-run weather variations.6
However, there are two concerns with using only ActBlue data for our short term study.
The first concern is that the lack of an established Republican equivalent of ActBlue leaves us with
only donations to Democrats.7 This feature of our data does not allow us to see how donations to
Republicans would respond, which is a shortcoming of our strategy. However, in the following
sections we propose alternative methodologies to address this concern. The second concern is
that it is unclear whether using ActBlue data will yield results that are representative of how
contributions to Democrats as a whole respond to weather shocks. For example, it is possible
that Internet contributors may be different in fundamental ways from the rest of contributors who
still make up the majority. This issue has been investigated by Karpf (2013) and Wilcox (2008).
Karpf (2013) suggests that the Internet brings about an increase in small donors by lowering
5Conversely, the total amount of contributions to Democrats is about 24 times the number of ActBlue contributions,
and the total amount contributed to Democrats is 122 times the amount contributed through ActBlue. We keep these
numbers in mind when assessing the magnitude of our coefficients later on.
6For an example of how contributions are made to a Democratic candidate through ActBlue, see Figure C.1.
7Rightroots, Big Red Tent, and Slatecard are examples, but their popularity has been far lower than ActBlue’s.
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transaction costs. They also suggest that this change has facilitated the flow of campaign funds
towards more polarizing candidates. Meanwhile, Wilcox (2008) finds that Internet donors are
much younger than other donors, but that those giving small amounts to Democrats online are
actually similarly likely to consider themselves “ideologically extreme” than as larger donors
are. However, these findings are taken from surveys conducted in the year 2000, while our main
time period is 2006-2012, during which Internet use was more prevalent among the general
population. For our purposes, even though Internet contributors may not be a mirror image of the
general contributing population, focusing on these contributions allows us to hone in on lower
cost, spontaneous decisions that may be affected by weather variations.
In order to further alleviate these representativeness concerns, we would ideally correlate
changes over time in ActBlue donations to changes in non-ActBlue donations, given that we
exploit time-varying weather shocks in our analysis. However, there are two difficulties associated
with doing this. First, as stated above, the date information for the non-ActBlue data is unreliable.
Second, ActBlue was founded in 2004 and has become more popular since then, meaning that the
trend of donations made through ActBlue will likely differ from the trend of overall Democratic
donations. However, even though exploiting the time dimension may be difficult, we can explore
whether ActBlue data do a good job at explaining the cross-section of total donations to Democrats.
In order to do this, we regress total donation amounts and counts at the state-by-election cycle
level on ActBlue donations and counts. If the cross-section of ActBlue donations is representative
of the total Democratic cross-section, it should have high explanatory power. Additionally, to
account for the fact that ActBlue becomes more popular over time and may represent a larger
portion of total donations, we let our coefficients vary by election cycle in alternative regressions.
The results of these regressions are in Table C.2. The first two columns refer to the total
amount contributed and the next two refer to the number of of contributions. As can be seen
in column (1), simply including the amount donated through ActBlue is a strong predictor of
total donations, leading to an R2 of 0.74. When we allow the effect to vary by election cycle, as
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in column (2), the explanatory is even higher, with an R2 of 0.86. When we consider counts of
donations instead of amounts donated, the fit is slightly better, with an R2 of 0.83 and 0.88 in
columns (3) and (4), respectively. Finally, an interesting feature of Table C.2 is the time-varying
estimates in columns (2) and (4). The estimates for earlier years tend to be larger than in later
years, revealing that over time the portion of ActBlue donations in total Democratic donations is
rising.8
3.2.3 League of Conservation Voters Scorecard
In order to capture the stance of incumbent politicians on environmental issues, we use
the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scorecard (also known as the National Environmental
Scorecard). The LCV scorecard assigns percentage scores to U.S. congresspersons based on
their voting records regarding environmental legislation introduced during a particular year.9
According to the terminology used by the LCV, if a politician aligns with the LCV opinion on a
vote, it is marked as a pro-environment action; conversely, if the politician does not align with
the LCV on a vote, it is marked as an anti-environment action (League of Conservation Voters,
2007). For conciseness, in this paper we will follow this terminology and refer to politicians who
frequently align with the LCV as pro-environment and to those who don’t as anti-environment.10
More specifically, LCV scores range from zero to one with pro- and anti-environment
voting records on either side of the spectrum. In this paper, we subtract the original scores from
one so that a score of zero indicates that the politician has disagreed with the LCV on 0% of
the votes selected (pro-environment); conversely, a score of one indicates that the politician has
disagreed with the LCV on 100% of the votes selected (anti-environment).11
8It is worth pointing out that this trend stabilizes during the 2012 election cycle.
9The legislation included in the scorecard arises from a consensus among leading environmental and conservation
organizations in the U.S.
10Disclaimer: these terms are used to facilitate communication with the reader and do not necessarily represent
the views of the authors on these issues or the politicians involved.
11For more information about the LCV scorecard, please visit the LCV website at http://scorecard.lcv.org/.
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Figure 3.1: LCV Score Distribution by Party Affiliation
If politicians tend to vote along party lines when it comes to environmental issues, then we
would expect to see a divide in the LCV scores of Democrats versus Republicans. This is certainly
the case, as can be seen in Figure 3.1, where we plot the LCV score of U.S. congresspersons. As
shown in the figure, most Democrats fall into the 0-0.25 range, meaning that they disagree with
the LCV on less than 25% of the relevant votes. On the other hand. most Republicans fall in the
0.75-1 range, meaning that they disagree with the LCV more than 75% of the time. However,
judging from the remaining mass in the 0.25-0.75 region, there is still substantial within-party
variation in environmental voting records.
Additionally, the LCV score is an important indicator of whether the politician is a climate
change denier. To show this, we obtain information on which congresspersons in the 112th caucus
are climate change deniers from the site ThinkProgress.org.12 Linking this information with LCV
score data, we show that the probability of being a climate change denier is 51% for politicians
with LCV scores above 0.5. Conversely, the probability of being a climate change denier for
politicians with LCV scores below 0.5 is zero.
12See the article “The Climate Zombie Caucus Of The 112th Congress” at https://thinkprogress.org/the-climate-
zombie-caucus-of-the-112th-congress-2ee9c4f9e46/.
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3.2.4 Weather Shocks
We obtain historical weather data from the Global Historical Climatology Network Daily
(GHCN-D) database. This database contains daily observations of maximum temperature and
precipitation from more than 8,000 weather stations throughout the United States during 1960-
2014. Using this information, we construct measures of county-level weather.13
We construct two measures of daily temperature shocks, which we later aggregate to the
appropriate time frames for our analyses. The first measure is the daily deviation in maximum
temperature from the historical climate normal in each county and month:
T maxDevcmd = T maxcmd−T maxcm
where c is county, m is month, and d is day-in-sample. T maxcmd is the contemporaneous daily
maximum temperature in county c. T maxcm is the long-run average of maximum temperature
for this county in the same month, calculated over the 30 preceding years. The second measure
is a pair of indicators for whether the maximum daily temperature is abnormally high or low,
compared to historical temperature distributions:
T maxLow5,cmd = 1(T maxcmd ≤ T max5,cm)
T maxHigh5,cmd = 1(T maxcmd ≥ T max95,cm)
where T max5,cm is the 5th percentile of the distribution of maximum temperatures in the same
county and month over the 30 preceding years, and T max95,cm is the corresponding 95th percentile.
As a result, T maxLow5,cmd is an indicator for whether the contemporaneous temperature is lower
than the 5th percentile of the historical distribution, whereas T maxHigh95,cmd indicates whether
it is higher than the 95th percentile of that distribution.
13If there is more than one weather station present in a given county, we take the average over all weather stations.
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For our short-run analysis at the county-week level, we aggregate these daily measures
by week, in order to obtain our independent variables of interest. We construct T maxDevcw,
which is the average of T maxDevcmd over the week, and is our primary temperature shock
measure. We also construct T maxHighcw and T maxLowcw, which are the sums over the week of
T maxHigh5,cmd and T maxLow5,cmd , respectively. Importantly, these measures capture different
aspects of weather shocks. Further, we also construct similar measures of precipitation deviations
which we use as controls in our regressions.
For our medium-run analysis, we first calculate the number of hot days, defined as those
above the 90th percentile of the historical distribution, experienced by the average person in
each congressional district and election cycle.14 We then rank district-cycle observations by this
variable and assign hot status to those cycles in the top quartile. Similarly, we assign cold status
to a district-cycle if it is in the top quartile ranked by number of cold days, defined as those below
the 10th percentile of the historical distribution.
3.2.5 Natural Disasters
We obtain official disaster declaration data from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) between 1990 and 2012. There are a total of 2,206 climate-related disasters,
with the largest categories being severe storms, hurricanes, floods, fires and snow events (see
Table C.1 for a detailed breakdown of disaster types). Importantly, these official records contain
the period of the incident and the specific counties affected. Most declarations are not statewide.
Because we analyze the impact of natural disasters at the congressional district level, we
need to assign disaster status to these for each election cycle. In order to do this, we first calculate
the fraction of the population in a district living in counties hit by disasters,15 and then assign
disaster status to a district if this fraction exceeds 50%. It should be noted that this might not
14Our procedure makes use of the MABLE/Geocorr crosswalks developed by Missouri Census Data Center (2017),
which partitions the population in a congressional district into its overlapping counties using Census data.
15This procedure also uses MABLE/Geocorr crosswalks (Missouri Census Data Center, 2017).
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be the exact threshold at which natural disasters become salient politically, potentially leading
to measurement error. However, in our data the majority of district-cycle observations have a
fraction of the population affected of either zero or one, so adjustments to the threshold would
not have substantial impact on our results.
3.3 Empirical Framework
Existing literature suggests that people might update their beliefs about climate change
as a result of contemporaneous weather shocks, or even after a prolonged period of unusual
temperature. Similarly, natural disasters may also lead to belief updating, given the salience of
these events. Given that there are multiple possible relevant time frames and types of weather
event, we examine the impacts of weather shocks both in the short-run and in the medium-run,
as well as the medium-run impacts of natural disasters. In this section, we outline our empirical
strategy for doing so.
3.3.1 Short-Run Weather Impacts
We first analyze the impact of weekly weather shocks on contributions to Democrats
through ActBlue. Since Democratic candidates tend to be more pro-environment than non-
Democratic candidates, we expect these donations to be responsive to weather shocks through the
environmental preference mechanism we have proposed.
The estimating equations we use to study the impact of weather shocks on campaign
contributions take the following general form:
Ycw = γ′Weathercw+δw+δc+δse+ εcw (3.1)
where c is county, w is week-in-sample, s is state, and e is election cycle. Ycw is the outcome of
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interest, which can be either (1) the contribution rate (the number of contributions per million
people), or (2) the average amount per contribution. These outcomes are calculated based on
contributions made through the ActBlue platform. Furthermore, Weathercw is a vector of weather
variables, which includes measures of temperature conditions as the key regressors and those of
precipitation conditions as controls. Our coefficients of interest are the ones in γ′ corresponding
to the temperature variables.
We use three different specifications of Weathercw in our main analysis. The first specifi-
cation includes only weekly contemporaneous deviations of temperature and precipitation from
long-run climate normals, as they are expected to be the most relevant. It takes the following
form:
Weathercw = [T maxDevcw,PrcpDevcw]T .
One thing to note about this specification is that it does not allow for weather from past weeks to
influence contribution decisions. However, it may be possible that the decision to contribute is
delayed with respect to exposure to weather shocks. To allow for this, our second specification is:
Weathercw = [T maxDevcw, ...,T maxDevc,w−4,PrcpDevcw, ...,PrcpDevc,w−4]T
where we have added four lags of both temperature and precipitation deviations. This way, we
capture the influence of weather shocks occurring during the past month. Furthermore, another
weakness of our first specification is that it may not adequately capture current weather for
contributions occurring earlier on in the week, since our measures are weekly averages. In order
to address this, we propose the following third specification:
Weathercw = [T maxDev
2W
c,w,PrcpDev
2W
c,w]
T
where T maxDev2Wc,w =
1
2(T maxDevcw+T maxDevc,w−1) and similarly PrcpDev
2W
c,w =
1
2(PrcpDevcw+
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PrcpDevc,w−1). Therefore, we average deviations in temperature and precipitation over the cur-
rent and previous weeks.
In all of our specifications we also control for week-in-sample (δw), county (δc), and
state-by-election cycle (δse) fixed effects. The county fixed effects absorb time-invariant factors in
each county such as general political preferences and contribution behavior. The week-in-sample
fixed effects control for confounding national events and the exponential growth of the platform
itself. Finally, the state-by-cycle fixed effects account for slower-moving changes across states,
such as whether the current president is politically aligned with the state, or new policies adopted
by the State. We cluster standard errors at the county level.
Aside from the main specifications outlined above, we also consider four extensions. First,
we estimate the effects of positive and negative temperature deviations separately, to shed light
on whether people respond to these differently. Second, we estimate effects separately for each
quarter of the election cycle, to study how these vary with the progression of campaigns. Third,
we consider alternative measures of our independent variables by focusing on counts of extreme
temperature events instead of average temperature. Fourth, we extend our main regressions to
allow for heterogeneous effects depending on the environmental stance of the incumbents in the
contributor’s place of residence, to rule out unobservable confounding factors that may drive all
contributions across time and location, and not only those that are environmentally motivated.
More specifically, we examine whether counties where the majority of the population lives
in districts represented by anti-environment incumbents exhibit stronger responses to weather
shocks.16 For more details on these additional specifications, see Appendix C.3.
16This is what we would expect as long as the Democratic candidates receiving contributions on ActBlue are more
pro-environment on average.
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3.3.2 Medium-Run Natural Disaster Impacts
Aside from studying weather shocks, we are interested in how fundraising and elections
are affected by natural disasters in the medium run. Specifically, we study how this relationship
varies depending on the environmental stance of the incumbent politician. In order to explore this
issue, we focus on races for the U.S. House of Representatives during election cycles 1990-2012.
We study campaign finance outcomes, such as the total funds raised and the funds raised by
the challenger or incumbent separately. Further, we consider electoral outcomes such as the
probability of the race being competitive and the probability of the incumbent being re-elected.
One concern that our approach will have to to address is that natural disasters may have
significant effects on campaign contributions and other political outcomes through channels
unrelated to environmental preferences and beliefs. For example, Stevens (2001) documents
that following the September 11 terror attacks, individuals substituted away from campaign
contributions and towards charitable giving. We expect this to be relevant in the case of natural
disasters, since they often entail tragic consequences and loss of property.
In order to address the above concern, our research design consists in comparing the out-
comes of congressional districts experiencing natural disasters whose incumbent politicians have
an anti-environment voting record to the outcomes of other districts experiencing natural disasters
but whose incumbents exhibit pro-environment voting records. By studying differential impacts
by the environmental stance of incumbents, we hope to isolate the environmental preference
mechanism. From an econometric standpoint, we run regressions of the following form:
Yde = β1Disasterde+β2LCVde+β3Disasterde×LCVde+δd +δe+ εde (3.2)
where Yde is an outcome for a race in congressional district d during election cycle e; Disasterde
is an indicator variable for whether over half of the population in a congressional district lives in
counties affected by a natural disaster during that cycle; LCVde is the LCV score of the incum-
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bent;17 and δd and δe are fixed effects for congressional district and election cycle, respectively.
We cluster standard errors at the state level.
Our coefficient of interest is β3. We interpret this coefficient as the difference in the
outcome of a congressional district affected by a natural disaster whose incumbent congressperson
has the most anti-environment voting record (LCV = 1), and the outcome of a similar, disaster-
struck congressional district whose incumbent congressperson has the most pro-environment
voting record possible (LCV = 0). Given that a one unit difference in the LCV score is a very
large difference, we suggest scaling our estimates by the standard deviation of the LCV score
in order to interpret them properly. Since the standard deviation of the LCV score is 0.2, we
interpret our coefficients by dividing them by five.18
While the LCV score captures precisely the political dimension we care about, it is
important to consider how it relates to party affiliation. As we can see in Figure 3.1, even though
there is certainly within-party variation in the LCV score, the two are closely related. This raises
a limitation of model (3.2): following a natural disaster, if people react differently to incumbents
from different parties for non-environmental reasons, then the above coefficient of interest would
be picking up on these factors as well. To address this issue, we propose an extension of the
above model. The proposed model is:
Yde =β1Disasterde+β2LCVde+β3Disasterde×LCVde
+β4Rde+β5Disasterde×Rde+δd +δe+ εde
(3.3)
where all variables are defined as in model (3.2) and we have now added Rde, an indicator
variable for whether the incumbent is a Republican, as well as an interaction of this variable with
Disasterde. Our coefficient of interest is still β3, which is now identified using variation in the
17In order to incorporate all available information at the time of the race, we average the LCV score of politicians
for that election cycle and all past election cycles, using this measure throughout in our regressions.
18The standard deviation we use is that of the LCV score after controlling for the politician’s party, which is 0.2.
Without controlling for the politician’s party the standard deviation is 0.32, which is slightly larger.
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LCV score within the incumbent’s political party.
It is important to note that model (3.3) comes with both advantages and disadvantages
with respect to model (3.2). The main advantage, as previously discussed, is that it addresses
the concern that people may respond to disasters differently depending on the incumbent party
for reasons unrelated to the environment. The disadvantage is that the model does not make
use of of valuable cross-party variation in environmental stances, which is perhaps the most
visible and available to people when making decisions. Therefore, we consider these models to
be complementary and keep these features in mind when interpreting results.
3.3.3 Medium-Run Weather Impacts
In the same way that campaign contributions and elections may be affected by natural
disasters, they may also respond to shocks to medium-run temperature. The main difference with
respect to natural disasters is that in this case there can be two distinct shocks: a hot weather
shock and a cold weather shock. Since people may respond to these shocks differently, they enter
our regressions separately. Using the same notation as in the natural disasters section, we study
the impact of medium-run weather as follows:
Yde = β1Hotde+β2Coldde+β3LCVde+β4Hotde×LCVde+β5Coldde×LCVde+δd +δe+ εde
(3.4)
where all variables are as previously defined, and Hotde and Coldde are indicators for whether the
election cycle was particularly hot or cold for a given district in an election cycle, constructed as
described in Section 3.2. Aside from including these variables, we also add their interaction with
the LCV score, following our earlier methodology.19
Our coefficients of interest are β4 and β5. As above, we interpret these coefficients as the
difference in the outcome of a congressional district undergoing an unusually hot (cold) cycle,
19Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
98
whose incumbent congressperson has the most anti-environment voting record (LCV = 1), and
the outcome of a similar district whose incumbent congressperson has the most pro-environment
voting record possible (LCV = 0). Again, to ensure a reasonable interpretation of estimates
we scale them by dividing by five. Finally, it is straightforward to extend this methodology to
make use of within-party variation in the LCV score following a disaster, by adding Rde and its
interaction with LCV as in model (3.3) above.
3.4 Results
In this section, we present our results in three parts: (1) short-run weather impacts on
ActBlue contributions, (2) medium-run natural disaster impacts on campaign contributions and
election outcomes, and (3) medium-run weather impacts on the same set of outcomes as in (2).
3.4.1 Short-Run Weather Impacts
In the short-run analysis, we investigate how ActBlue contributions are affected by
temperature shocks in current and previous weeks. We examine two main outcomes. The first
outcome is the contribution rate, defined as the number of contributions per million people in
a county. This variable captures extensive-margin responses, i.e. whether temperature shocks
motivate more or fewer contributions. The second outcome is the average amount per contribution,
calculated as the total amount contributed divided by the number of contributions for each county-
week. Absent any extensive-margin responses, this outcome measures intensive-margin responses,
i.e. whether temperature shocks motivate larger or smaller donations from regular contributors.
However, if extensive-margin responses are present, this outcome captures both the intensive-
margin responses and potential changes in the composition of contributors.
In our sample period of 2006-2012, each county receives on average 2.4 donations per
week or around 15.4 per million people, as can be seen in Table 3.1. The average amount of these
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ActBlue, 2006-2012 (county-week)
Amount ($) 935,201 151.72 2061.05 0 583663.8
Count 935,201 2.42 23.10 0 5315
Average amount 935,201 13.19 125.67 0 32500
Count (per 1M pop) 935,201 15.40 135.84 0 38848.92
Population 935,201 110665.3 337187.7 403 9974868
Mean LCV 830,316 0.6720 0.3219 0 0.9800
Republican incumbent 830,316 0.6220 0.4849 0 1
Anti-env incumbent 830,316 0.6945 0.4606 0 1
Short-run Weather, 2006-2012 (county-week)
Tmax dev. (F) 935,201 0.4453 6.621 -37.60 37.51
Tmax positive dev. (F) 935,201 2.789 4.036 0 37.51
Tmax negative dev. (F) 935,201 2.344 3.805 0 37.60
Tmax low (< 5th pct) 935,201 0.3185 0.7855 0 7
Tmax high (> 95th pct) 935,201 0.4719 1.0652 0 7
Prcp dev. (1/10mm) 935,201 0.0609 13.5375 -49.91 468.54
Natural Disasters, 1990-2012 (congressional district-cycle)
Election cycle 4,478 2001.03 7.01 1990 2012
Disaster indicator 4,478 0.58 0.49 0 1
Num. donors (C) 4,095 232.18 1074.94 0 27122
Receipts ($1,000) (C) 4,095 326.72 703.71 0 9825.57
Num. donors (I) 4,095 536.83 1151.29 0 43718
Receipts ($1,000) (I) 4,095 1076.15 1108.93 6.77 25894.72
Receipts PACs ($1,000) (C) 4,095 42.57 101.39 0 1122.45
Receipts PACs ($1,000) (I) 4,095 466.07 387.56 0 4082.6
Receipts Ind. ($1,000) (C) 4,095 194.61 436.17 0 6248.91
Receipts Ind. ($1,000) (I) 4,095 545.11 745.35 0 21836.54
Competitive election 4,478 0.74 0.44 0 1
Unopposed election 4,478 0.18 0.38 0 1
Open race election 4,478 0.09 0.28 0 1
LCV score 4,478 0.5 0.34 0 1
Republican incumbent 4,478 0.47 0.5 0 1
Incumbent wins 4,095 0.95 0.22 0 1
Hot indicator 4,478 0.25 0.43 0 1
Cold indicator 4,478 0.25 0.43 0 1
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donations is $13.2, demonstrating that ActBlue contributions are usually small. Table 3.1 also
provides summary statistics on weather variables. The mean temperature deviation is 0.45 oF,
since positive deviations are larger than negative ones on average. This pattern is also captured
by the extreme temperature bins, as the number of extremely hot days exceeds the number of
extremely cold ones.20 This general warming trend is a common observation in the literature.
The estimates from equation (3.1) are reported in Table 3.2. In columns (1)-(3), we
examine responses in the contribution rate. In column (1), the main weather variable is temperature
in the current week. As detailed in Section 3.2.4, this variable is constructed as the deviation
from the long-run temperature normal. Precipitation deviation is also included in the model as a
control. The estimate on temperature is positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that
more positive or less negative deviations are associated with a higher number of contributions.
In particular, a 1 oF increase in weekly temperature is associated with about 0.19 additional
contributions per million people, or an approximately 1.2% increase in the contribution rate
relative to the mean.21
Column (2) adds four lags of temperature deviations. This specification allows us to
examine whether temperature deviations from previous weeks might affect contemporaneous
contributions. The estimated dynamics have two remarkable features. First, the estimates are
across-the-board positive and significant. This pattern is inconsistent with a harvesting mechanism,
where a temperature shock simply shifts the timing of contributions but not the overall amount.
Instead, these effects could represent a net increase in contributions. Second, the impact of
a temperature shock appears to decay over time, as the estimates are lower for temperature
deviations that took place longer ago. The contemporaneous effect is smaller than in column (1),
but the cumulative effect is larger: a 1 oF increase in weekly temperature is associated with a
cumulative effect of 0.42 additional contributions per million population, or a 2.7% increase in
20Extremely hot days are those above the 95th percentile of the historical distribution, while extremely cold days
are those below the 5th percentile of that distribution.
21γ0 is the coefficient on T maxDevc,w. The contemporary effect as a percentage of the mean of the dependent
variable is γ̂0/MeanD.V.= 0.186/15.40≈ 1.2%.
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Table 3.2: Actblue Donation Responses to Short-run Temperature Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Count Count Count Avg. Avg. Avg.
/1M pop /1M pop /1M pop amount amount amount
T maxDevc,w 0.186∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.016 0.013
(0.057) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046)
T maxDevc,w−1 0.103∗∗∗ –0.043
(0.035) (0.034)
T maxDevc,w−2 0.054∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.017) (0.041)
T maxDevc,w−3 0.072∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.025) (0.035)
T maxDevc,w−4 0.055∗∗ –0.035
(0.023) (0.032)
T maxDev2Wc,w 0.287
∗∗∗ –0.007
(0.083) (0.054)
R2 0.209 0.204 0.209 0.054 0.054 0.054
N 944,172 935,201 941,672 944,172 935201 941,672
Mean D.V. 15.45 15.40 15.42 13.13 13.19 13.15
County F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (3.1) are shown. The dependent variable in columns
(1)-(3) is the number of ActBlue contributions per 1 million population. The dependent
variable in columns (4)-(6) is the average amount per ActBlue contribution. The sample
consists of ActBlue contributions by week and county. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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the contribution rate relative to the mean.22
The comparison between columns (1) and (2) suggests that omitting temperature lags
might have led us to overestimate the contemporaneous effect and underestimate the overall
effects of a temperature shock. Furthermore, column (2) shows that the current and previous week
temperature deviations have the largest impact. In column (3), we take the average of deviations
in these two weeks and use it as our main independent variable. As expected, the estimate is again
positive and significant at the 1% level. Below, we will use this as our specification of reference
and estimate variants of it in later extensions of our analysis.
Next, we re-estimate our models using the average contribution amount as the outcome
variable. The results are in columns (4)-(6) of Table 3.2. In this case, all estimates are small
and statistically insignificant, with no recognizable pattern. This could mean that temperature
shocks do not induce intensive-margin responses or changes in contributor composition that are
strong enough to be statistically detectable. It is also possible that these changes go in opposite
directions and cancel each other out.
A feature of the specification used above is the implicit assumption that reducing a
negative shock by one degree and increasing a positive one by the same amount has the same
quantitative effect. However, positive and negative shocks might not be viewed symmetrically
by individuals when it comes to belief formation. In Table C.3, we report separate estimates of
the effects of positive and negative shocks. This is implemented by replacing each deviation
regressor above with a pair of variables that separately capture the absolute values of its positive
and negative components.23 The results suggest that the observed effects are mainly driven by
variation in positive deviations.
So far, our temperature measures are all in the form of deviations from the long-run
norm. An alternative is to use measures of extreme temperature events because they might be
more salient. As detailed in Section 3.2.4, we also construct variables that count the number
22(γ̂0+ ...+ γ̂4)/MeanD.V.= (0.134+0.103+0.054+0.072+0.055)/15.40≈ 2.7%.
23For more details on the specification, see Appendix C.3.
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of extremely hot or cold days in a week. Table C.4 reports estimates based on these measures.
Again, we find effects on the contribution rate but not the average amount. Specifically, one more
extreme-hot day in a week is associated with a contemporaneous increase of 0.35 contributions per
million people, or 2.3% of the mean contribution rate. Further, the cumulative monthly increase
in this case is 7%.24 For one more extreme-cold day, the contemporaneous and cumulative
effects are decreases of 6.6% and 15.8%, respectively. These results share a number of qualitative
similarities with the ones in Table C.3. They both show that heat shocks have extensive-margin
impacts, but not intensive-margin ones. They both find these effects lasting up to a month and
decreasing over time. On the other hand, the two sets of results differ on the effects of cold shocks.
The average deviation specification suggests no effect, while the cumulative extreme weather
approach suggests significant and negative effects. This suggests that a cold spell might not be as
salient as one additional extremely cold day. It might also be related to the political discourse
surrounding extremely cold weather events. In the past, some politicians have used extremely
cold weather to argue against climate change, which could plausibly change public opinion in the
opposite direction (Pierre-Louis, 2017).
Overall, our results so far are consistent with two potential mechanisms. First, temperature
shocks prompt people to update their beliefs about climate change and become more politically
aligned with Democratic candidates, who are typically pro-environment. Second, temperature
shocks make environmental issues more salient in the election, reminding pro-environment donors
to express their preferences through contributions. As these two mechanisms are similar, we do
not attempt to disentangle them and refer to them collectively as the environmental preference
mechanism. However, there are still a few alternative explanations for our results that are
unrelated to environmental reasons. For example, weather is known to change voting behavior
through psychological channels (Meier, Schmid, and Stutzer, 2016; Jachimowicz, Menges, and
Galinsky, 2017). It might also affect time use or the expediency of online versus other contribution
24The contemporaneous effect of an additional hot day is γ̂0/MeanD.V.= 0.353/15.40≈ 2.3% of the mean of
the dependent variable.
104
channels.25
To address these concerns and shed light on the mechanisms behind our results, we
examine heterogeneous effects based on incumbent characteristics.26 To enhance statistical power,
we estimate effects by using a single temperature variable, the mean deviation in the current and
past week.27 Furthermore, we also include a measure that characterizes the population-weighted
environmental stance of the incumbent congresspersons in a county, and its interaction with the
temperature variable. We are interested in the coefficient associated with the interaction term,
which shows how the effects of weather shocks vary according to incumbent characteristics.28
Three characteristics are examined in separate regressions: (1) population-weighted mean LCV
score (mean = 0.672); (2) whether over half of the population has a Republican incumbent (mean
= 62.2%); and (3) whether over half of the population has an incumbent with an LCV score
above 0.5 (mean = 69.5%). In this analysis, we restrict our sample to competitive races. The
summary statistics suggest that the counties in our sample tend to have incumbents who are
unfavorable to environmental protection and more likely to be Republicans. This could be due to
people supporting a Democratic challenger being more active in online contributions than those
supporting a Democratic incumbent.
The results are reported in table 3.3. In terms of the baseline effects, as before, we find
a positive and significant effect of temperature deviations on the contribution rate, but not on
the average contribution amount. Importantly, by examining the interaction term we can now
see that the effect on contributions is larger when the incumbents have a more unfavorable view
of environmental protection. This is true for all three measures of incumbents’ environmental
positions. The scale is also economically important. According to column (1), when the mean
25Section 1.6 presents a detailed discussion of the alternative mechanisms.
26We do not observe which candidates receive the contribution in the ActBlue data, only the place of residence
of the donor. This limits our investigation to incumbent characteristics. While many contributions are directed to
candidates outside of the district of residence of the contributor, we think this is a meaningful margin of giving
behavior to study. For example, environmentally motivated donors may look to other congressional district races if
the district they reside in is a very safe seat held by an anti-environment politician.
27Baseline estimates are reported in Table 3.2, columns (3) and (6).
28For more details on the specification, see Appendix C.3.
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneous Effects by Incumbent Characteristics
Incumbent Char. LCV Republican 1(LCV>0.5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Count Avg. Count Avg. Count Avg.
/1M pop amount /1M pop amount /1M pop amount
T maxDev2Wc,w 0.193
∗∗ −0.115 0.228∗∗ −0.102 0.241∗∗ −0.110
(0.098) (0.118) (0.103) (0.075) (0.110) (0.088)
IncChar 10.299∗∗ 2.016 5.336∗∗ 0.764 7.043∗∗ 1.538
(4.658) (1.318) (2.674) (0.854) (3.129) (0.954)
T maxDev2Wc,w× IncChar 0.152∗∗ 0.128 0.107∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.118∗
(0.068) (0.110) (0.037) (0.056) (0.037) (0.118)
N 830,316 830,316 830,316 830,316 830,316 830,316
R2 0.2070 0.0550 0.2070 0.0551 0.2070 0.0551
Mean D.V. (All/R/Anti) 12.29 11.09 11.12 8.16 10.33 7.48
Mean D.V. (All/D/Pro) 12.29 11.09 14.22 15.93 16.75 19.30
County F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (C.3) are shown. The dependent variables in columns (1), (3), and
(5) is the number of ActBlue contributions per 1 million population. The dependent variable in columns
(2), (4), and (6) is the average amount per ActBlue contribution. The temperature shock measure is
the average temperature deviation in the current and past week. The IncumbChar variable is the mean
LCV in columns (1)-(2), whether the county is dominated by Republican incumbents in columns (3)-(4),
and whether the county is dominated by incumbents with anti-environment voting records in columns
(5)-(6). Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
LCV score increases by one standard deviation, the scale of the positive effect goes up by 15.8%
of the baseline effect, corresponding to that of a county represented fully by pro-environment
incumbents.29 Further, the effect of temperature shocks in Republican-dominated counties is 47%
larger than in Democrat-dominated ones, according to column (2). The corresponding difference
in column (3) is 32.7%.30 These results suggest that following a temperature shock, Democratic
candidates are rewarded for their pro-environment stance when the incumbents in the contributors
29LCV incremental effect: SD(LCV )× β̂3/β̂1 = 0.2×0.152/0.193≈ 15.8%.
30Republican incremental effect: β̂3/β̂1 = 0.107/0.228≈ 47%. Anti-environment incremental effect: β̂3/β̂1 =
0.079/0.241≈ 32.7%.
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district are more anti-environment.31
Next, we explore how effects vary depending on the progression of campaigns. We use
a similar specification, interacting the two-week average deviation measure with a set of eight
indicators for quarters in the election cycle. This allows us to obtain a separate estimate for each
quarter. The results are plotted in Figure 3.2 and reported in Table C.5.
For the contribution rate, the estimates are positive and significant for quarters 2-5 and 8.
As expected, the effect is especially pronounced in the last quarter, as the election date draws near
and campaigning efforts ramp up. The second largest effect is in quarter 3, or June to August
in the year prior to the election. This might be driven by presidential candidates declaring their
candidacy around that time. When we examine average amount as an outcome, the pattern is
flipped. The effect is large and negative in quarter 8, followed by quarter 3, and fluctuates around
0 for the rest. This pattern is most likely driven by a change in the composition of the contributors
– heat shocks draw in more small-amount contributions in this case.32 Given this negative impact
on the average contribution amount, we also examine the contribution amount per million people,
which is a combined outcome of the two margins. As the extensive and intensive margins often
change in opposite directions, the overall effect is mostly small except for quarters 5 and 8,
where the increase in the extensive margin appears to dominate, leading to increased contribution
amounts in those quarters.
Lastly, we perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation to infer the effects of temperature
shocks on total Democratic contributions, instead of only ActBlue contributions. This calculation
31It is also possible to examine the coefficients on the incumbent characteristics, which are all positive and
significant when looking at contribution rates. Since we have controlled for county fixed effects, this parameter
identifies the increase in the contribution rate corresponding to an increase in anti-environment incumbents within a
county. Together, these results suggest that people make compensatory contributions when politicians ideologically
different from them are elected in their district.
32When interpreting the pattern, one caveat is that the average-amount variable is constructed by dividing total
contribution amount by the number of contributions. This procedure might transform any measurement error in the
denominator into non-classical ones in the outcome. The estimates might thus be biased, the confidence interval
invalid, especially when the mean of the denominator is close to zero. A remedy of this issue is beyond the scope of
this paper. In quarters 3 and 8, however, the number of contributions is sufficiently large that we are more confident
in the estimates.
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Figure 3.2: Variations of Estimates Across Quarters in Election Cycle
Notes: Point estimates from equation (C.4) and 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. The
outcome variables, as displayed next to the y-axis, are based on ActBlue records. Standard errors
are clustered by county. All regressions control for county, week-in-sample, and state-by-cycle
fixed effects.
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allows us to gauge the actual magnitudes of our previous estimates. In our sample, the total
number of Democratic contributions is 24 times that of ActBlue contributions, and the total
amount is 122 times larger. Using these numbers and our estimates in Table 3.2, we find that
the contemporaneous effect of a 1 oF increase in weekly mean temperature corresponds to a
total increase of 3.2 contributions or $215.6 per million people per week.33 The corresponding
cumulative effects are 10 contributions and $672.6. It should be noted that this calculation relies
on the assumption that total Democratic donations and ActBlue donations react similarly to
weather shocks. In reality, we may expect ActBlue donations to react more strongly given the
small and spontaneous nature of these contributions, meaning that these calculations are likely to
represent upper bounds on the actual effects.
3.4.2 Medium-Run Natural Disaster Impacts
In the previous section, we show that heat shocks are associated with more contributions to
Democratic candidates through ActBlue. As they are often the more pro-environment candidates,
it is consistent with the mechanism that people update their beliefs about climate change and
express their preference for pro-environmental policies through contributions. However, with
only contribution records for the Democrats, it is difficult to fully disentangle this environmental
preference channel from other factors that drive contributions in general.
In this section, we study the impact of natural disasters on campaign finance and elec-
tions. This analysis complements the previous results, as we explicitly account for politicians’
environmental attitudes and include contributions to both Democratic and Republican candidates.
As suggested by previous studies, natural disasters can draw public attention to climate change
(Lang and Ryder, 2016; Sisco, Bosetti, and Weber, 2017) and they also bring about political
ramifications for the incumbents (Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Healy
33∆ number of contribution = γ̂0 × ratio(Dem/ActB) = 0.134× 24 = 3.22. ∆ total amount = ∆ number of
contributions × average amount ×ratio(Dem/ActB) = 0.134×13.19×122 = 215.63.
109
and Malhotra, 2009). Building on this literature, we hypothesize that anti-environment leaning
incumbents will be held accountable for their environmental stance when a natural disaster strikes,
leading to increased support for challengers. However, we do not necessarily expect support for
these incumbents to remain unchanged, since they may intensify their fundraising efforts as a
response to the increased support for challengers. In other words, we are agnostic about what
happens to incumbent support.
In order to study the impact of natural disasters on campaign finance and elections, we
examine how the impact of a natural disaster varies depending on the environmental voting
record of the incumbent politician (LCV score), while focusing on competitive races. We run
regressions that follow the specifications in Equations (3.2) and (3.3). When interpreting the
magnitude of our coefficients, we divide them by five so that they correspond to the effect of a
one-standard-deviation difference in the LCV score of a candidate.34
We start by studying the effects of natural disasters on the amount of funds raised during
the election in Table 3.4. Panel A contains the results using our main specification, described
in Equation (3.2). In column (1) we can see that total fundraising following a natural disaster is
higher in those districts with more anti-environment incumbents. More precisely, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the LCV score of the incumbent translates to a $78,000 increase in total
fundraising during a cycle (5.1% D.V. mean), when a natural disaster strikes. We can further
break down the fundraising effect by distinguishing between the types of donor. In columns (2)
and (3) we can see that funds from PACs go up by about $20,000 (3.8% D.V. mean) and funds
from individuals go up by about $38,000 (4.6% D.V. mean).
In order to assess whether there is increased support for challengers, incumbents, or both,
we turn to columns (4)-(6) in Table 3.4. In column (4), we find that a one-standard-deviation
34By doing this, we make sure we are taking into account the variation in the LCV variable. Since the standard
deviation of the LCV score (after controlling for the politician’s party) is 0.2, we interpret our coefficients by dividing
them by five. This allows us to interpret results as those corresponding to a one-standard-deviation difference in
the LCV score of a candidate, instead of a one-unit difference, which would correspond to the entire range of the
variable.
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increase in the LCV score of the incumbent translates to a $39,000 increase in fundraising by
challengers during a cycle, when a natural disaster strikes. This result substantiates the hypothesis
of increased support for challengers in races with anti-environment incumbents. In column (5),
we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the LCV score of the incumbent also translates
to a $39,000 increase in fundraising by incumbents following a natural disaster. These results
are consistent with the hypothesis that incumbents may perceive the strengthened support for the
challengers and react by increasing fundraising efforts themselves. Furthermore, even though
fundraising increases for both the incumbent and the challengers, we can assess the relative
strength of these effects by studying the share of funds raised by the challenger. The results of this
exercise are in column (6). According to these estimates, the share of funds going to challengers
is higher when the incumbent is anti-environment, although the estimate is not statistically
significant. However, it is worth pointing out that the magnitude of the effect is economically
non-negligible: a one-standard-deviation increase in LCV is associated with a 0.6 p.p. increase
over a baseline of 19.6 p.p. Further, another way to assess whether the increase in support is
greater for challengers or incumbents is by comparing the effects in columns (4) and (5) to their
respective dependent variable means. In this case, the effect for challengers appears to be stronger,
as the baseline level of donations to incumbents is higher and the estimated effects are similar.
While the evidence is weak, it is consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in support may
be stronger for challenges than for incumbents.
Panel B of Table 3.4 includes the results of our within-party specification described in
Equation (3.3). As previously mentioned, this specification is not necessarily superior to our main
specification, since within-party differences in environmental stances may be harder for people to
perceive. With the exception of the share of funds raised by challengers, all the estimates on the
interaction term are of the same sign as those in Panel A, albeit with varying relative magnitudes
and levels of statistical significance. For example, the effects on giving from PACs and giving
to the incumbent remain significant and of similar size as those in Panel A, whereas the effects
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Table 3.4: The Effects of Natural Disasters on Amount Raised ($1,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Total Total (PAC) Total (Ind.) Challenger Incumbent Share (C)
Panel A: Main Specification
Disaster -316.4*** -78.15*** -164.8*** -184.7*** -131.7** -0.0328***
(70.39) (24.16) (55.17) (46.02) (54.61) (0.0122)
LCV -253.2 -87.08* -39.90 -226.7** -26.53 -0.0453*
(305.8) (48.97) (259.3) (107.3) (221.0) (0.0249)
Disaster × LCV 389.7*** 101.8*** 191.8** 194.1** 195.5** 0.0299
(125.6) (35.78) (88.96) (93.66) (73.00) (0.0245)
R2 0.413 0.533 0.388 0.262 0.457 0.287
Panel B: Within-Party Specification
Disaster -300.2*** -79.88*** -152.3*** -168.3*** -131.8** -0.0247**
(72.39) (24.44) (55.54) (48.70) (56.14) (0.0112)
LCV 228.1 33.41 200.2 -11.27 239.4 0.0371
(406.4) (86.51) (332.0) (176.0) (295.7) (0.0385)
Disaster × LCV 255.7 122.2* 84.72 49.67 206.1* -0.0422
(227.9) (61.79) (154.2) (156.7) (115.5) (0.0272)
R2 0.414 0.534 0.388 0.263 0.458 0.290
Observations 3299 3299 3299 3299 3299 3299
Mean D.V. 1535.8 535.7 823.8 405.6 1130.2 0.196
Cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
C.D. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equations (3.2) and (3.3) are shown. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is
the amount of money raised in an election cycle from different sources in a given district, expressed in thousands
of dollars. The dependent variable in column (6) is the share of total funds raised by the challengers. The sample
includes competitive elections. Standard errors are clustered at the State level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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on giving to challengers and by individuals are reduced considerably and are not significant.
Therefore, under this specification, we do not find evidence that giving to challengers is higher
following a disaster if the incumbent has a more anti-environment voting record.
Having examined natural disaster impacts on fundraising, it is natural to also look at the
number of donors to challengers and incumbents. We do so in Table 3.5, and start by examining
the results for our main specification in Panel A. The coefficients in columns (1)-(3) are all
positive and significant, indicating that, following a natural disaster, there is a higher number of
donors from all sources if the incumbent has a more anti-environment stance. For example, in
column (1) we can see that a one-standard-deviation increase in the LCV score of the incumbent
translates to 97 additional donors when there is a natural disaster. When we break it down by
giving to incumbent versus challengers, the effect sizes are about 42 and 55 additional donors,
respectively. As in the case of fundraising, we have seen that the number of donors increases
both in the case of challengers and incumbents, and we would again like to explore the relative
strength of these effects by looking at the share of donors contributing to challengers. In column
(4), we find a similar effect, indicating that the share of donors to challengers is slightly higher,
although it is not significant. However, we again note that the effect for challengers is larger when
comparing it to its average, suggesting that the effect on giving to challengers might be relatively
stronger.
In panel B, we report estimates from our within-party specification. In this case, none of
the estimates are statistically significant. The estimated effect on giving to challengers is now
negative, although the confidence interval is very wide, including economically significant effects
in either direction. Therefore, the results in this panel are uninformative of whether within-party
variation in the LCV score influences the number of donors following a natural disaster.
Next, we take the analysis a step further by exploring how natural disasters affect elections.
There are several reasons for this. First, the campaign finance consequences of natural disasters,
as shown above, may in turn affect electoral outcomes. Second, natural disasters may affect
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Table 3.5: The Effects of Natural Disasters on the Number of Donors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Total Challenger Incumbent Share (C)
Panel A: Main Specification
Disaster -335.1∗∗∗ -118.2∗∗ -216.8∗∗ -0.0301∗∗
(118.5) (50.78) (105.0) (0.0139)
LCV -515.5 47.11 -562.6 0.00104
(492.9) (153.4) (392.1) (0.0279)
Disaster × LCV 484.9∗∗ 211.4∗ 273.5∗ 0.0334
(201.1) (111.1) (155.5) (0.0264)
R2 0.297 0.216 0.320 0.283
Panel B: Within-Party Specification
Disaster -305.3∗∗ -88.64 -216.7∗∗ -0.0207
(122.0) (63.64) (106.2) (0.0130)
LCV -167.3 184.4 -351.7 0.0978∗∗
(611.3) (236.5) (507.9) (0.0407)
Disaster × LCV 220.9 -58.37 279.2 -0.0507
(306.4) (252.9) (172.6) (0.0333)
R2 0.297 0.217 0.321 0.286
Observations 3299 3299 3299 3299
Mean D.V. 862.6 288.2 574.4 0.208
Cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
C.D. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equations (3.2) and (3.3) are shown. The depen-
dent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the number of donors in an election cycle
from different sources in a given district. The dependent variable in column
(4) is the share of total donors corresponding to the challengers. The sample
includes competitive elections. Standard errors are clustered at the State level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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the composition of elections by influencing the choice of prospective challengers to enter the
race. Third, natural disasters may prompt issue voting by environmentally conscious constituents
and directly influence the results of the election. Therefore, we focus on the following four
outcomes: whether the election is competitive (i.e. there is a challenger), whether the incumbent
runs unopposed, whether there is an open seat election (i.e. the incumbent does not run for
re-election), and whether the incumbent is re-elected.
The results of this analysis are in Table 3.6. In panel A we present results from our main
specification, with the first three columns focusing on the election type and the fourth column
focusing on the election outcomes. When it comes to the election type, we can see that if the
incumbent in a disaster-struck district has a higher LCV score, they are more likely to face a
challenger in the race. For a one-standard-deviation increase in the LCV score, the probability of
the race being competitive following a disaster is almost 3% higher. As a result, the effect on the
incumbent running unopposed is negative and similar in magnitude. The probability of an open
seat election taking place is unaffected. Importantly, these results are in line with our hypothesis
of increased support for challengers, although they relate to the presence of challengers (extensive
margin) and not the strength of the support they receive (intensive margin). Potential challengers
may join the race simply because of the increased funds they are able to raise, or because they
recognize an opportunity to run on a pro-environment platform given the incumbent’s record. As
for the election outcome, we examine the impacts on the incumbent’s re-election probability in
column (4). The estimates show that the probability of the incumbent winning the election is lower
following natural disasters if the incumbent has an anti-environment voting record. Specifically,
for a one-standard-deviation difference in the LCV score this effect is about 1.3%. Note that there
are at least two possible mechanisms behind this effect: first, given that we observe an increased
probability of the election being competitive, this can mechanically lead to a reduced probability
of an incumbent victory, as the incumbent is now more likely to face a challenger. Second, the
effect may be driven by stronger opposition to the incumbent as a result of their voting record,
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independently of the presence of a challenger.
In panel B we examine the effects of natural disasters on elections using our within-party
specification. The results look similar to those in panel A. Importantly, we still find evidence that
if the incumbent in a disaster-struck district has a higher LCV score, they are more likely to face a
challenger in the race. This result, which is robust and significant across specifications, is in line
with our hypothesis of increased support for challengers. However, under this specification we no
longer find evidence that the probability of the incumbent being re-elected is reduced, although
the estimate is still negative.35
3.4.3 Medium-Run Weather Impacts
In the previous section we studied how natural disasters affected campaign finance and
elections in the medium run. However, it is possible for other weather events to have a similar
effect in the medium run, such as temperature shocks. In this section, we focus on how these
shocks influence our political outcomes. Importantly, we treat temperature shocks as separate
from natural disasters for two reasons: first, temperature shocks can be either hot weather shocks
or cold weather shocks, each with their own possible ramifications. While people may interpret
extremely hot weather as evidence of climate change, this may not be the case for extremely
cold weather, which some may interpret as evidence against climate change, as we argued in
the section on short-run impacts. Second, temperature shocks may be less salient than natural
disasters, in part because the latter often results in property damage.
We start by looking at the effect of extreme temperature on the amount raised in an
election in Table C.6. As explained in previous sections, we now study the effect of two events at
35Note how these findings related to election composition may affect the interpretation of our earlier results on
amount raised and the number of donors. Since we focus on competitive elections, and the interaction of LCV and
Disaster influences whether an election is competitive in the first place, our earlier results may capture a selection
effect as well as a direct effect. The selection effect is likely to induce weaker challengers – those who would have
not entered the race in absence of a natural disaster – to enter the race. This would likely bias our results towards
lower fundraising, especially in the case of challengers, which could explain the absence of an effect on the share of
funds going to challengers in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.6: The Effects of Natural Disasters on Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Competitive Unopposed Open Seat Incumbent Re-Election
Panel A: Main Specification
Disaster -0.0352 0.0391 -0.00390 0.0470**
(0.0246) (0.0264) (0.0158) (0.0189)
LCV -0.103** 0.0484 0.0547 0.104**
(0.0493) (0.0512) (0.0410) (0.0436)
Disaster × LCV 0.141*** -0.117** -0.0239 -0.0629**
(0.0411) (0.0444) (0.0232) (0.0254)
R2 0.169 0.232 0.103 0.171
Panel B: Within-Party Specification
Disaster -0.0358 0.0353 0.000543 0.0420**
(0.0241) (0.0265) (0.0176) (0.0181)
LCV -0.0853 -0.0402 0.125** 0.0243
(0.0786) (0.0602) (0.0614) (0.0477)
Disaster × LCV 0.147** -0.0842 -0.0632 -0.0166
(0.0640) (0.0686) (0.0531) (0.0370)
R2 0.169 0.233 0.104 0.173
Observations 4478 4478 4478 4095
Mean D.V. 0.737 0.178 0.0855 0.948
Cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
C.D. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equations (3.2) and (3.3) are shown. The dependent variable in
columns (1)-(3) is the probability of a congressional race being of a certain type (competitive,
unopposed, open seat). The dependent variable in column (4) is the probability that the incumbent
is re-elected. Columns (1)-(3) include all elections and column (4) excludes open seat elections.
Standard errors are clustered at the State level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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once: whether the election cycle was abnormally hot or whether it was abnormally cold. In line
with our previous analysis, we interpret the interaction terms to see how the effects of weather
events vary with the LCV score. We focus on specifications of the type in Equation (3.4). We can
see that for abnormally hot cycles, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term are positive,
as in the case of natural disasters, but they are insignificant and imprecisely estimated. The
effects for abnormally cold cycles are also typically positive (with the exception of donations to
PACs) and imprecisely estimated. In general, these results are not informative of the fundraising
consequences of abnormal weather in the medium run. Next, we look at effects on the number of
donors in Table C.7. The estimated effects are typically positive for abnormally hot election cycles
and typically negative (with the exception of donors to challengers) for abnormally cold cycles.
However, as before, these are imprecisely estimated. As in the natural disasters section, we also
explore the effects of extreme temperatures on elections in Table C.8. For hot cycles, the effects
point in the same direction as natural disasters, with races more likely to be competitive and a
lower probability of incumbent re-election. However, these effects are smaller and not statistically
significant. In the case of cold cycles, these relationships are largely reversed, although the
estimates are still not statistically significant.
Given the level of statistical significance of our estimates, we cannot rule out that these
are null results. A possible explanation for this is the salience of temperature events compared to
natural disasters, as mentioned above. However, it is worth noting that in some of these results
suggest the effects of hot and cold cycles are opposite in sign, with the effects of hot cycles
looking more like those of natural disasters. While suggestive at best, these results point to the
possibility that in this context people react differently to hot and cold weather abnormalities.
3.4.4 Mechanisms and Limitations
Throughout this paper, we have proposed the environmental preference mechanism –
which contains two separate margins – as the driver of our results. First, we suggest that natural
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disasters and weather shocks lead people to update their beliefs about climate change, which in
turn enables them to act on these beliefs politically. Second, we suggest that extreme weather
events simply increase the salience of climate change and other environmental issues, which in
turn incentivizes those who have already made up their mind on these issues to take action. We do
not attempt to distinguish between these two mechanisms, and acknowledge that our observations
may stem from either or both of these. However, there may still be other possible explanations
for these results. In this section, we address limitations and alternative mechanisms, discussing
them in the context of our findings.
One mechanism that is especially relevant to our results regarding weather shocks is time
use. If short- or medium-run weather shocks affect time use, which in turn may affect giving
behavior, then this could be a driving force behind our results. This is especially important in
the case of online giving, since if weather leads people to spend more time indoors then this
could expose them to more opportunities for online giving. Importantly, if time spent indoors is
driving our results, then results should be similar for hot weather shocks and cold weather shocks
since it has been shown that both types of shock can lead to more time spent indoors (Graff Zivin
and Neidell, 2014). However, in both short-run and medium-run analyses, we find that hot and
cold events generally have different, sometimes opposite effects on campaign contributions. In
addition, in the medium-run analysis we include contributions from all sources, and the patterns
are generally similar even though the effects are often not statistically significant. Therefore, time
spent indoors is not likely to account for our results.
In the case of natural disasters, an important alternative mechanism is that of factors
that are correlated with the LCV score but unrelated to incumbents’ stances on environmental
issues. For example, if pro-environment candidates are also more willing to pass disaster relief
packages for those affected, this may explain the increase in funds and support for these candidates
following disasters. While this is a possibility, we argue that these factors are not likely to be
driving our results for two reasons. First, the observed effects of unusually hot weather in the
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short and medium-run are in the same direction as those of natural disasters, and there is no
obvious policy position regarding hot weather other than a politician’s stance on environmental
issues. This is especially true in the case of short-run weather variations. Second, to alleviate this
concern we study the effects of natural disasters using a within-party specification, since policy
positions on several issues are determined along party lines. We find that estimates generally
point in the same direction as in our main specification, despite party affiliation being perhaps the
most visible source of information on politicians’ environmental positions.
Finally, it is possible that there are other psychological explanations for our results. For
example, Meier, Schmid, and Stutzer (2016) explore the link between rainy weather, risk aversion,
and voting for status quo candidates. This link between short term weather and emotions could be
a confounder to the extent that emotions affect individuals’ incentives to make political campaign
contributions. However, we observe similar patterns in the medium term, as well as stronger
short-term effects in counties with more anti-environment incumbents, so our results cannot be
entirely driven by the emotional consequences of short-run weather.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impacts of extreme weather events on campaign contributions
and electoral outcomes in the United States. As these events are often considered signs of climate
change, our analyses place particular emphasis on testing for differential constituent responses
based on the incumbent politician’s views on environmental issues. In a short-run analysis, we
find that weekly temperature shocks lead to a higher number of online donations to Democratic
candidates, especially in counties with a greater share of anti-environment incumbents. In a
medium-run analysis, we find that when a natural disaster strikes, challengers are more likely to
enter congressional races the more anti-environment the incumbent is. We also find suggestive
evidence that natural disasters lead to increased overall funding in congressional races where the
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incumbent is more anti-environment.
Throughout the paper, we have argued that our results are driven by the environmental
preference mechanism. We have suggested that this mechanism is a combination of two margins.
First, extreme weather may lead people to update their beliefs in climate change, which in turn
enables them to act on these beliefs politically. Second, extreme weather events may simply
increase the salience of climate change, which in turn incentivizes those who have already made
up their mind on these issues to take action.
Irrespective of the margin at play, the results in this paper suggest that politicians’ policy
positions on environmental issues are taken into account by people when responding to extreme
weather events, and that these responses may have political consequences. Further, these findings
suggest additional mechanisms for results in previous studies showing that congresspersons are
more likely to vote in favor of environmental legislation following natural disasters in their state
(Herrnstadt and Muehlegger, 2014). Put together, these behaviors from constituents, candidates,
and legislators are consistent with a representative democracy at work.
Even though our results have important implications as they stand, both margins of the
environmental preference mechanism have their own ramifications. If the belief-updating margin
is at play, one concern is the extent to which such updating is rational; as is often pointed
out in the literature, people tend to process shocks with psychological and ideological biases
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). If this is the case, our findings caution that such biases might be
expressed through the political system with unclear welfare consequences. On the other hand,
if the salience margin is at play, one might instead be concerned about the electorate having
limited attention. If this is the case, election outcomes might not represent well-defined collective
preferences, since the salience of different policy issues may vary due to stochastic events. Given
these ramifications, it is important to distinguish which margin of the environmental preference
mechanism is predominantly at play. Therefore, we believe this is an important question for
future work.
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In addition to distinguishing between the two margins of the environmental preference
mechanism, the results presented in this paper pose a series of additional questions and possible
extensions. Firstly, a question raised by this work is whether the politicians themselves react
to the salience of climate change by adjusting their narratives when it comes to speeches and
soliciting contributions. Secondly, an important player which is missing from our analysis are
environmental advocacy groups. Future research should focus on the role these groups play in
disseminating information and forming opinions following extreme weather events. Finally, it is
an open question whether the behavior observed here generalizes to other policy areas in which
the event of interest has a stochastic component, like terrorism or gun violence.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Additional Figures
Figure A.1: CSI Incentive Step Design
Source: http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/csi/rebates.php
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Figure A.2: Monthly Peak Demand in California, 2006-2011
Source: California ISO (2012)
Notes: This graph shows the actual monthly peak demand for southern California (SP26),
northern California (NP26), and the entire California ISO system over the years 2006-2011.
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Figure A.3: Support for Linear Specification
Notes: These graphs verify the linear relationship between the probability of cancellation and
solar production index using two approaches. The upper panel fits the relationship with a flexible
local polynomial, and the lower one uses a binned scatter plot by dividing the observations into
twenty bins.
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Figure A.4: Harvesting Effects in Sign-ups
Notes: This graph plots the contemporaneous and lagged effects of the production index on
sign-ups. The dependent variable is the number of applications by zip code by month, and the
main regressors are the average production index in the same month, its lead and six lags. The
controls include monthly economic conditions as well as zip code, month-in-year, and year
fixed effects. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals are shown. Standard errors are
clustered by county.
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Figure A.5: Density of Days to Next Incentive Step Change
Notes: This graph plots the distribution of days to next incentive step change. The vertical
dashed red line represents 47 days, the cutoff used in the heterogeneity analysis.
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A.2 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Variable Descriptions, Continued
Variable Description Source
A. Application Characteristics
CSI rating AC output of photovoltaic module CSI
total cost ($) Total cost of eligible portion of the project CSI
incentive amount ($) CSI incentive amount for the system CSI
net unit cost ($) Net out-of-pocket cost per kW of capacity CSI
third-party ownership (TPO) Indicates whether the system owner is a CSI
different entity than the host customer
year Application begin year CSI
B. Weather
Note: The term “post-period” below refers to the 113 days following application submission.
solar insolation Solar insolation, post-period average POWER/NASA
max temp (F) Maximum temperature, post-period average GSOD/NOAA
#days(max ≤ 40) Number of days with max temp below 40F GSOD/NOAA
in the post-period
#days(max > 100) Number of days with max temp above 100F GSOD/NOAA
in the post-period
wind speed (knots) Wind speed, post-period average GSOD/NOAA
#(precipitation> 0) Number of days with positive precipitation GSOD/NOAA
in the post-period
production index Index of solar panel productivity, calculated Calculated
using solar insolation, max temp, and wind
speed, post-period average
cooling degree days Total cooling degree days in the post-period Calculated
heating degree days Total heating degree days in the post-period Calculated
total degree days Sum of cooling and heating degree days in Calculated
the post-period
C. Economic Conditions
leading index The leading index for California, predictor FRED
of six-month growth
unemployment The unemployment rate in California FRED
prime interest rate The U.S. (Fed) prime rate
index of consumer sentiment Index of consumer sentiment in the West Survey of Consumers
index of buying condition Index of buying conditions in the West Survey of Consumers
D. Zip Code Demographics and Interconnection Characteristics
white (%) Percent of white population in the zip code 2011 ACS
bachelor degree (%) Percent of population with bachelor’s degree 2011 ACS
in the zip code
median income ($) Median income in the zip code 2011 ACS
monthly housing cost ($) Average monthly housing cost in the zip code 2011 ACS
mean household size Average household size 2010 Census
urban (%) Percent of urban households 2010 Census
current installed base Number of interconnected solar systems in NEM Interconnection
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 Variable Descriptions, Continued
Variable Description Source
the zip code
installed penetration Number of interconnected solar systems per NEM Interconnection
thousand households in the zip code
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Table A.2: Cancellation and Solar Insolation (113 Days After Sign-up)
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
solar insolation −0.146 −0.203 −0.110 −0.121 −0.143
[0.055]∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗ [0.051]∗∗ [0.057]∗∗ [0.085]∗
wind speed 0.262 0.799 −0.065 0.314 0.105
[0.241] [0.271]∗∗∗ [0.204] [0.256] [0.243]
#days(tmax < 40) 1.055 1.406 0.658 0.757 1.071
[0.383]∗∗∗ [0.520]∗∗∗ [0.348]∗ [0.304]∗∗ [0.394]∗∗∗
#days(tmax≥100) −0.020 −0.024 −0.019 −0.024 −0.006
[0.023] [0.021] [0.024] [0.022] [0.025]
CSI Rating 0.590 0.592 0.589 0.578 0.588
[0.091]∗∗∗ [0.091]∗∗∗ [0.087]∗∗∗ [0.086]∗∗∗ [0.091]∗∗∗
unit cost 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
third-party ownership 0.833 0.830 0.962 0.962 0.840
[0.520] [0.514] [0.510]∗ [0.508]∗ [0.520]
CA leading index 0.457 0.506 0.435 1.860 0.378
[0.485] [0.481] [0.499] [0.552]∗∗∗ [0.515]
CA unemployment rate −0.782 −0.735 −0.990 0.746 −0.711
[0.460]∗ [0.543] [0.453]∗∗ [0.833] [0.529]
prime interest rate −2.084 −2.155 −2.289 −2.103 −2.345
[1.102]∗ [1.061]∗∗ [1.111]∗∗ [1.199]∗ [1.354]∗
index of consumer sentiment 0.188 0.205 0.202 0.125 0.149
[0.058]∗∗∗ [0.053]∗∗∗ [0.052]∗∗∗ [0.070]∗ [0.054]∗∗∗
index of buying conditions −0.134 −0.141 −0.143 −0.119 −0.092
[0.040]∗∗∗ [0.039]∗∗∗ [0.038]∗∗∗ [0.045]∗∗ [0.040]∗∗
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
R2 (within) 0.033 0.035 0.042 0.051 0.034
N 154,519 154,518 154,513 154,465 154,519
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes
Month Yes
County-quarter Yes
County-year Yes
County-quarter-year Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates based on a time frame of 113 days following the application date.
Columns (1)-(2) show full results of regressions (1)-(2) in Table 1.2. Columns (3)-(5) shows results
with other fixed-effect specifications. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Standard
errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Cancellation and Solar Insolation (60 Days Before Completion/Cancellation)
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
solar insolation −0.186 −0.192 −0.181 −0.185 −0.090
[0.045]∗∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗ [0.048]∗∗∗ [0.051]∗∗∗ [0.113]
wind speed 0.815 0.754 0.728 0.719 0.787
[0.173]∗∗∗ [0.162]∗∗∗ [0.185]∗∗∗ [0.208]∗∗∗ [0.169]∗∗∗
#days(tmax < 40) −1.278 −1.572 −1.482 −2.069 −1.206
[0.489]∗∗ [0.361]∗∗∗ [0.417]∗∗∗ [0.391]∗∗∗ [0.494]∗∗
#days(tmax≥100) −0.256 −0.330 −0.261 −0.336 −0.250
[0.030]∗∗∗ [0.065]∗∗∗ [0.032]∗∗∗ [0.069]∗∗∗ [0.031]∗∗∗
CSI Rating 0.590 0.592 0.589 0.578 0.588
[0.091]∗∗∗ [0.091]∗∗∗ [0.087]∗∗∗ [0.086]∗∗∗ [0.091]∗∗∗
unit cost 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000]∗∗ [0.000]∗∗ [0.000]∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗ [0.000]∗∗
third-party ownership 0.766 0.767 0.691 0.638 0.766
[0.362]∗∗ [0.349]∗∗ [0.366]∗ [0.372]∗ [0.364]∗∗
CA leading index −0.100 −0.173 −0.139 1.071 −0.321
[0.269] [0.269] [0.274] [0.516]∗∗ [0.289]
CA unemployment rate −0.780 −0.736 −0.811 −0.142 −0.436
[0.374]∗∗ [.378]∗ [0.397]∗∗ [0.930] [0.473]
prime interest rate −0.556 −0.324 −0.576 −0.315 0.026
[0.924] [0.983] [0.939] [1.136] [1.118]
index of consumer sentiment 0.266 0.253 0.285 0.244 0.242
[0.090]∗∗∗ [0.097]∗∗ [0.092]∗∗∗ [0.118]∗∗ [0.093]∗∗
index of buying conditions −0.086 −0.082 −0.099 −0.121 −0.064
[0.037]∗∗ [0.039]∗∗ [0.037]∗∗ [0.056]∗∗ [0.040]
D.V. Mean 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70
R2 (within) 0.072 0.076 0.081 0.098 0.073
N 62,069 62,062 62,053 61,951 62,069
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes
Month Yes
County-quarter Yes
County-year Yes
County-quarter-year Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates based on a time frame of 60 days prior to the comple-
tion/cancellation date. Columns (1)-(2) show full results of regressions (3)-(4) in Table 1.2. Columns
(3)-(5) shows results with other fixed-effect specifications. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for
legibility. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by county.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Robustness Check: Varying Controls
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
solar insolation −0.129 −0.151 −0.219 −0.254 −0.115 −0.094
[0.041]∗∗∗ [0.039]∗∗∗ [0.044]∗∗∗ [0.053]∗∗∗ [0.045]∗∗ [0.035]∗∗∗
wind speed 0.797 0.791
[0.259]∗∗∗ [0.168]∗∗∗
#days(tmax < 40) 1.460 −1.622
[0.550]∗∗ [0.366]∗∗∗
#days(tmax ≥ 100) −0.021 −0.333
[0.020] [0.066]∗∗∗
Sample
Time Frame First 113 Last 60 First 113 Last 60 First 113 Last 60
Duration All 0-100 All 0-100 All 0-100
D.V. Mean 12.06 6.70 12.06 6.70 12.06 6.70
R2 (within) 0.035 0.073 0.035 0.074 0.035 0.076
N 154,518 62,062 154,518 62,062 154,518 62,062
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System characteristics and monthly economic
conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10;
∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Robustness Check: Zip-Code-Specific Time Trends
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
solar insolation −0.104 −0.171 −0.119 −0.184
[0.051]∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗ [0.047]∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗
wind speed −0.061 0.745 0.178 0.746
[0.215] [0.189]∗∗∗ [0.238] [0.201]∗∗∗
#days(tmax < 40) 0.569 −1.634 0.672 −1.806
[0.362] [0.451]∗∗∗ [0.384]∗ [0.376]∗∗∗
#days(tmax≥100) −0.022 −0.265 −0.023 −0.271
[0.022] [0.030]∗∗∗ [0.023] [0.033]∗∗∗
Sample
Time Frame First 113 Last 60 First 113 Last 60
Duration All 0-100 All 0-100
D.V. Mean 12.06 6.70 12.06 6.70
R2 (within) 0.053 0.103 0.053 0.104
N 154,513 62,053 154,513 62,053
Time Trend
Zip-year Yes Yes
Zip-quarter-year Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results from adding two types of zip-code-specific time trends
to the two main specifications. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System
characteristics and monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors
(in squared brackets) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Robustness Check: Logit Model
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
solar insolation −1.071 −1.540 −1.206 −1.656
(0.293)∗∗∗ (0.425)∗∗∗ (0.436)∗∗∗ (0.785)∗∗
wind speed 4.038 2.567 2.187 0.911
(1.609)∗∗ (1.746) (1.795) (1.810)
#days(tmax < 40) 9.284 9.843 10.734 10.011
(4.222)∗∗ (4.221)∗∗ (4.166)∗∗∗ (4.204)∗∗
#days(tmax≥100) −0.294 −0.190 −0.166 −0.050
(.125)∗∗ (0.131) (0.132) (0.140)
N 153,452 153,452 153,452 153,452
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes
Quarter-year Yes Yes
Month Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates based on a time frame of 113 days after the sign-up. All
coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System characteristics and monthly economic
conditions are always controlled for. Marginal effect calculations are not feasible due to
the fixed effects, and specifications with county-interacted fixed effects are omitted due to
computation problems. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by zip code.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Robustness Check: Varying Period Length
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period length 70 days 70 days 90 days 90 days 113 days 113 days
solar insolation −0.147 −0.185 −0.157 −0.206 −0.146 −0.203
[0.045]∗∗∗ [0.043]∗∗∗ [0.048]∗∗∗ [0.043]∗∗∗ [0.055]∗∗ [0.045]∗∗∗
wind speed 0.319 0.652 0.317 0.751 0.262 0.799
[0.210] [0.248]∗∗ [0.220] [0.249]∗∗∗ [0.241] [0.271]∗∗∗
#days(tmax < 40) 0.358 0.511 0.379 0.569 1.055 1.406
[0.351] [0.400] [0.352] [0.421] [0.383]∗∗∗ [0.521]∗∗∗
#days(tmax ≥ 100) −0.042 −0.052 −0.030 −0.036 −0.020 −0.024
[0.024]∗ [0.022]∗∗ [0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.021]
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
R2 (within) 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.035
N 154,519 154,518 154,519 154,518 154,519 154,518
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6) report estimates based on a time frame of 70, 90, and 113 days
following the application date. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for better display. System characteristics
and monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered
by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Robustness Check: Different Subsamples
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
solar insolation −0.185 −0.208 −0.113 −0.129 −0.104 −0.117
[0.055]∗∗∗ [0.064]∗∗∗ [0.047]∗∗ [0.054]∗∗ [0.038]∗∗∗ [0.044]∗∗
wind speed 0.478 0.470 0.229 0.254 0.214 0.258
[0.292] [0.391] [0.208] [0.273] [0.178] [0.219]
#days(tamx<40) 0.513 0.895 0.360 0.499 0.434 0.484
[0.226]∗∗ [0.331]∗∗∗ [0.176]∗∗ [0.240]∗∗ [0.173]∗∗ [0.228]∗∗
#days(tmax≥100) 0.019 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.019
[0.022] [0.013] [0.014] [0.010] [0.009]∗ [0.009]∗∗
Sample
Time Frame Last 60 Last 60 Last 60 Last 60 Last 60 Last 60
Duration Restriction 0-100 0-100 0-150 0-150 0-200 0-200
D.V. Mean 6.70 6.70 4.97 4.97 4.49 4.49
R2 (within) 0.070 0.073 0.047 0.049 0.039 0.041
N 62,069 62,062 93,061 93,055 111,654 111,650
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6) restrict the sample to those with reported duration within 100,
150, and 200 days, respectively. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System characteristics and
monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by
county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Channel: Solar Production vs. Energy Demand (Alternative Time Frame)
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ProdIndexpost −1.343 −1.486 −1.529 −1.639 −1.208 −1.277
[0.300]∗∗∗ [0.311]∗∗∗ [0.300]∗∗∗ [0.351]∗∗∗ [0.359]∗∗∗ [0.360]∗∗∗
CDD 0.376 0.312
[0.261] [0.248]
T DD(=CDD+HDD) 0.287 0.506
[0.243] [0.251]∗∗
D.V. Mean 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70
R2 (within) 0.071 0.074 0.071 0.074 0.071 0.074
N 62,069 62,062 62,069 62,062 62,069 62,062
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates based on a time frame of 60 days prior to the completion/cancellation date. All
indices are normalized. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System characteristics and monthly
economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by county.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.10: Attenuation Bias with Different Period Lengths
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10 days 30 days 50 days 70 days 90 days 113 days
ProdIndex 0.057 −0.249 −0.443 −0.542 −0.692 −0.761
[0.141] [0.141]∗ [0.144]∗∗∗ [0.154]∗∗∗ [0.172]∗∗∗ [0.191]∗∗∗
Test: Equality of Coefficients with Column (6)
χ2 : β(i) = β(6) 25.38∗∗∗ 13.70∗∗∗ 6.90∗∗∗ 5.00∗∗ 1.89 -
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The length of the post-contract period used to calculate the production index is indicated in
the header. All indices are normalized. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. System
characteristics and monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared
brackets) are clustered at county level. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Potential Selection by Pre-contract Weather (System Size)
System Size (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 month 1 month 2 months 2 months
ProdIndexpre 0.024 0.020 0.006 0.004
[0.014]∗ [0.014] [0.013] [0.012]
D.V. Mean 4.69 4.69 4.69 4.69
R2 (within zip code) 0.204 0.206 0.204 0.206
N 153,108 153,108 153,108 153,108
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes
Notes: All indices are normalized. Other system characteristics and monthly economic condi-
tions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by county.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Responses to Weather Updates
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProdIndexpre −0.039 −0.854 −0.591
[0.246] [0.374]** [0.354]
U pdate −0.769 1.170 0.472 0.588
[0.264]∗∗∗ [0.653]∗ [0.252]∗ [0.352]
Indicator =
1(U pdate < 0) −0.000
[0.005]
1(ProdIndexpre > Indexz) −0.014
[0.004]∗∗∗
1(ProdIndexpost < Indexz) 0.006
[0.004]
U pdate× Indicator −2.779 −1.705 −1.053
[0.600]∗∗∗ [0.332]∗∗∗ [0.280]∗∗∗
D.V. Mean 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06 12.06
R2 (within) 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.033
N 154,519 154,519 154,519 154,519 154,519
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ProdIndexpre is the normalized average production index for a 60-day pre-contract period.
U pdate is the average post-period index minus the pre-period one. 1(U pdate < 0) indicates whether
U pdate is negative. 1(ProdIndexpre > Indexz) is an indicator of whether the pre-period index is higher
than the zip-code average, and 1(ProdIndexpost < Indexz) is whether the post-period one is lower. All
coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Indicator in the interaction term in the last rows refers
to the indicator variable that is included in the same regression. System characteristics and monthly
economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered by
county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
151
Table A.13: Heterogeneous Effects by Area Characteristics
Panel A. Local Demographics
Median Income % White % College Household Size
Above Median Above Median Above Median Above Median
Cancel = 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
β1 : ProdIndexpost −0.664 −0.802 −0.715 −0.731
[0.386]∗ [0.292]∗∗∗ [0.321]∗∗ [0.337]∗∗
β2 : ProdIndexpost ×1(Character) −0.125 0.079 −0.064 −0.045
[0.283] [0.231] [0.239] [0.247]
β1+β2 −0.789 −0.723 −0.779 −0.776
p-value: β1+β2 = 0 0.003∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
Panel B. Housing and Geographic Characteristics
% Urban > 0.5 Housing Cost Northern Non-coastal
Above Median California Counties
Cancel = 1 (5) (6) (7) (8)
β1 : ProdIndexpost 0.381 −0.575 −0.875 −0.840
[0.442] [0.335]∗ [0.313]∗∗∗ [0.261]∗∗∗
β2 : ProdIndexpost ×1(Character) −1.211 −0.249 0.177 0.314
[0.362]∗∗∗ [0.233] [0.211] [0.260]
β1+β2 −0.830 −0.824 −0.698 −0.526
p-value: β1+β2 = 0 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.137
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The area characteristic of interest is indicated in the header. The last two rows in each panel show the
value of β1+β2, which is the weather effect in zip codes with the characteristic of interest, and the corresponding
p-value. The production index is normalized. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Other system
characteristics and monthly economic conditions are always controlled for. Standard errors (in squared brackets)
are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Does Current Weather Predict the Near Future?
Future Index (1) (2) (3) (4)
ProdIndex −0.001 −0.008 0.033 −0.114
[0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.136]
R2 0.740 0.881 0.882 0.953
N 154,104 154,104 154,103 154,054
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Quarter Yes
County-quarter Yes
County-quarter-year Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is mean daily production index in the one-year period starting right
after the 113-day post-period. Standard errors (in squared brackets) are clustered at county level.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.15: Weather and Complete Duration
Complete Duration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indexpost −3.402 −3.170 −3.568 −3.430
[2.024]∗ [1.951] [2.235] [2.200]
Indexpre −1.710 −2.729
[2.719] [3.429]
#days(prcp > 0) −0.093 −0.121
[0.133] [0.190]
wind speed −2.186 −2.420
[1.067]∗∗ [1.595]
#days(tmax < 40) 3.790 5.451
[3.282] [3.961]
#days(tmax > 100) 0.238 −0.001
[0.122]∗ [0.085]
D.V. Mean 128.11 128.11 128.11 128.11 128.11 128.11
R2 0.115 0.123 0.115 0.123 0.115 0.123
N 130,162 130,161 130,162 130,161 130,166 130,165
Fixed Effects
Zip Code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Yes Yes Yes
County-quarter Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The post-period production index is calculated based on the reported duration for each
observation. Standard errors are clustered at county level. System characteristics and monthly
economic conditions are always controlled for. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
154
A.3 Kleissl (2013) PV Performance Model
The PV performance model used in this paper is developed by Kleissl (2013), which is
funded by the CSI Research, Development, Demonstration and Deployment (RD&D) Program.
It uses satellite solar resource data to simulate PV power output while accounting for local
weather conditions and system characteristics. It explicitly modeled the following components:
irradiance on tilted surface, panel temperature effect on efficiency, DC-AC conversion efficiency,
and maximum power point efficiency. The model parameters are then calibrated using CSI PV
performance data.
I use this model to construct the solar production index, which is intended to measure how
favorable the weather is for solar generation. The main weather inputs are daily solar insolation,
maximum temperature, and wind speed. I use the same tilt, azimuth angle and system size for all
applications so that the variations in the index only reflect differences in weather conditions. The
predicted output for each application is then averaged over the relevant period and normalized to
have mean zero and standard deviation one. Therefore, it is not necessary for the modeled output
to completely match actual solar generation.
Kleissl (2013) has validated the 30-minute output of this model against measured power
output at 192 PV sites over SDG&E, SCE, and PG&E territories. Fig 7-1 in Kleissl (2013) shows
that the predictions are unbiased with typical errors of 4-9%. Because this measure is averaged
over a much longer period in the current paper, such measurement errors should be significantly
reduced.
The performance of this model is also compared against the PVWATTS model at three
representative sites. PVWATTS is a standard calculator of PV performance in the industry. Table
6-1 in Kleissl (2013) shows that they have similar performance in terms of the relative mean
bias error and relative mean absolute error, and the current model is slightly better calibrated for
California.
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A.4 Late Cancellation Reporting
As discussed in Section 1.3.1, the majority of cancellations have a reported cancellation
period beyond one year, which is the program deadline for installation. These observations are
referred to as “late reports” henceforth. In this section, we examine these late reports more closely
to shed light on the nature of this data issue. We will first look at patterns in the timing of these
reports and then move on to understanding the potential roles of program administrators and
contractors.
Figure A.6 plots the distribution of reported cancellations by calendar month. Between
2007 and 2016, the number of reported cancellations varies substantially across calendar months.
However, there is no discernible seasonal pattern, which suggests the reports are not likely to be
driven by seasonal production cycles. Additional analysis also shows no evidence of concentrated
reporting right before or after incentive step changes in the program.1 Figure A.7 breaks down
the sample by whether the observation is reported before or after the deadline. Again, there is no
seasonal pattern in either of the distributions. 2
Figure A.8 plots the full distribution of cancellation duration. Here, we find clear evidence
of bunching right after the one-year deadline. More than half of the late reports are within 30
days from the deadline and 92.8% are within 180 days. Such bunching strongly suggests that
the timing of these reports are related to the program deadline rather than the true time frame of
cancellation. There is no incentive for the contractor or the customer to report a cancellation in
time. As a result, a likely scenario is that the cancellation would remain unknown to the program
administrator until the deadline when a report on the project status is required. Moreover, some
cancellations reported before the deadline might also be subject to delay due to the same incentive
problem.
1Results available upon request.
2October 2012 appears to be an outlier with an unusually high number of cancellations reported before the
deadline. On close scrutiny, this is mainly due to October 11 and 12. Moreover, over 95% of cancellations reported
on these two days are associated with Vertigo Solar. This suggests at least some cancellations reported before the
deadline are subject to contractor delay.
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The accuracy of the reported dates might be related to practices of the program admin-
istrator (PA). There is a separate PA for each of the three investor-owned utilities: Pacific Gas
and Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and Center for Sustainable Energy (for
San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) territory). In Figure A.9, I plot the distribution of reported
cancellation duration separately for each of them. The pattern for each PA is qualitatively similar
to the aggregate: most of the cancellations are reported late with clear bunching immediate after
the deadline. This suggests that the administrative process is similar across PAs.
Next, we turn our attention to the contractors. As many contractors handle the CSI
application for their customers, they might play a major role in determining how promptly the
cancellations are reported. Table A.16 below lists the top 30 contractors by size (as indicated
by the number of applications). There are a total of 2,398 contractors in the data, but the size
distribution is highly right-skewed. For example, SolarCity is the largest contractor in the market
with 15.1% of applications. It also has the largest number of cancellations and late reports.
Together, the top 30 contractors account for about 60% of all applications, cancellations, and late
reports. Among them, late reporting appears to be universal. The probability is substantial across
the board and varies around the sample average of 0.62.
To sum up, we have three main findings. First, there is no seasonal pattern regarding
the report timing of cancellations. Second, there is strong evidence of bunching right after the
individual deadlines, suggesting the reported dates reflect more on program rules rather than
the actual cancellation time frame. Last but not least, the problem is pervasive in the program
regardless of the associated program administrator and the contractor.
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Figure A.6: Monthly Distribution of Reported Cancellations
Figure A.7: Monthly Distribution of Reported Cancellations by Late Status
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Figure A.8: Full Distribution of Reported Cancellation Duration
Notes: The red vertical line indicates the deadline at one year.
Figure A.9: Distribution of Reported Cancellation Duration by Program Administrator
Notes: The red vertial line indicates the deadline at one year. SCE accounts for 53.69% of all
cancellations, PG&E 37.09%, and CSE 9.23%.
159
Table A.16: Top 30 Contractors by Number of Applications
Contractor Rank Apps Cancel Late Duration Pr(Late)
% % % mean
SolarCity 1 15.10 15.82 17.83 347.7 0.697
Verengo Solar 2 7.748 11.98 9.081 282.3 0.469
Rec Solar 3 5.608 4.743 5.808 351.4 0.758
Real Goods Energy 4 3.827 2.289 2.686 330.5 0.726
Petersen-Dean 5 3.085 5.348 4.723 287.9 0.546
Sungevity 6 2.672 2.008 2.170 334.2 0.668
American Solar Direct 7 2.029 1.188 0.925 234.9 0.481
Akeena Solar 8 1.372 0.820 0.889 337.8 0.671
Galkos Construction 9 1.252 1.271 0.916 221.3 0.446
Burke Electric 10 1.252 2.058 2.855 378.9 0.858
Future Energy Corporation 11 1.074 0.473 0.107 98.87 0.140
HelioPower 12 1.072 1.150 1.388 331.4 0.746
Sullivan Solar Power 13 1.028 0.688 0.694 289.6 0.624
Solar Service Center 14 0.982 0.583 0.596 291.1 0.632
The Solar Company 15 0.906 0.677 0.720 333.6 0.659
Smart Energy Solar 16 0.803 0.930 0.694 221.1 0.462
Energy Efficiency Solar 17 0.747 0.556 0.614 309.4 0.683
Baker Electric Solar 18 0.736 0.341 0.231 222.9 0.419
Stout & Burg Electric 19 0.704 0.226 0.0800 213.9 0.220
Solar West Electric 20 0.581 0.138 0.0978 202.4 0.440
Vivint Solar Developer Llc 21 0.567 0.286 0.382 362.3 0.827
Advanced Solar Electric 22 0.565 0.501 0.569 377.9 0.703
Solar Network 23 0.553 0.374 0.382 281.9 0.632
Natural Energy 24 0.549 0.253 0.222 283.1 0.543
Sunlogic 25 0.545 0.462 0.543 349.8 0.726
Elite Electric 26 0.541 0.792 0.756 278.2 0.590
Mohr Power Solar 27 0.516 0.743 0.720 301.6 0.600
Sierra Pacific Home & Comfort 28 0.504 0.880 1.245 382.9 0.875
Sungate Energy Solutions 29 0.477 0.347 0.240 209.5 0.429
Skytech Solar 30 0.447 1.370 2.081 393.0 0.940
All Others – 42.16 40.70 39.75 281.5 0.604
Total 1-2398 100 100 100 281.83 0.619
Notes: This table lists top 30 contractors by the number of applications. Columns 1-2 shows contractor
name and rank, respectively. Column 3 shows, among all applications, the percentage associated with
each contractor. Similarly, columns 4 and 5 show these percentages for cancellations and late cancellation
reports, respectively. Column 6 shows the average duration as reported. Column 7 shows the probability
of late report, which is the number of late reports divided by the number of cancellations. The second
to last row shows aggregate statistics for the remaining contractors, and the last row shows aggregate
statistics for all contractors.
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Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Additional Figures
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Figure B.1: Florida Borrowers Market Price and Sales Share
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ZTRAX data.
Notes: The top panel plots the median price in the borrower subsample. The bottom panel plots
the share of borrower sales among all sales. All time series are monthly.
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(a) Percent White (b) Percent Hispanic or Latino
(c) Percent Black (d) Median Age
Figure B.2: Demographics in Florida Counties
Source: Census Data Mapper based on data from the 2010 Census.
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(a) Percent Family Households (b) Percent Occupied Housing Units
(c) Homeowner Vacancy Rate (d) Rental Vacancy Rate
Figure B.4: Family and Housing Statistics in Florida Counties
Source: Census Data Mapper based on data from the 2010 Census.
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Figure B.6: Hurricane Effects on House Prices – Borrower Sample
Notes: Estimates from Equation (2.1) are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals. The
model controls for standard hedonic variables and census tract, month, and county-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by county. The results are based on the sub-sample of
borrowers (N = 4,177,090).
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Figure B.7: Florida Population by County Aggregation
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from US Census Bureau.
Notes: Red dashed lines denote hurricane years in which at least 1/3 of hit county populations
were affected (including Miami-Dade) according to the census tract hit definition, with the
exception of Andrew in 1992, which affected all of Miami-Dade, but respectively only 17%
and 5% of the other large and small counties. Orange dashed lines represent all other hurricane
years. The 1995 and 1998 hurricanes only affected populations in the group of small counties
(around 18% in both years).
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Figure B.8: Hurricane Effects on the Share of Transactions Involving a Mortgage
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the transaction involves a mortgage.
The estimates are from a linear probability model which controls for standard hedonic variables
and census tract, month, and county-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county.
The results are based on the full sample (N = 7,408,259).
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Figure B.9: Heterogeneous Price Effects by Hurricane Intensity – HMDA
Notes: Estimates for separate wind categories are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals.
The dependent variable is log price. The model controls for standard hedonic variables and
census tract, month, and county-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county. The
results are based on the HMDA sub-sample. (N = 1,967,334).
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Figure B.10: Heterogeneous Income Effects by Hurricane Intensity – HMDA
Notes: Estimates for separate wind categories are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals.
The dependent variable is log income. The model controls for standard hedonic variables and
census tract, month, and county-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county. The
results are based on the HMDA sub-sample. (N = 1,881,208).
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B.2 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Housing Transactions
Full Sample Borrower Sample HMDA Sample
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Price 274793.9 155000 239283.2 178000 252847.4 187500
Assessed Value 150314 103208 149673.1 110516 159508.5 117750
No. of Buildings 0.955 1 0.960 1 0.951 1
No. of Stories 1.254 1 1.234 1 1.235 1
No. of Bathrooms 1.812 2 1.870 2 1.867 2
Lot Size 15094.95 8676 11730.01 8725 14624.76 8999
House Age 22.512 19 20.043 16 21.204 18
Effec. House Age 17.993 15 15.549 12 16.513 14
Loan Amount – – 196927.1 149809 198629.7 157102
Buyer Income – – – – 113683.2 73000
N 7,606,673 4,300,986 2,011,933
% Single Family 70.52 76.62 77.35
% Condo 23.49 16.96 16.56
% Townhouse 6.00 6.42 6.08
Notes: The unit of observation is a transaction. The full sample contains all transactions. The
borrower sample contains all transactions with a mortgage. The HMDA sample contains all
transactions that have a valid match to the HMDA records.
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Parcel-Year Panel
Statistics Full Sample Single Family Condominium Townhouse
Transacted1 Mean 0.107 0.110 0.098 0.099
Assessed Value Mean 149359.6 154694.6 136878.4 131665
Median 105360 110480 84223.5 106373
No. of Buildings Mean 0.960 0.989 0.878 0.968
Median 1 1 1 1
No. of Stories Mean 1.223 1.107 2.059 1.258
Median 1 1 1 1
No. of Bathrooms Mean 1.665 1.743 1.371 1.972
Median 2 2 2 2
Lot Size Mean 16908.74 16255.06 29942.06 4180.165
Median 9017 9496 8800 3485
House Age Mean 30.171 31.859 27.700 21.324
Median 28 29 28 21
Effec. House Age Mean 23.842 23.884 25.076 18.139
Median 22 21 26 18
N 49,523,080 33,709,921 12,836,476 2,976,683
Share (%) 100 68.07 25.92 6.01
Notes: The unit of observation is a parcel-year. The second column indicates the type of statistics reported.
1 “Transacted” is a dummy variable indicating whether the parcel has been involved in a transaction in the
given year.
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Table B.3: Variations in Hurricane Indicators (Housing Price Model)
Pre-Hurricane Event Year
Hurricane -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Andrew92 . . . . . . . . . .
Opal95 . . . . . . . . . .
Earl98 . . . . . . . . . .
Georges98 . . . . . . . . . .
Irene99 . . . . . . . . . .
Charley04 . . . . . 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5
Frances04 . . . . . 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.1
Jeanne04 . . . . . 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9
Ivan04 . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Dennis05 . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Katrina05 . . . . 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0
Wilma05 . . . . 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.8 4.1 4.6
Hermine16 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Matthew16 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7
Irma17 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.9 0.3
Total 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.3 5.0 8.5 10.2 11.3 11.8 10.9
Post-Hurricane Event Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Andrew92 . . . . . . . 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.4
Opal95 . . . . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Earl98 . 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Georges98 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Irene99 2.8 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.6 3.7 2.4 1.6 1.8 2.5
Charley04 2.5 2.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.9
Frances04 2.3 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.7
Jeanne04 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4
Ivan04 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dennis05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Katrina05 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Wilma05 3.4 2.2 1.5 1.8 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.3
Hermine16 0.0 . . . . . . . . . .
Matthew16 0.1 . . . . . . . . . .
Irma17 . . . . . . . . . . .
Total 11.7 10.3 8.4 8.1 9.3 10.7 9.9 10.2 10.5 10.8 10.7
Notes: House hit definition defined in Section 2.2.2. Dots denote hurricane event years not covered by the
2000-2016 sample.
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Table B.4: Variations in Post-Hurricane Indicators (Transaction Probability Model)
Pre-Hurricane Event Year
Hurricane -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Andrew92 . . . . . . . . . .
Opal95 . . . . . . . . . .
Earl98 . . . . . . . . . .
Georges98 . . . . . . . . . .
Irene99 . . . . . . . . . .
Charley04 . . . . . . 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Frances04 . . . . . . 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Jeanne04 . . . . . . 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Ivan04 . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dennis05 . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Katrina05 . . . . . 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Wilma05 . . . . . 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Hermine16 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Matthew16 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Irene17 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Total 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 5.8 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
Post-Hurricane Event Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Andrew92 . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.4 1.4
Opal95 . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Earl98 . . 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Georges98 . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Irene99 . 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Charley04 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Frances04 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Jeanne04 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Ivan04 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dennis05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Katrina05 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Wilma05 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Hermine16 0.1 . . . . . . . . . .
Matthew16 0.8 . . . . . . . . . .
Irene17 . . . . . . . . . . .
Total 7.3 9.6 9.9 9.9 9.9 10.2 10.2 10.2 11.6 11.6 11.6
Notes: Parcel hit definition described in Section 2.2.2. Dots denote hurricane event years not
covered by our 2000-2016 sample.
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Table B.5: Variations in Cat-3 Hurricane Indicators (Housing Price Model)
Pre-Hurricane Event Year
Hurricane -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Andrew92 . . . . . . . . . .
Opal95 . . . . . . . . . .
Earl98 . . . . . . . . . .
Georges98 . . . . . . . . . .
Irene99 . . . . . . . . . .
Charley04 . . . . . . . . . .
Frances04 . . . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Jeanne04 . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
Ivan04 . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dennis05 . . . . . . . . . .
Katrina05 . . . . . . . . . .
Wilma05 . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Hermine16 . . . . . . . . . .
Matthew16 . . . . . . . . . .
Irma17 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
Total 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8
Post-Hurricane Event Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Andrew92 . . . . . . . 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4
Opal95 . . . . . . . . . . .
Earl98 . . . . . . . . . . .
Georges98 . . . . . . . . . . .
Irene99 . . . . . . . . . . .
Charley04 . . . . . . . . . . .
Frances04 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Jeanne04 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Ivan04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dennis05 . . . . . . . . . . .
Katrina05 . . . . . . . . . . .
Wilma05 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
Hermine16 . . . . . . . . . . .
Matthew16 . . . . . . . . . . .
Irma17 . . . . . . . . . . .
Total 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
Notes: House hit definition described in Section 2.2.2. Dots denote hurricanes not reaching category 3
speeds in Florida or event years not covered by sample.
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Table B.6: The Impacts of Hurricanes on Prices and Transaction Probability (Event Study)
(1) (2) (3)
Price – Full Sample Price – Repeat Sales Probability – Full Sample
Event Time Year -6 -0.004 -0.02 -0.003
(0.04) (0.04) (0.002)
Event Time Year -5 0.002 -0.02 -0.004∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.002)
Event Time Year -4 -0.009 -0.02 -0.003
(0.03) (0.05) (0.002)
Event Time Year -3 -0.1 -0.03 -0.002
(0.1) (0.04) (0.002)
Event Time Year -2 -0.008 -0.03 -0.003
(0.03) (0.03) (0.002)
Event Time Year 0 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05 -0.009∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.004)
Event Time Year 1 0.1∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ -0.004∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.002)
Event Time Year 2 0.03 0.08∗∗∗ -0.005∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.003)
Event Time Year 3 0.02 0.03 -0.003∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.002)
Event Time Year 4 -0.03 0.01 -0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.002)
Event Time Year 5 -0.02 0.04 -0.0004
(0.02) (0.03) (0.001)
Event Time Year 6 -0.03 0.06∗ 0.004
(0.02) (0.04) (0.002)
Event Time Year 7 -0.01 0.05∗∗ -0.0006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.002)
Event Time Year 8 0.02 0.06∗∗∗ -0.0005
(0.04) (0.01) (0.002)
Event Time Year 9 -0.04 0.05∗∗∗ 0.0007
(0.03) (0.02) (0.001)
Event Time Year 10 -0.005 0.05∗∗ 0.0008
(0.01) (0.02) (0.001)
County-Year-Type FEs Yes Yes Yes
Month-Type FEs Yes Yes Yes
Tract FEs Yes
Parcel FEs Yes Yes
Hedonic Variables Yes Yes Yes
N 1,741,743 1,338,384 49,120,139
R2 0.61 0.78 0.086
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. The unit of analysis is a transaction in
columns (1)-(2), and a parcel-year in column (3). The hedonic variables include bins of number of stories and
number of bathrooms, lot size, house age, and effective age. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.7: The Impact of Hurricanes on Housing Prices (Diff-in-Diff)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Price) Full Sample Single Family Condominium Townhouse
Event Time Year 0-2 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.008) (0.02)
Age -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.005) (0.001)
Effective Age -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.004) (0.005)
Lot Size 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.0003 0.03∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.01)
County-Year-Type FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Type FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hedonic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,408,259 5,221,707 1,741,743 444,809
R2 0.56 0.55 0.61 0.60
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. The unit of analysis is a
transaction. The dependent variable is log transaction price. Other hedonic variables include the
number of stories and the number of bathrooms in bins. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.8: The Impact of Hurricanes on Transaction Probability (Diff-in-Diff)
(1) (2) (3)
Transaction Probability Single Family Condominium Townhouse
Event Time Year 0-2 -0.003 -0.02∗∗ -0.005∗
(0.003) (0.01) (0.002)
Effective Age -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.002∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.001)
Lot Size 0.00007∗∗ -0.00002 -0.0003
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0004)
County-Year-Type FEs Yes Yes Yes
Parcel FEs Yes Yes Yes
Hedonic Variables Yes Yes Yes
N 33,651,628 12,834,214 2,976,067
R2 0.087 0.083 0.097
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. The unit
of analysis is a parcel-year. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether a
transaction takes place that involves the given parcel in a given year.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.9: Differential Capitalization
Log(Price) Main Effect Hurricane Interaction
Event Time Year 0-2 0.0698∗
(0.0403)
Home Characteristics
House Age -0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Effec. House Age -0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗
(0.0009) (0.001)
One-Story -0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0165
(0.0193) (0.0159)
Lot Size (1000 sq. ft.) 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0006)
No. of Bathrooms 0.1692∗∗∗ -0.0355∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0128)
N 7,408,259
Within R2 0.11
Notes: This table reports the estimates from a single regression. The “Main Effect”
column reports the main effects of home characteristics on the price, and the “Hurricane
Interaction” column reports the effects of their interaction with the simplified DID
treatment indicator. The model controls for tract-type, month-type, and county-year-type
FEs. Standard errors are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.3 Determining Hurricane Exposure
B.3.1 Imputing Maximal Reach Radius of 96 Knots Wind Speed
In this section, we describe how we calculate the maximal reach radius associated with a
wind speed of 96 nautical miles per hour (kn). For each hurricane track point, we observe the
radii associated with a wind speed of 34, 50, and 64 kn. We estimate the relationship between the
maximal reach radii and wind speed using the following model:
log(Maxradiussht) = αht +β1Speed+β2Speed2+ εsht (B.1)
where αht are hurricane-track-point fixed effects and Speed (s) takes one of the three speed values
available. Note that instead of specifying the minimum pressure and maximum wind speed, we
choose to employ a set of fixed effects which absorb their variations. The relationship between a
wind speed threshold and its associated maximal radius is very well captured by this model as
suggested by its estimation’s R2 of 0.93 (0.90 within track-point fixed effects). The estimated
function is negative and concave, suggesting the radius decreases at an increasing rate when the
wind speed increases. Full results are reported in Table B.10.
Table B.10: Wind Speed and Maximal Reach Radius Model
log(Maxradius)
Speed -0.0224∗∗∗
(0.004)
Speed2 -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00004)
Hurricane-track-point FEs Yes
N 1188
R2 0.93
R2 (within) 0.90
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the hurricane-track-point level).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We use the estimates (including the track-point fixed effect) to predict the maximum radii
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for 96kn wind speeds at track points where the maximum sustained wind speed is actually above
96 kn. This procedure raises the typical concerns regarding out-of-sample predictions since 96
kn is not within the support of wind speeds used in the estimation. To address this concern, we
check the validity of our predictions by comparing them to the observed radius of the maximum
speed, which is provided in the Extended Best Track dataset. In particular, because the radius is
strictly decreasing in wind speed, our imputed radius should always be greater than (or equal to)
the radius of maximum speed in these cases. Our prediction satisfies this condition for over 90%
of imputations and is within rounding error (all radii measurements in the dataset are rounded to
the nearest 5 nautical miles) for 10 of the 13 extrapolations for which it fails. In these 13 cases,
we replace the model’s predicted maximal radius for 96 kn speeds with the wider observed radius
of the maximum speed reached.
B.3.2 Hurricane Track Interpolation and Exposure Calculation
In this section, we describe the procedure used to assign the exposure status of a house
to a hurricane, with the geometric relationships illustrated in Figure B.11. Suppose we want
to determine the exposure status of a house H1 to a hurricane, whose track is recorded in three
observations, P1, P2, and P3. At each track point, we observe the maximal reach radius r(·)
associated with 64 kn wind speed and the maximum wind speed v(·) at the center.
We take the following steps to calculate exposure:
1. We interpolate linearly between neighboring track points (P1→ P2, P2→ P3), and calculate
the distance from the house H1 to each linear segment. For instance, the distance between
H1 and P1–P2 is d(H1, I1), or the distance between H1 and its projection point I1.
2. We calculate key variables for each projection point by interpolating between the observed
track points. These variables are the 64 kn wind speed radius (denoted r(·)) and the center
wind speed (denoted v(·)). They are calculated as a weighted average of the observed
values associated with the two end points of the segment, weighted by inverse distances.
179
P1
P2
P3
H1
H2
H3
I1
I′1
I2
r(I1) d(H1, I1)
Figure B.11: Hurricane Track Interpolation
For example, the 64 kn wind speed for I1 is calculated using observed radii of P1 and P2 as
follows:
r(I1) =
d(I1,P2)
d(P1,P2)
r(P1)+
d(I1,P1)
d(P1,P2)
r(P2).
Similarly, v(I1) is calculated using v(P1) and v(P2):
v(I1) =
d(I1,P2)
d(P1,P2)
v(P1)+
d(I1,P1)
d(P1,P2)
v(P2)
3. We also calculate the distance of the house to each track point: d(H1,P1), d(H1,P2),
and d(H1,P3). We thus have a collection of points SH1 = {P1, I1,P2, I′1,P3} with their
corresponding distances to H1, 64 kn wind speed radius, and center wind speed. SH1
contains all possible points that might be the closest to H1 on the interpolated hurricane
track. We call it the potential exposure set.
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4. For each point inSH1 , we check two conditions: (1) whether H1 is within its 64 kn wind
speed radius (e.g. d(H1, I1)< r(I1)); (2) whether the center wind speed is above 64 kn (e.g.
v(I1 ≥ 64)). If both are satisfied for any point in SH1 , H1 is considered to be exposed to
this hurricane.1
Our approach takes care of two general cases where the house does not lie “inside” the
curve like H1: the potential exposure set of H2 consists of P1, P2, I2, and P3, while that of H3
consists of P1, P2, and P3. In practice, a hurricane track is observed in many more segments. We
pre-select the four segments closest to the house and perform the above procedure to all points
involved in those segments.
B.4 Zillow-HMDA Matching Procedure
We use the following procedure to match the HMDA data to transactions:
1. We first select the subset of HMDA loan applications that are (1) successful and (2) whose
purpose is purchase.
2. We create all possible pairs of observations from Zillow and HMDA with the same year,
census tract, and loan amount (in 1000s) using the “joinby” command in Stata. A small
percentage of lenders make multiple loans of the same amount in a single census tract every
year. If there also exist multiple Zillow records with these same characteristics, we drop all
such matches because we cannot infer the exact mapping between the multiple observations
on the two sides.
3. Lender names may be recorded differently across and even within Zillow and HMDA.
Extensive manual inspection has revealed some general patterns of mismatch. We apply
1In general, the radius will be zero or close to zero when the center wind speed does not reach 64 kn. The
small discrepancy comes from the linear change assumption. We take the conservative approach by requiring both
conditions.
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corresponding corrections to both datasets. For example, we replace acronyms such as
“FCU” and “NB” with their full forms (“Federal Credit Union” and “National Bank”).
4. We calculate the Jaccard similarity index for every pair of HMDA-Zillow observations
using the “matchit” command in Stata. This index indicates the extent of the overlap
between the strings containing the lenders’ names from both datasets.
5. We keep all pairs with their Jaccard similarity index above an acceptable threshold. The
threshold is chosen so that we observe it to produce the correct pairing in large random
subsamples chosen from every year in our data.
6. Finally, we drop all cases when a single HMDA record is joined to more than one transaction
in Zillow.
B.5 A Model on Income and Location Valuation
Our empirical results show that the average income of home buyers increases when the
housing stock is exogenously reduced by hurricanes. In this section, we examine the theoretical
implication of this finding for the underlying relationship between income and location preference
in a simple model. We also explore the role of credit constraint.
Suppose a location j has a fixed and homogeneous housing stock S j.2 Consider a
population of households with different income levels who might potentially live in location j.
Suppose the amenity value of location j to household i with income Yi takes the form
Vi j = α jYi+θi j. (B.2)
which consists of two components. The first component is income-related: α j is the correlation
between the amenity value of location j and household income. It can be positive, negative, or
2We assume a homogeneous housing stock for ease of notation. It is not essential for deriving our results and can
be relaxed.
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zero, depending on the characteristics of location j. The second component, θi j, is household-
specific and orthogonal to income. We also assume it is bounded: θi j ∈ [θ,θ].
Denote the equilibrium housing price as p∗j . Household i would buy a house here if and
only if Vi j ≥ p∗j . The equilibrium is characterized by demand being exactly equal to the fixed
housing stock:
S j =∑
i
1(Vi j ≥ p∗j). (B.3)
Equation (B.3) implies that p∗j(S j)< 0 is a decreasing function: the larger the housing stock, the
lower the price. In addition, the average income of buyers in the equilibrium is given by
Yj
∗ ≡ E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Vi j ≥ p∗j]. (B.4)
Consider an exogenous shock that decreases the stock of housing, such as a hurricane.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (without credit constraint) If Yj
∗ increases when S j decreases, then α j > 0.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose α j < 0, then
Yj
∗
(S j)≡ E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Vi j ≥ p∗j(S j)]
= E
[
Yi
∣∣∣α jYi+θi j ≥ p∗j(S j)],
= E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Yi ≤ θi j− p∗j(S j)−α j
]
where the second equality follows by substituting in Equation (B.2). Suppose the housing stock
is decreased by ∆S. In order to maintain the relationship depicted in Equation (B.3), we have
p∗j(S j−∆S)> p∗j(S j). It follows that
Yj
∗
(S j−∆S) = E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Yi ≤ θi j− p∗j(S j−∆S)−α j
]
≤ E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Yi ≤ θi j− p∗j(S j)−α j
]
= Y j
∗
(S j),
which contradicts the assumption.
Suppose α j = 0, then Equation (B.4) is reduced to
Yj
∗ ≡ E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Vi j ≥ p∗j(S j)]= E[Yi∣∣∣θi j ≥ p∗j(S j)]= E[Yi]
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because θi j is orthogonal to Yi. In this case, market adjustment will be associated with no change
in average buyer income. Contradiction.
We now consider the case with credit constraints, where household i are only able to buy
a house worth up to cYi and c is a positive constant. This is consistent with the two main forms of
credit constraints often studied in the literature, where the mortgage limit is proportional to the
household income, and up to a percentage of the house value (Greenwald, 2018). In this case, the
equilibrium price is characterized by
S j =∑
i
1(p∗j ≤min(Vi j,cYi)) (B.5)
We then have the following proposition that relaxes the requirement of α j > 0 and is still able to
generate the negative relationship between housing stock and average buyer income:
Proposition 2. (with credit constraint) Suppose households are subject to a credit constraint so
that they can only buy a house worth up to cYi, where c > 0.
1. If α j ≥ 0, then Yi∗ increases as S j decreases.
2. If−c< α j < 0, there exist S and S such that, when S j ∈ (S,S), Yi∗ increases as S j decreases.
(When S j < S, no transaction is possible. When S j > S, the credit constraint is not binding
for anyone.)
Proof. Suppose α j > 0. The average buyer income is given by
Yj
∗
(S j)≡ E
[
Yi
∣∣∣p∗j(S j)≤min(Vi j,cYi)]
= E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Yi ≥max( p∗j(S j)−θi jα j , p
∗
j(S j)
c
)]
< E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Yi ≥max( p∗j(S j−∆S)−θi jα j , p
∗
j(S j−∆S)
c
)]
= Yj
∗
(S j−∆S).
The strict inequality follows from
max
( p∗j(S j)−θi j
α j
,
p∗j(S j)
c
)
< max
( p∗j(S j−∆S)−θi j
α j
,
p∗j(S j−∆S)
c
)
.
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Suppose α j = 0. Then we have
Yj
∗
(S j)≡ E
[
Yi
∣∣∣p∗j(S j)≤min(θi j,cYi)]
= E
[
E
[
Yi|p∗j(S j)≤ cYi
]∣∣∣p∗j(S j)≤ θi j]
= E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Yi ≥ p∗j(S j)c ]
< E
[
Yi
∣∣∣Yi ≥ p∗j(S j−∆S)c ]
= Yj
∗
(S j−∆S).
The equality in the third row holds because θi j is orthogonal to Yi.
Suppose −c < α j < 0. We define S and S as follows:
p∗j(S) =
cθ
c−α j ; p
∗
j(S) =
cθ
c−α j .
For any S j ∈ (S,S), marginal buyers at equilibrium price p∗j(S j) have average income defined by:
Y j|p∗j(S j) = E
[
Yi
∣∣∣ p∗j(S j)
c
≤ Yi ≤
θ− p∗j(S j)
−α j
]
.
Then we have
dYj|p∗j(S j)
dS j
=
p∗′j
c
f
( p∗j
c
)
− p
∗′
j
−α j f
(θ− p∗j
−α j
)
> 0,
where f (·) is the density function of income assumed to follow a uniform distribution here. We
can replace this assumption with f (·) being bounded on both sides while also change the range of
negative values that α j can take.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Additional Figures
Figure C.1: Example of an ActBlue Donation
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Figure C.2: Distribution of Individual ActBlue Donation Amounts
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.1: FEMA Disaster Declarations, 1990-2012
Type # Disasters # County-Year Obs.
Coastal Storm 18 402
Drought 5 178
Fire 785 2,535
Flood 178 3,198
Freezing 6 127
Hurricane 233 7,680
Severe Ice Storm 44 1,566
Severe Storm(s) 738 13,187
Snow 126 2,745
Tornado 41 480
Tsunami 3 9
Typhoon 29 69
Total 2,206 32,176
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Table C.2: Predicting Total Democratic Donations Using ActBlue Donations
Dep. Var. Amount Number
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ActBlue 85.33∗∗∗ 14.67∗∗∗
(5.63) (1.30)
ActBlue × 2006 209.93∗∗∗ 32.58∗∗∗
(24.98) (8.14)
ActBlue × 2008 99.09∗∗∗ 21.95∗∗∗
(6.14) (2.97)
ActBlue × 2010 57.51∗∗∗ 12.15∗∗∗
(6.32) (2.44)
ActBlue × 2012 111.23∗∗∗ 14.63∗∗∗
(6.55) (1.00)
Observations 200 200 200 200
R2 0.74 0.86 0.83 0.88
Notes: the above table includes point estimates from various O.L.S.
regressions of the amount and number of donations to Democrats from
all sources, to the amount and donations from ActBlue sources. All
regressions include an intercept term. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.3: Positive and Negative Temperature Shocks on ActBlue Contributions
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. Count/1M pop Avg. amount
T maxDev+c,w 0.274
∗∗∗ −0.070
(0.098) (0.052)
T maxDev+c,w−1 0.110
∗∗∗ −0.075
(0.029) (0.059)
T maxDev+c,w−2 0.165
∗∗∗ 0.072
(0.041) (0.059)
T maxDev+c,w−3 0.173
∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗
(0.037) (0.042)
T maxDev+c,w−4 0.124
∗∗∗ −0.035
(0.033) (0.039)
T maxDev−c,w 0.015 −0.096
(0.031) (0.059)
T maxDev−c,w−1 −0.095 0.003
(0.074) (0.039)
T maxDev−c,w−2 0.070
∗ −0.041
(0.041) (0.051)
T maxDev−c,w−3 0.036 −0.175∗∗
(0.032) (0.075)
T maxDev−c,w−4 0.029 0.031
(0.031) (0.060)
N 935,201 935,201
R2 0.204 0.054
Mean D.V. 15.40 13.19
County F.E. Yes Yes
Week F.E. Yes Yes
State-cycle F.E. Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (C.1) are shown. The dependent variable
in column (1) is the number of ActBlue contributions per 1 million population.
The dependent variable in column (2) is the average amount per ActBlue
contribution. The sample consists of ActBlue contributions by week and
county. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by county.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: The Effect of Extreme Temperature Events on ActBlue Contributions
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. Count/1M pop Avg. amount
T maxHighc,w 0.353∗ −0.043
(0.183) (0.138)
T maxHighc,w−1 0.211∗∗ 0.058
(0.092) (0.187)
T maxHighc,w−2 0.224∗∗∗ 0.215
(0.082) (0.211)
T maxHighc,w−3 0.277∗∗ −0.058
(0.135) (0.126)
T maxHighc,w−4 0.010 −0.032
(0.159) (0.125)
T maxLowc,w −1.020∗∗∗ −0.318
(0.368) (0.229)
T maxLowc,w−1 −0.641∗ 0.176
(0.336) (0.183)
T maxLowc,w−2 −0.083 −0.063
(0.188) (0.211)
T maxLowc,w−3 −0.315∗ −0.140
(0.187) (0.220)
T maxLowc,w−4 −0.372∗∗ 0.442
(0.170) (0.368)
N 936,954 936,954
R2 0.203 0.054
Mean D.V. 15.40 13.19
County F.E. Yes Yes
Week F.E. Yes Yes
State-cycle F.E. Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (C.2) are shown. The dependent variable
in column (1) is the number of ActBlue contributions per 1 million population.
The dependent variable in column (2) is the average amount per ActBlue
contribution. The sample consists of ActBlue contributions by week and county.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by county.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.5: Heterogeneous Effects Across Quarters in Election Cycle
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Count/1M pop Avg. amount Amount/1M pop
T maxDev2Wc,w ×
Q1 (Dec-Feb) –0.114∗∗ 0.401∗ –1.901
(0.049) (0.241) (4.431)
Q2 (Mar-May) 0.183∗∗ 0.086 –4.271
(0.072) (0.158) (4.233)
Q3 (Jun-Aug) 0.681∗∗∗ –0.273∗∗∗ –3.407
(0.093) (0.078) (5.062)
Q4 (Sep-Nov) 0.200∗∗∗ 0.054 2.314
(0.051) (0.062) (4.076)
Q5 (Dec-Feb) 0.324∗∗∗ –0.077 ∗ 14.826∗
(0.073) (0.046) (7.697)
Q6 (Mar-May) 0.010 0.142∗∗ –2.968
(0.063) (0.055) (4.634)
Q7 (Jun-Aug) 0.023 0.223∗∗ 8.640
(0.131) (0.095) (7.540)
Q8 (Sep-Nov) 1.256∗∗ –0.795∗∗∗ 31.664∗
(0.596) (0.126) (18.835)
N 941,672 941,672 941,672
R2 0.209 0.054 0.073
Mean D.V. 15.40 13.19 639.65
County F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Week F.E. Yes Yes Yes
State-cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (C.4) are shown, which allows the estimates to differ by
quarter-in-cycle. The dependent variable in column (1) is the number of ActBlue contributions
per 1 million population. The dependent variable in column (2) is the average amount per
ActBlue contribution. The dependent variable in column (3) is the ActBlue contribution amount
per 1 million population. The sample consists of ActBlue contributions by week and county.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by county. ∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.6: The Effects of Extreme Temperature on Amount Raised ($1,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Total Total (PAC) Total (Ind.) Challenger Incumbent Share (C)
Hot -106.4 -6.998 -56.97 -28.24 -78.15 0.00160
(137.8) (29.85) (92.21) (78.99) (83.71) (0.0187)
LCV -75.00 -21.50 37.19 -121.5 46.53 -0.0269
(257.1) (40.37) (210.4) (97.15) (192.8) (0.0232)
Hot × LCV 123.5 0.871 65.81 12.90 110.6 0.00538
(231.0) (52.98) (157.6) (108.9) (153.7) (0.0277)
Cold -43.86 0.333 -18.95 -28.16 -15.70 -0.00420
(117.2) (22.41) (91.79) (78.13) (61.89) (0.0136)
Cold × LCV 92.25 -23.10 85.53 22.17 70.08 -0.0122
(154.3) (34.22) (129.0) (93.32) (91.45) (0.0178)
Observations 3299 3299 3299 3299 3299 3299
R2 0.411 0.531 0.386 0.259 0.456 0.285
Mean D.V. 1535.8 535.7 823.8 405.6 1130.2 0.196
Cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
C.D. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (3.4) are shown. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is
the amount of money raised in an election cycle from different sources in a given district, expressed
in thousands of dollars. The dependent variable in column (6) is the share of total funds raised by the
challengers. The sample includes competitive elections. Standard errors are clustered at the State level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.7: The Effects of Extreme Temperature on the Number of Donors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Total Challenger Incumbent Share (C)
Hot -204.2 -170.8∗∗ -33.37 -0.0114
(125.7) (76.48) (94.47) (0.0219)
LCV -342.7 116.7 -459.4 0.0225
(371.5) (171.5) (285.3) (0.0250)
Hot × LCV 476.0 230.6 245.4 0.00832
(311.7) (197.1) (188.0) (0.0369)
Cold 28.87 -33.83 62.70 0.00152
(242.4) (91.73) (179.7) (0.0171)
Cold × LCV -16.09 7.949 -24.03 -0.0145
(351.2) (137.7) (254.6) (0.0344)
Observations 3299 3299 3299 3299
R2 0.296 0.217 0.320 0.282
Mean D.V. 862.6 288.2 574.4 0.208
Cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
C.D. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (3.4) are shown. The dependent
variable in columns (1)-(3) is the number of donors in an election cycle
from different sources in a given district. The dependent variable in
column (4) is the share of total donors corresponding to the challengers.
The sample includes competitive elections. Standard errors are clustered
at the State level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.8: The Effects of Extreme Temperature on Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competitive Unopposed Open Seat Incumbent victory
Hot -0.0574∗ 0.0516∗ 0.00582 0.00733
(0.0289) (0.0294) (0.0181) (0.0138)
LCV -0.0144 -0.0220 0.0364 0.0732∗
(0.0467) (0.0492) (0.0310) (0.0385)
Hot × LCV 0.0568 -0.0608 0.00397 -0.0197
(0.0411) (0.0374) (0.0309) (0.0278)
Cold 0.0245 -0.00792 -0.0166 0.0124
(0.0292) (0.0260) (0.0167) (0.0145)
Cold × LCV -0.0722 0.0622 0.0101 -0.00588
(0.0545) (0.0448) (0.0314) (0.0208)
Observations 4478 4478 4478 4095
R2 0.166 0.231 0.103 0.169
Mean D.V. 0.737 0.178 0.0855 0.948
Cycle F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
C.D. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: point estimates from equation (3.4) are shown. The dependent variable in
columns (1)-(3) is the probability of a congressional race being of a certain type (com-
petitive, unopposed, open seat). The dependent variable in column (4) is the probability
that the incumbent is re-elected. Columns (1)-(3) include all elections and column (4)
excludes open seat elections. Standard errors are clustered at the State level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.3 Additional Specifications in the Short-Run Analysis
As shown in Section 3.3.1, our main estimating equation takes the form
Ycw = γ′Weathercw+δw+δc+δse+ εcw.
Specifications for Table 3.2:
– Columns (1) and (4):
Weathercw = [T maxDevcw,PrcpDevcw]T .
– Columns (2) and (5):
Weathercw = [T maxDevcw, ...,T maxDevc,w−4,PrcpDevcw, ...,PrcpDevc,w−4]T .
– Columns (3) and (6):
Weathercw = [T maxDev
2W
c,w,PrcpDev
2W
c,w]
T
where
T maxDev2Wc,w =
1
2
(T maxDevcw+T maxDevc,w−1)
PrcpDev2Wc,w =
1
2
(PrcpDevcw+PrcpDevc,w−1).
Specification for Table C.3:
Weathercw = [T maxDev+cw, ...,T maxDev
+
c,w−4,T maxDev
−
cw, ...,T maxDev
−
c,w−4,
PrcpDevcw, ...,PrcpDevc,w−4]T
(C.1)
where T maxDev+ = T maxDev× (T maxDev > 0) and T maxDev− = |T maxDev|× (T maxDev <
0). This specification allows us to estimate the effects of positive and negative deviations
separately.
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Specification for Table C.4:
Weathercw = [T maxHighcw, ...,T maxHighc,w−4,T maxLowcw, ...,T maxLowc,w−4,
PrcpDevcw, ...,PrcpDevc,w−4]T ,
(C.2)
where T maxHighcw is the total number of days in week w when the maximum temperature
exceeds 95th percentile of the historical distribution in the month, and T maxLowcw counts days
with temperature below the 5th percentile.
Specification for Table 3.3:
Ycw =β1T maxDev
2W
c,w +β2IncChar+β3T maxDev
2W
c,w× IncChar+
γPrcpDev2Wc,w +δw+δc+δse+ εcw,
(C.3)
where T maxDev2Wc,w and PrcpDev
2W
c,w are defined as above. IncChar is a measure that characterizes
the environmental stance of the incumbents associated with a county. Our coefficient of interest is
β3, which shows how the effects of weather shocks vary according to the incumbent characteristic.
Specification for Figure 3.2 and Table C.5:
Ycw =
8
∑
t=1
βtT maxDev
2W
c,w×Qt + γPrcpDev2Wc,w +δw+δc+δse+ εcw, (C.4)
where T maxDev2Wc,w and PrcpDev
2W
c,w are defined as above. Qt is a set of eight indicators for
quarters in the election cycle. This specification allows us to obtain a separate estimate for each
quarter-in-cycle.
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